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The governance of migration as a ‘crisis’ in the context of EUrope forces us to rethink 
the ways in which strategies of (b)ordering are being deployed to maintain relations 
between borders and migrants. By considering (b)ordering, biopolitics and survival, this 
thesis aims to frame practices and discourses that limit migrants’ political potential. 
Migrants are confronted with (im)mobilities that (b)order their conditions to mere 
survival, life with death. Survival here epitomises this process of (b)ordering as the result 
of what (bio)politics considers relevant for administering ‘life’ and modes of governing 
that reduce migrants’ lives to mere survival. Through the production of migrants as 
surviving bodies - remnants in excess, as securitised and (de)humanised bodies inserted 
in continuous and overlapping processes of (b)ordering - this work follows migrants’ 
journeys with the aim of punctuating not just mobilities in space, or highlight multiple 
ways of (b)ordering, but also to provide a reading of ‘affirmative’ survival that accounts 
for migrants’ resistance. From the Mediterranean Sea to Rome and Calais, the realism of 
borders is confronted with modes of governing migrants that aim to reduce them to lives 
that should (only) survive, therefore delimiting their political engagements to it. As 
survival itself is a form of resistance, migrants’ struggles to life will be rearticulated 
through the language of the politics of perseverance as life as politics. The thesis argues 
that while (b)orderings aim to reduce life to minimal forms of survival, migrants, and 
their alliances with aid workers, and indirectly artists, have the potential to rearticulate 
life otherwise, bringing their ‘lived experienced’ to the core of life as politics. These 
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In Death and Life (fig.1) the symbolist painter Gustav Klimt addresses the cycle of human 
life. While entangled in this cycle, death and life are depicted in the painting as 
irremediably distinct. To the left, we see a grim reaper that is the personification of death, 
covered in a robe with crosses. To the right, we see life that is nurtured and fructifies 
through the figures of a mother and a child, an old woman, a loving couple and four 
women who all lay down on a flowered bed.2 Both death and life are somehow treated in 
the painting as possessing univocal functions: death watches and awaits for life at a 
certain distance while human beings flourish in life. Death and life are depicted by Klimt 
 
1 Klimt G., Death and Life, Leopold Museum, Vienna, Austria: 






as being reconciliatory, harmoniously coexisting by being located at the antipodes of our 
existence. This general representation of life and death that exist as fixed and separated, 
seems to be inadequate for thinking about how life and death interact: functions of life 
and death in Klimt’s painting do not account for how life is governed with death.  
This painting helps us introduce one of the main points of this thesis, namely the 
rethinking of biopolitical processes of (b)ordering life and death (and life in death) as 
those of life with death within the context of border/migration management in EUrope.3 
Starting from the Foucauldian framework of biopolitics and departing from the ‘making 
live/letting die’ of the binary biopolitical formula, this thesis aims to bring to the fore a 
more complex reading of (b)ordering. By considering the relationship between 
biopolitical life and politically engaged life in the making of borders and the management 
of migration, this thesis argues that modes of governing inclusive of a wide range of 
practices of surveillance/exclusion and biopolitical forms of control4 to the point that 
“sovereign power [..] circulates within biopower” are only one part of the story.5 
Sovereign power and biopower have two different referent objects: the first one is more 
concerned with how to contain life processes while the second aspires to expand them but 
only for some subjects to the detriment of others. Sovereign and biopolitical power are 
understood as productive and destructive processes that regulate life with death 
conjugating processes of survival.  
Complex processes of survival as a product of (b)ordering, however, cannot be 
conceptualised only through the logic of sovereignty, that of the exception, the camp or 
bare life but need to be considered in the framework of more nuanced politics.6 What 
 
3 Throughout the thesis I refer to the political and geographical space of the European Union as EUrope.  
4 See Topak E. O., ‘The Biopolitical Border in Practice: Surveillance and Death at the Greece-Turkey Borderzones’, 
Environment and Planning D: Society and Space (2014), 32(5), 815-33, 816; Debrix F., Barder A. D. (2013) Beyond 
Biopolitics: Theory, Violence and Horror in World Politics (Abingdon: Routledge). 
5 Butler J. (2004) Precarious Life: The Power of Mourning and Violence (Verso Books) qtd in De Larrinaga M., Doucet 
M. G., ‘Sovereign Power and the Biopolitics of Human Security’, Security Dialogue (2008), 39(5), 517-37, 519.  





counts as biopolitics should not be regarded simply as post-sovereign mechanisms of 
governance7 but as renewed spaces in which life for certain people is administered with 
death through multiple means of control/circulation/containment. In order to account for 
these processes of survival, this thesis does not aim to trace the historical roots of 
biopower and sovereign power, explain their respective function in detail or fully engage 
with the concept of biopolitics, but it attempts to rethink the effects of (b)ordering through 
discourses and practices by making connections about biopolitical rationales and modes 
of governance. Techniques of governance, in fact, go hand in hand with the erection of 
new boundaries.8 These new boundaries are being drawn by the emergence of ways of 
governing forms of life with forms of death, not as thanatopolitics or through the more 
general idea of death as necropolitics, but as something in between extremes, as a 
(b)ordering strategy that that allows mere survival.  
In Remnants of Auschwitz: The Witness and the Archive, Agamben takes as starting 
point the condition of life in the camp in order to better explain the kind of caesura that 
biopower determines. In the Nazi camp the effects of absolute biopower are exemplified 
by the figure of the Muselmann (literally “the Muslim”) who represents what is being let 
to exist in the context of its imminent annihilation. Agamben describes the Muselmann 
as the perfect cypher of the camp as it embodies the negation of humanity at its fullest. 
The paradoxical ethical situation of the Muselmann, that effectively ceases to be human 
while existing as a biological entity, is deployed by Agamben as a figure of analysis, one 
that makes visible death through the biological continuation of survival.9 According to 
Agamben, survivability is what defines twentieth-century biopolitics: “the decisive 
activity of biopower in our time consists in the production not of life and death, but rather 
 
7 See Coleman M., Grove K., ‘Biopolitics, Biopower and the Return of Sovereignty’, Environment and Planning D: 
Society and Space (2009), 27(3), 489-507. 
8 Ansems de Vries L. (2015) Re-imagining a Politics of Life. From Governance of Order to Politics of Movement 
(London: Rowan & Littlefield International), 71. 
9 Agamben G., (translated by Heller-Roazen D.) (1999) Remnants of Auschwitz: The Witness and the Archive (Zone 




of a mutable and virtually infinite survival”.10 Survival is framed by Agamben as another 
mechanism of power that puts life in a limbo for the time needed to its annihilation.11 The 
Muselmann embodies the actualisation of the supreme ambition of biopower: the point in 
which the prisoner becomes the Muselmann is identified by Agamben as a point where 
death cannot be called death as the very humanity of a man disappears as only appears 
through the body.12  
Theoretically, Agamben identifies a crucial ambiguity with the verb ‘to survive’ 
(from the latin supervivo “that indicates the person/thing with respect to which there is 
survival”) as “it implies the reference to something or someone that is survived [but also 
it makes explicit that] the one who survives and the person to whom something survives 
coincide”.13 He identifies two different ways of approaching survival. On the one hand, 
“survival designates the pure and simple continuation of bare life with respect to the truer 
and more human life” (Bettelheim),14  on the other hand, it “refers to the person who, in 
fighting against death, has survived the human” (Des Pres).15 In the context of the Nazi 
camp, ultimately, Agamben relies on Foucault’s conceptualisation of 20th century 
biopolitics as make survive to complicate the binarism which opposes the old sovereign 
and territorial power expressed through make die and let live, and the modern biopower 
of make live and let die.16 
In other words, the idea of survival as a continuation of bare life, what I refer to as 
life in death, needs to be rethought outside the absolute extremes of the Nazi camp in 
order to put into focus the more generalised biopolitical borders that it creates.17 Mere 
 
10 Ibid., 155. 
11 Agamben G. (2000) Means Without End: Notes on politics (Theory Out of Bounds) (University of Minnesota Press), 
8. 
12 Agamben G., Remnants of Auschwitz, 84-5, 70. 
13 Ibid.,132. 
14 Bettelheim B. (1979) Surviving and other essays (New York: Knopf) qtd in Agamben G., Remnants of Auschwitz., 
133.  
15 Des Pres T. (1966) The Survivor: An Anatomy of Life in the Death Camp (New York: Washington Square Press), qtd 
in Agamben G., Remnants of Auschwitz, 133. 
16 Ibid., 155 
17 Vaughan-Williams N., ‘The generalised biopolitical border? Re-conceptualising the limits of sovereign power’, 




survival is considered in the thesis as a product of processes of (b)ordering that makes up 
subjects whose survival is intertwined with modes of governance that reduce migrants’ 
lives. Migrants are thought to be surviving bodies as effect of biopolitical (b)ordering but 
also the product of more complex relationships between ontological and epistemological 
articulations of the ‘human’ and practices and discourses that securitise them. To begin 
with, this work substantially departs from Agamben’s analysis of the camp, survival and 
bare life with the attempt of foregrounding a more dynamic and less deterministic 
interpretation of how life interacts with death in survival. Contrary to Agamben’s analysis 
of biopolitical survival as the point in which life and death coincide as life in death, 
survival is considered in the thesis as the point at which life is made to coexist with death 
in a condition that is not as extreme as the one of the camps, its difficulties 
notwithstanding.  
Tazzioli and Aradau identify three different paths that have been developed in relation 
to the conceptualisation of biopolitics18. These literatures have (1) supplemented, (2) 
specified or (3) displaced the concept of biopolitics.  
(1) Firstly, many authors have attempted to supplement accounts of biopolitics by 
exposing the co-constitution of life and death through concepts such as 
thanatopolitics and necropolitics by reading “life as subjugated to death”.19 
Otherwise, life and death have been opposed through a vital/negative dualism 
raising criticism about their accuracy when representing the governing of 
migration in the European Union.20  
(2) A second approach has highlighted the necessity to make the concept of 
biopolitics less general by distinguishing it from the politics of life. These authors 
 
18 Tazzioli M., Aradau C., ‘Biopolitics Multiple: Migration, Extraction, Subtraction’, Millennium: Journal of 
International Studies (2019), 00(0), 1-23, 7-10.  
19 Agamben G. (translated by Daniel Heller-Roazen) (1995) Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life (Stanford 
University Press, 1998); Mbembe A., ‘Necropolitics’, Public Culture (Winter 2003), 15(1), 11-40. 





have not altered the concept of biopolitics per se but worked toward specifying 
how it needs to be distinguished from other interventions on life.21 
(3)  Lastly, Tazzioli and Aradau identify a third engagement with the limits of 
biopolitics, one that aims to displace it in order to approach it in the context of 
neoliberal capitalism and racialisation.22  
The contribution that this thesis aims to make can be situated in the interstices of different 
forms of critical engagements with biopolitics as I aim to rethink not the concept of 
biopolitics itself but the heterogenous ways of governing migrants’ lives through 
(b)ordering and the limitations of (b)ordering itself. The thesis mobilises the concept of 
biopolitics in order to reveal a rationale of governing ‘life’ that accounts only for basic 
survival. As such, I depart from Foucault’s formulas making live/letting die and making 
die/letting live to consider ways of (b)ordering that do not simply involve making death, 
but that reduce people to live with it. In particular, I am interested to highlight a more 
complex view of modes of governing migration that account for (b)ordering as 
overlapping strategies for ensuring migrants mere survival. In my reading, the 
relationship between life and death needs to be supplemented by a more complex 
approach that accounts for degrees of living and dying. These degrees produce subjects 
whose life is governed without ‘letting’ them die. Analyses of the different ways in which 
the function of death works as a function of life are to be revisited through modes of 
governance that recognise survival as the new (bio)political limit of (im)mobility.23 In 
this process of rethinking the effects of (b)ordering, biopolitics is mobilised to reveal the 
 
21 Fassin D. (2018) Life: A Critical User’s Manual (Polity Press). 
22 See Howell A., Richter-Montpetit M., ‘Racism in Foucauldian Security Studies: Biopolitics, Liberal War, and the 
Whitewashing of Colonial and Racial Violence’, International Political Sociology (2018), 13(1), 1-19; Lemke T., 
‘Biopolitics and Beyond. On the Reception of a Vital Foucauldian Notion’. Available at: 
https://transmediji.files.wordpress.com/2013/03/biopolitics_and_beyond_thomas-lemke.pdf [accessed 27 February 
2020].  
23 Throughout the thesis (im)mobility is deployed as a key concept that accounts at once for the ways in which migrants 
are made mobile but also immobilised. As a political concept, (im)mobility captures the liminality (b)ordering migrants 
to (only) survive by promoting both a calculated autonomy and control. Ultimately, (im)mobility aims to make 




limits of processes that, ultimately, reduce migrants to mere survival and, more broadly, 
expose ‘life’ as a method of containment that is voided of political relevance. (B)ordering 
understood as a technology for dividing and ordering lives, generates modes of abjection 
that normalise both life and death and the possibility of a life that needs to be just 
preserved. 
Redfield talks about “minimalist biopolitics” to highlight situations in which “the 
political dynamic emerging from situations of life and death contracts into an attenuated 
form focused on survival”.24 According to Redfield, the political concern for life 
encompasses “destruction” when it aims at assisting populations by maintaining their 
physical existence, even when such efforts do not lead to more than ensuring that the bare 
minimum is provided.25 The temporary administration of survival becomes a priority for 
humanitarian actors who intervene to maintain people alive. However, I suggest that 
survival needs to be treated as a specific mode of governing that informs practices where 
people are kept closer to both life and death, to live with death, as a function of what 
biopolitical life renders necessary. Returning to Klimt’s painting, we can then say that his 
symbolic representation of life and death as vital but separate components of the 
harmonious circle of human life is disrupted by the ways of governing life we have just 
examined. Focusing on survival means to recognise how processes of (b)ordering reduce 
some forms of lives and allow life and death to ‘touch each other’, coexisting but never 
fully coinciding. At the same time however, one could also observe that despite the 
ominous presence of death, the figures which represent life get on with their lives and, 
through multiple contortions, negotiate and renegotiate their positions and roles. These 
renegotiations will be discussed in particular in the last three chapters which will focus 
on humanitarian activists, migrants, and artists in order to demonstrate the importance of 
 





establishing alliances which contribute to nurture and create a more fulfilled and fulfilling 
(political) life. 
 
Borders, (B)ordering and Migration  
 
 
“The spectacle of mass movement draws attention inevitably to the borders, the porous places, the 
vulnerable points where one's concept of home is seen as being menaced by foreigners. Much of the 
alarm hovering at the borders, the gates, is stoked, it seems to me, by (1) both the threat and the promise 
of globalism and (2) an uneasy relationship with our own foreignness, our own rapidly disintegrating 
sense of belonging”  
Toni Morrison26  
 
 
“I stood at the border, I stood at the edge and claimed it as central.  




There is something particularly evocative in the words with which Toni Morrison 
describes both the eternal fixation of borders on identity-making, and the need to 
decentralise them following those who challenge their own (b)ordering from the centre. 
These words seem to speak directly to the fabric of everyday life that places the borders 
of the nation state at the centre of relationships of (b)ordering: we ‘stand at the border’ 
but we also ‘move over to where the border is not supposed to be’. The question of what 
borders are, often signifies what borders do, but this relationship changes when borders 
are stretched beyond the edges of territorial states through (b)ordering. In What is a 
Border? Manlio Graziano considers the return of borders in the international context. By 
providing a geopolitical mapping of the history of borders, Graziano considers how today 
borders are still relevant not because they are what we currently need, but because their 
existence is inescapable.28 While Graziano focuses on particular border sites, he insists 
that as political objects of conflict and contact, borders need to be considered from a 
 
26 Morrison T. (2019) The Source of Self-Regard: Selected Essays, Speeches, and Meditations (Alfred A. Knopf), 5-6. 
27 Morrison T., Interview with Jana Wendt (1998). Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DQ0mMjII22I 
[accessed 27 February 2020].  




dynamic point of view: as products of history; as means and not an end; as institutions of 
the state.29  
This thesis starts from the conditions of the present,30 and regards borders as means 
of the state, and a starting point for rethinking functions of (b)ordering as more than 
dividing lines that specify life and ways of living. What borders are and do, therefore, 
changes according to who encounters, crosses and resists them.31 As the invention of 
borders historically proceeded with the invention of the nation, sovereignty is today being 
reconfigured as exceeding the territorial limits of its “imagined communities”.32 As such, 
the political idea of borders as mechanism of ideological, legal, economic and 
identitiarian exclusion is maintained as possible only through means of re-
territorialisation.33 It can be argued then that the “borderless world” imagined by Ohmae 
at the end of the 1990s is today nothing more than a speculative thought of those times.34 
Far from disappearing, the physical borders of sovereign states are not becoming obsolete 
per se, but they are morphing into processes that contain, control and follow movements 
of people. Most importantly, as we will see throughout this thesis, these borders today do 
not only serve the purpose of dividing territories but, as Thomas Nail reminds us, they re-
arrange social motion by distributing kinetic surplus.35 Borders can then take different 
shapes, from the fence to the wall, from the checkpoint to the frontier, none of which can 
answer the more elusive concept of what a border is. From classic realist ideas of borders 
that mark the limits of sovereign jurisdiction to manifest the intelligibility of power (and 
 
29 Ibid., 3-4. 
30 This differs from Foucault’s genealogical approach interested in presenting a ‘history of the present’ by re-valuating 
contemporary phenomena and putting them in perspective. While studies of migration have been criticised for being 
too rooted in the present, therefore erasing historical process, this thesis maintains thought rooted in historical practices 
but questions present dynamics of governance in order to situate political rationalities that are considered to be always 
in the making. To understand Foucault’s genealogic inquiry, see Garland D., ‘What is a “history of the present”? On 
Foucault’s genealogies and their critical preconditions’, Punishment & Society (2014), 16(4), 365-84.  
31 Salter M. B., “The Global Visa Regime and the Political Technologies of the International Self: Borders, Bodies, 
Biopolitics”, Alternatives (2006), 31, 167-89. 
32 Anderson B. (1983) Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism (Verso, 2006).  
33 According to Deleuze and Guattari deterritorializations are always accompanied by reterritorialisation that is how 
power re-designs itself through space. See Deleuze G., Guattari F. (1988) A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and 
Schizophrenia, (trans. Brian Massumi, London: Athlone). 
34 Ohmae K. (1990) The Borderless World: Power and Strategy in the Interlinked Economy (Harper Business, 1999). 




purity) of nations, we are increasingly confronted with ways of (b)ordering that aim not 
to mark the limiting potential of borders but to expand their functions. These functions 
extend to “discourses of truths”36 about what borders are and do, therefore remapping 
where borders can be found.  
As Balibar convincingly noticed, “borders have a polysemic nature” and are 
“dispersed a little everywhere […] wherever the movement of information, people and 
things is happening and is controlled”. 37 Since the 1980s, as Brambilla has argued, critical 
border studies has experienced a “processual turn” where borders as given and almost 
naturalised entities began to be questioned and delinked from the univocal territorial logic 
of states.38 This shift was followed by a rethinking of (b)ordering processes as multiple 
and mobile so that the forms and functions of borders no longer coincided with their 
physical location.39 This “everywhere” of borders translates today into processes of 
(b)ordering that are mutually reinforcing: if the border is ubiquitous, then its effects need 
to be felt everywhere too.40 In discussing what borders do, therefore, this work makes a 
conceptual shift that accounts for different processes of (b)ordering. Located at the 
intersection between the political and the sociocultural, (b)ordering is a process that is 
continuously happening by maintaining social order connected with notions of material 
borders and migration: “crossing borders […] is only one way in which bordering has 
come to play a major part in people’s everyday lives”.41  
 
36 When referring in the thesis to the notions of ‘discourse’ and ‘truth’, I understand these to be rooted on relations of 
power as theorised by Foucault who writes: “in a society such as ours, but basically in any society, there are manifold 
relations of power which permeate, characterise and constitute the social body, and these relations of power cannot 
themselves be established, consolidated nor implemented without the production, accumulation, circulation and 
functioning of a discourse. There can be no possible exercise of power without a certain economy of discourses of truth 
which operates through and on the basis of this association. We are subjected to the production of truth through power 
and we cannot exercise power except through the production of truth.” See Gordon C. (ed.) Power/Knowledge. Selected 
Interviews and Other Writings 1972-1977. Michel Foucault (New York: Pantheon Books), 93. 
37 Balibar E. (2002) Politics and the Other Scene (London: Verso), 71. 
38 Brambilla C., ‘Exploring the Critical Potential of the Borderscapes Concept’, Geopolitics (2015), 20(1), 14-34.  
39 This even though the need to make the border visible in various ways still persists. See for example: Amlhat Szary 
A., ‘Walls and Border Art: The Politics of Art Display’, Journal of Borderlands Studies (2012), 27(2), 213-28. 
40 Balibar E., Politics and the Other Scene. 




Yuval-Davis and others emphasise four major complementary arguments about 
bordering:  
“1) contemporary borderings are central and constitutive of a myriad of political, economic 
and social processes; 2) different and contesting political projects of governance and 
belonging make up bordering; 3) these processes produce and are produced by intersectional 
inequalities; 4) differently situated social agents make bordering relevant to a wide range of 
bordering scapes”.42  
 
 
However, while Yuval-Davis and others speak of bordering, (b)ordering adds extra layers 
to this in the sense that it does not constitute a specific form of a political project of 
belonging per se, but it refers to a more general process of border-making, ordering, and 
othering that is both spatial and political and aims to create borders that are more fluid. 
Processes of (b)ordering do not only differentiate between us/them or inside/outside, but 
they also juxtapose belonging to processes of (b)ordering.43 Drawing on this, (b)ordering 
is understood in the thesis as a key aspect for thinking about how people on the move44 
are kept (im)mobile, securitised and ‘humanised’ by maintaining crucial relations with 
linear borders. In the thesis, I interrogate (b)ordering by considering discourses and 
practices that contribute to the construction of the figure of the migrant as a ‘life that 
needs to be rescued’ because of his/her humanity and as ‘a life that we should protect 
ourselves against’ through his/her securitisation. Such a construction contributes to the 
making of processes of survival that include and exclude at the same time by (b)ordering 
those who should minimally survive instead.  
In the context of the European Union, these processes of (b)ordering have become 
particularly visible with the political construction of migrants’ movement as ‘crisis’. 
Especially since 2015, the hegemonic framing of migration in EUrope as a crisis has been 
highly debated as this raises two major problems. On the one hand, the crisis is said to be 
 
42 Ibid., 160. 
43 Ibid. 
44 While in the thesis I refer to migrants by critically engaging with the conceptualisation of this state centric category, 
I also refer to people on the move as a mean to emphasise people’s precarious conditions and uncertain status as 
‘‘illegalised’’ and ‘mobile’ individualities. In this work, I mobilise the two terms in a very similar way, as mutually 




provoked by an excess of people crossing borders illegally. This has led to “the 
proliferation of physical, technological and mental borders within and outside the EU 
[which] has made the movement of migrants into a crisis”.45 On the other hand, the 
discursive register of the crisis is one that does not account for the structural 
responsibilities that EUrope possesses in ensuring that its borders keep people out.46 
Borders make migrants: “if there were no borders, there would be no migrants - only 
mobility.”47  Concomitantly, mobility as a mean for protection for the most vulnerable is 
often downplayed:48 there are only migrants. In the thesis, I refer to a crisis of uneven 
mobility in this sense, by shifting attention from a problem of distribution of ‘too many 
migrants’, to the structural production of excesses sanctioned by unequal mobility caused 
by borders.  
This framing also helps us to draw attention to what Fassin calls a “moral crisis” 
of governance in the management of migration in EUrope.49 This “moral crisis” redefines 
the notion of human mobility by dividing people between those who can be mobile and 
those who are ‘illegalised’ because of their mobility and shape the way in which the 
European Union, and its member states in their specificity, establish and re-stablish new 
relationships of security between individuals on the move. New biopolitical borders 
generating more pervasive asymmetrical realities of survival or life with death, are also 
drawn to address the limits of what political life should mean for those who struggle for 
life: as part of the European project,50 in fact, borders as “artefacts on the ground”51 are 
 
45 Ansems de Vries L., Carrera S., Guild E., ‘Documenting the Migration Crisis in the Mediterranean: Spaces of Transit, 
Migration Management and Migrant Agency’, CEPS Paper in Liberty and Security in Europe (13 September 2016), 
94. Available at: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2859431 [accessed 10 October 2019], 2. 
46 Jones R. (2016) Violent Borders: Refugees and the Right to Move (London: Verso). 
47 De Genova N., ‘We are of the connections’: migration, methodological nationalism, and ‘militant research’, 
Postcolonial Studies (2013), 16(3), 250-8. 
48 Pallister-Wilkins P., ‘Humanitarian Rescue/Sovereign Capture and the Policing of Possible Responses to Violent 
Borders’, Global Policy (February 2017), 8(1), 19-24, 23. 
49 Fassin D., ‘From Right to Favour: The Refugee Question as Moral Crisis’, The Nation, 5 April 2016. Available at: 
https://www.thenation.com/article/from-right-to-favor/ [accessed 27 February 2020]. 
50 I draw here on Glissant idea that Europe is not a place but a project. See Glissant E. (1989) Caribbean Discourse: 
Selected Essays (University Press of Virginia). 




being continuously redrawn by a series of displacements that make borders mobile,52 
virtual53 and more violent.54 As De Genova remarks, the question of Europe itself is 
entangled with that of migration so that its putative borders are both displaced and 
eminently and politically kept still.55 I will consider this contradictory border regime by 
standing at the border (my field work Calais) but also by taking the edges to the centre 
of (b)ordering (re-centralising the migrants’ lived experience and the politics of 
perseverance practised by migrants, activist aid workers, and artists). 
 
The Landscape of Migration in EUrope: Securitisation and Humanisation 
 
In Europe’s Border Crisis: Biopolitical Security and Beyond, Vaughan-Williams 
addresses the ambiguities of European governance which, for the aim of securing its 
communitarian borders, manages migration through policies and practices that expose a 
reality/rhetoric gap between humanitarian interventions and the construction of migrants 
as irregular. This framing ends up sustaining a reality/rhetoric of fear-necessity and 
human value.56 Specifically, Vaughan-Williams underlines this by showing how the 
figure of the ‘irregular’ migrant is central to the constitution of the present ‘crisis’: 
 “On the one hand, the ‘irregular’ migrant is cast in ‘official’ documentation as a political 
subject who potentially threatens the identity, economy and security of the EU and its 
member states […] On the other hand, alongside these dynamics there has also emerged a 
strong humanitarian discourse of ‘migrant centredness’ associated with the EU’s 




52 Amlhat Szary A., Giraut F. (2015) (eds) Borderities and the Politics of Contemporary Mobile Borders (Palgrave 
Macmillan, London) 
53 Dillon M., ‘Virtual Security: A Life Science of (Dis)order’, Millennium: Journal of International Studies (2003), 
32(3), 531-58. 
54 Jones R., Violent Borders. 
55 De Genova N., ‘“The Borders of “Europe” and the European Question’ in De Genova N. (ed.) (2017) The Borders 
of “Europe”: Autonomy of Migration, Tactics of Bordering (Duke University Press), 22. 
56 Vaughan-Williams N., Europe’s Border Crisis. 
57 EU Commission, 2011, ‘The Global Approach to Migration and Mobility’, 18-11-2011. Available at: 
https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/international-affairs/global-approach-to-migration_en 
[accessed 21 January 2018]; EU Commission, 2010, ‘The EU Internal Security Strategy in Action: Five steps towards 
a more secure Europe’. Available at: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-10-598_en.htm?locale=en [accessed 




The impact of such impasse is made visible by the author who explores how in our 
contemporary life we are experiencing a conceptual crisis where political significations 
are inexorably entrenched with two main elements of biopolitical governmentality: 
humanitarianism and securitisation.58 The GAMM commits the EU state members to 
protect the more general category of the migrant, rather than the formal juridical-political 
category of migrants, upholding the human rights sanctioned in the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights, in their territorial limits and migratory routes.59 Such a commitment 
is differently operationalised by the European Agency for the Management of Operational 
Cooperation at the External Borders, Frontex. Frontex, in fact, operates within a sort of 
exceptionalism of power and too often qualifies its actions in terms of irregular push-
backs, omissions, abandonment of migrants in hostile environments, and causing border 
violence that results in retaining migrants in spaces of detention.60  
While European border security exposes migrants to violence for the need of 
protecting EU citizens, it does so by committing to the necessity of upholding the human 
rights of endangered lives.61 Vaughan-Williams investigates such paradox by stressing 
how the figure of the ‘irregular’ migrant is now co-opted into such managerial 
mechanisms of power and results in identifying threats and political subjects differently, 
without drawing a clear line between the two. According to him, in fact, this ambiguity 
reproduces “lives worthy of protection” and “lives from which we should protect 
ourselves against”.62 Because migration is increasingly becoming a de-politicised 
security issue to be managed, the construction of ‘irregularity’ constitutes a specific 
technology of power that re-politicises humanitarian interventions. Vaughan-Williams 










questioning how an affirmative approach to Europe’s border management could have a 
more positive impact on the politics of migration.63 However, while he suggests that we 
need to move beyond the gap between the policy-rhetoric of humanitarianism and the 
reality-irregularity of securitisation,64 conceptually it is key to rethink this gap as it allows 
us to better interrogate the ‘making’ of migration as a field of intervention where migrants 
are (allegedly) in need of only minimal interventions. 
Taking this central ambiguity as a starting point, and further extending this ‘gap’ 
to include entrenched interventions in the field of security and humanitarianism, 
throughout this work I argue that relationships of (b)ordering are maintained by 
promoting migrants’ mere survival. Migrants are not just surviving the injustice and 
violence of borders, but they are also caught up between the imperfect synthesis of what 
their securitisation and ‘humanisation’ cannot hide. As such, and through a complex array 
of interventions, migrants’ lives are often reduced to be in need of only minimal 
interventions that preserve their lives. In a broad sense, security as securitisation and 
humanitarianism as humanisation refer to the processes through which bodies are both 
qualified as more or less ‘human’ in need of protection and disqualified as ‘security 
threats’ to be contained. This tension casts migrants as people in need of only minimal 
interventions giving rise to discourses and practices of care and control, recovery and 
abandonment, tolerance and exhaustion that, ultimately, further impact their lives. These 
complementary processes capture not only policy rationales of politicisation of migration 
but also draw attention to the production of subjects who should (only) survive. As 
Aradau has insisted when talking about constructions of human trafficking, people can 
be a risk and at risk depending on security and humanitarian articulations of mutually 
reinforcing interventions:65 in other words, “politics of pity” are enmeshed with “politics 
 
63 Idem. See also: ‘Zoopolitical Borders’, Chapter 4.  
64 Ibid., Conclusions. 
65 Aradau C., ‘The perverse politics of four-letter words: Risk and pity in the securitisation of human trafficking’, 




of risk”.66 Interventions in the field of migration governance, therefore, simultaneously 
render migrants humans in need of (minimal) care and subjects of security concern.  
The question of the meaning of security and the question of the meaning of the 
‘human’ within it, are understood as problems of knowledge construction and practices 
of containment that make up framings of life. As Huysmans has argued, the politics of 
framing insecurity relay on the fabrication of domains of knowledge that modulate 
relations between threats and methods for managing them.67 As such, these processes are 
more than ‘speech acts’ and account for multidimensional aspects in which a threat, for 
example, is less the result of discourses of danger and more of “logics of security practice 
that traverse and connect events, institutional sites, skills, knowledge, etc”.68 It is 
possible, in fact, to look at processes of securitisation and ‘humanisation’ as political 
rationales that, while being historically rooted,69 conjecturally morph subjects who can 
be victims in danger and dangerous victims who are both made to exist in excess. 
 
Political Border-lines: Surviving Migrants  
 
Terms such as “surplus humanity”,70 “surplus population” or “reserve army of labour”,71 
“surplus people”,72 and “human waste”73 and refer to the more general idea of people who 
exist in excess. Excesses are never a natural outcome, but they are the amount of 
something that is strategically considered as not necessary, therefore disposable. While 
 
66 Idem. 
67 Huysmans J. (2006) The Politics of Insecurity. Fear, migration and asylum in the EU (London/New York: 
Routledge). 
68 Ibid.,153. 
69 While this thesis looks at processes that are in the making, it acknowledges that these processes need also to be 
grounded within studies that contextualise the rise of humanitarian rationales. See Edkins, J., ‘Humanitarianism, 
Humanity, Human’, Journal of Human Rights (2003), 2(2), 253–58. 
70 See Davis M. (2006) Planet of Slums (London: Verso). 
71 Marx refers to ‘surplus population’ as the consequence of the capitalist economic system. From his analysis of the 
function of capital it is possible to think of the idea that what has been made in excess is people’s labour in relation to 
wage levels. Such people become reserve of labour that are furtherly exploited within a capitalist system of surpluses. 
For instance, unemployment becomes functional to the accumulation of wealth that is the uneven distribution of modes 
of production. By referring to the unemployed and under-employed as “reserve army of labour”, Marx theorises surplus 
as being made in excess to the condition of labour that a capitalist society demands. In this sense, population is made 
to be in relative surplus as in the circuit of capital not all find a place within it. See Marx K., (1894) Capital. Critique 
of Political Economy (CreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform), Vol. 1, Chapter 25. 
72 Bauman Z. (2007) Liquid Times: Living in an age of uncertainty (Polity Press). 




this thesis briefly discusses the production of “surplus lives” in the context of a 
bioeconomy of life, it substantially engages with the concept of excess in order to better 
capture the processes through which inequalities of lives are produced. Far from being 
only the remnants of “unabsorbed capitalism”, in fact, in this thesis, migrants are more 
widely considered to be remnants in excess for two main reasons: they remain if they are 
not channelled within the legal frameworks of asylum (or otherwise channelled) and 
qualified as politically recoverable; they are in excess as deportable, as an ‘illegalised’ 
surplus in need of a set of interventions.74 This framing aims to counteract the state-
centric construction of excesses as a natural outcome of necessary governance that 
represents remnants as the product of excessive asylum claims being considered, a surplus 
of ‘dangerous’ bodies knocking at European’s doors, illegal border-crossers. This idea of 
excesses, that is closely linked to that of crisis, in fact, tells us more about why people are 
managed in the way they are, rather than how the crisis is fabricated, legitimised and 
normalised. 
One way of exploring the making of migration through the EU and its member 
states qualification of excesses is that of starting by considering, and problematising, 
Agamben’s idea of bare life. Agamben argues that refugees/’illegalised’ migrants can be 
thought as a contemporary example of bare life. Bare life is a condition that is produced 
by a sovereign political act of exclusion that does not separate political life and natural 
life as such but makes life indistinguishable to its qualification from the polis.75 
According to Agamben, sovereignty poses the “naked life” of the individual as a 
presupposition of its governability. “Vita nuda” – “naked life” – is a form of life that is 
without appeal once the human is dehumanised as a natural entity. Naked life or ‘bare 
 
74 In chapter 5 this idea of institutional excesses of biopolitical governance will be better complemented by considering 
excess also from the point of view of the sociability and mobility of migrants. 
75 Whitley L. M., More than a Line: Bodies as Embodied Borders. PhD thesis, Goldsmith, University of London. 




life’ does not simply refer to natural life,76 and it does not exist before sovereign power 
intervention,77 but is a condition that defines life, and situates it, closer to death. Death 
needs to exist as a threat, sustained as possible by the instruments of politics. I refer in 
this thesis as life in death to epitomise this.  
The proximity to death that defines bare life, in Agamben’s view, is potential for 
everybody. As ontological category, therefore, bare life is also a homogenous category 
that fails to take into account how power functions asymmetrically and people are 
vulnerable in different ways78 and how these vulnerabilities are the product of hierarchical 
interventions predicated on race, gender, class and sexuality.79 By proposing a concept 
that functions as an “empty abstraction”,80 therefore, Agamben’s disregards the role of 
structural violence and the working of racism in the distribution of death.81 Moreover, it 
can be argued that such abstraction is not only empty but also too simplistic and 
universalising. While Agamben refers to bare life as intrinsic in the logic of sovereignty 
and the camp, he focuses on the exceptional circumstances of the Holocaust, “the most 
extreme condition inhumane that has ever existed on earth”.82 The idea of grounding his 
analysis on the extremes conditions of the Nazi camp to then generalise these conditions 
to any life can in fact be contested and one could argue that what he calls ‘bare life’ is not 
simply subjected to death and cannot always be reduced to being solely the product of the 
rule of law or sovereign decisions.83  
More attention, therefore, should be paid to the ways in which thresholds of life 
are crossed and how (b)ordering can be contested otherwise the agency of the migrant is 
 
76 De Genova, N., ‘The Deportation Regime: Sovereignty, Space, and the Freedom of Movement’ in De Genova, N., 
Peutz, N. (2010) (eds.) The Deportation Regime: Sovereignty, Space and the Freedom of Movement (Durham & 
London: Duke University Press) 33-68; Murray, A. (2010) Giorgio Agamben (London and New York: Routledge). 
77 Ibid. 
78 Butler J., Precarious Life, 68. 
79 Coleman M., Grove K., ‘Biopolitics, Biopower and the Return of Sovereignty’. 
80 Deuber-Mankowsky, A., ‘Cutting off Mediation: Agamben as Master Thinker’, (2005), The Irvine Critical Theory 
Institute. 
81 Foucault M. (1997) Society must be defended (Penguin books), 254-56. 
82 Agamben G., Homo Sacer, 166. 
83 Lemke T. ‘A Zone of Indistinction’ – A Critique of Giorgio Agamben’s Concept of Biopolitics’, Outlines. Critical 




not factored in. If we read the figure of the migrant as bare life, in fact, migrants are 
reduced to mere breathing beings, that is perpetuating a form of subjectivity that reduces 
life to its biological minimum and denies the possibility of resistance. Obviously, many 
studies have convincingly engaged with these limitations and have considered the 
rendering of (potential) bare life in a range of contexts and fields.84 This work aims to 
supplement these accounts by focusing on a different logic of governing migration and 
borders. For this aim, this thesis retains Agamben’s analysis on how the production of 
survival contributes to governing biopolitical life only in general terms and resituates it 
within accounts of how degrees of non-life and non-death are re-valued once the political 
limbo in which life with death is inserted is no longer considered without any appeal, but 
recast as differently appealable. Life is “naked” insofar as its definition proceeds 
unquestioned, and, as we will see in the last chapters of this work, oppression always 
triggers (im)perceptible and creative forms of resistance. In order to engage fully with the 
concept of survival, therefore, we need to move beyond the idea of bare life as put forward 
by Agamben and rethink the complexity of survival in all its manifestations.  
It is important to rethink survival not as an achievement (with all the positivity 
that the concept entail) but also as a never-ending condition whereby (b)ordering reduces 
its subjects to a predicament in which they can only aspire to survive in basic terms and 
in which a more fulfilled life and a political life are denied a priori. ‘Surviving’ migrants 
are those who are rescued and tolerated while also being criminalised and conceived as a 
threat; those who are made to cope for their life with death condition and denied any 
aspirations. (B)ordered between the necessity to care for them and that of controlling 
them, they do not die, strictly speaking, but are made to remain in excess, and for this 
reason their life needs to take also a form of death. In the thesis, the governance of life 
 
84 In particular, see Doty R. L., ‘Bare Life: Border-Crossing deaths and Spaces of Moral Alibi’, Environment and 
Planning D: Society and Space (2011), 29(4), 599-612; Darling J., ‘Becoming Bare Life: Asylum, Hospitality, and the 




with death is understood as the practice of (b)ordering surviving migrants also through 
their continuous strategic ‘humanisation’ and securitisation. If surviving migrants are 
those who are reduced to (only) survive, however, they are also those who, for this reason, 
are struggling to be recognized as people not only in need of humanitarian interventions 
or securitisation. 
In order to better recognise these (b)ordering processes that take ‘hold’ of 
migrants’ lives and shape it, in the thesis I introduce the theme of political border-lines. 
Referring to political border-lines allows us to look at boundaries in ways that are diffuse, 
(im)mobilised, and as a compromising point between securitised and ‘humanised’ bodies. 
While retaining the metaphor of the line and linking it to borders as political tools of 
division and contact, border-lines reflect the ambiguities of a process of (b)ordering that 
keeps migrants in-between. As such, political border-lines can be defined as the state of 
being in an intermediate position that is not still transcended, but in the process of being 
so. Migrants here are not treated as undifferentiated beings but considered to be surviving 
the conditions of their unequal relations with the distribution of life and death. Such 
distribution is always hierarchical and based on political constructions that differentiate 
among figures of migration. Once borders expand within society, the political potential 
of migrants who ‘carry’ them is (im)mobilised as their ‘humanisation’ and their 
securitisation cannot allow them to be fully seen as subjects of rights/care without being 
also considered as subjects that might represent a threat to individuals and communities 
more broadly.  
The making of political border-lines through survival is discussed by focusing on 
the construction of migrants as people to rescue or un-rescue in the Mediterranean Sea; 
their channelling on land as lives to be recovered or abandoned, their neutering and 
demonization as ‘abject’ political presence in protest camps in Rome; their management 




solidarity to exist in the name of a policed form of humanitarianism. These specific sites 
take us to the physical borders of EU member states but also allow us to depart from those 
borders in order to rethink the more general effects of (b)ordering in EUrope. These 
effects reduce migrants to biophysical needs and life to an administrative task of politics. 
A commitment to rethinking, rather than simply explaining, ways of understanding the 
governance of migration as a measure of what the biopolitical governance of life has 
come to normalise has been central to my work. My aim, in fact, was not to produce 
rigorous empirical knowledge – and this aspect will be further clarified when discussing 
the value of ‘living theory’, and post-qualitative research when conducting fieldwork also 
in Chapter four,  - but to engage with, and contribute to, political thinking (and to some 
extent political theory) more broadly. 
 
In Search of Political Life 
 
Starting from the assumption that the politics of control are always entrenched with the 
politics of migrants,85 the analytical focus of the thesis will be on, on the one hand, 
interrogating survival as a strategy for governing migration and, on the other, on the 
politics of perseverance. The particular value assigned to biopolitical life through 
(b)orderings calls into question the more general idea of life that these processes specify. 
As Fassin has noted, in fact, there is very little about life or even politics within biopolitics 
which is more concerned with rationales and techniques for governing populations. 
Biopolitics does not provide substantial meaning to what life is:86arguably, in fact, 
biopolitics disallows certain lives so that they live with death in order to specify what life 
might be and become for them too, but not what it is. (B)ordering is core to governing 
through survival and to reducing migrants to their political (im)mobilisations. Forced to 
 
85 See Squire V. (2011) (ed) The Contested Politics of Mobility: Borderzones and Irregularity (London: Routledge). 




operate in a condition of life with death, migrants are (im)mobilised not just in their 
configurations of movement, but also in their potential for exercising their own politics. 
If biopolitical governance voids the political of meaning through the imperative of 
managerial efficiency and ordering, a contestation of mere survival can be articulated by 
looking at how the politics of (b)ordering confront what, as we will see in chapter five, 
Asef Bayat calls life as politics. 
Keeping the effects of (b)ordering at the centre of my inquiry but moving away 
from biopolitics and approximating life as politics, it is possible to re-centre the margins 
and give life a meaning which transcends effects of (b)ordering that preserve some lives 
in death. Once mere survival has been exposed as a strategy of governance, it is possible 
to see that, while biopolitics reduces and normalises life to its imperatives of ordering, 
migrants’ engagements with it do not simply reproduce negative biopolitical ceasures. 
Any analysis about modes of confronting injustices is asymmetrical but it is nonetheless 
imperative to think of ways through which confrontation happens without happening, 
through “imperceptible politics”, “nonmovements”, “screams”, and so on.87 The politics 
of perseverance can be linked to the complex ways through which migrants attempt to 
reconstruct their social reality by continuously reasserting their political presence and in 
the acts of solidarity and support which I have seen activist aid workers in Rome and 
Calais perform every day. This is a politics of inverse excesses that will be also considered 
through the analytical lens of Autonomy of Migration and alternative contributions of 
solidarity networks and art.88 
The work of humanitarian activists and art and artistic engagements are given 
centre stage in this process of rethinking biopolitical (b)ordering in the context of political 
responses engaged in the restitution of meaning to lives. Art is seen as a manifestation of 
 
87 I will better engage with these concepts in chapter 5 of the thesis.  
88 These politics are not produced by migrants’ practices alone but also through ‘transversal alliances’ of solidarity and 
artistic re-representations. Also see Tazzioli M., Walters W., ‘Migration, solidarity and the limits of Europe’, Global 




alternative framings of migration: murals, for instance, re-imagine the imaginary and 
function of borders as walls and give them new meaning and poignancy. Drawing on this, 
at the beginning of each chapter and in the conclusion of my thesis I highlight murals that 
engage with migration in various ways. These murals cover the walls of my hometown, 
Orgosolo: confined within an island (Sardinia) where ‘there is no sea’ it boasts more than 
two hundred fifty murals painted since the late 60s and describing political events --from 
Tiananmen Square to Gaza, from the oppression of Nazism to the destruction of the Twin 
Towers, from working class struggles to the hypocrisy of political and religious figures. 
Located a few hours away from the birthplace of Antonio Gramsci, these murals remind 
us that to be indifferent to life is always a possibility, but a possibility to hate. In the 
thesis, visual representations, which also include paintings and photographs, contribute 
together with the comprehensive approach of ‘living theory’, to enlarge my research 
methodology and processual rethinking.  
 
‘Living Theory’: My Positionalities, Encounters and Visuals as ‘Method’ 
 
Social research is always influenced by theories that interpret and represent the world we 
inhabit. What constitutes existing knowledge, in fact, is first theorised, and made 
manifest, as a possible valid way to frame issues. Theory is not only what gives 
knowledge ‘authority’ but also what motivates various research decisions, from the 
formulation of research questions to the choice of particular investigative methods. A 
widely held principle of social research is a normative understanding of how it should be 
conducted in order to produce ‘valid’ knowledge. This preliminary process is often 
subservient to research predictions that conform with research methods where ‘knowing’ 
and ‘investigating’ becomes addressing the ‘expected’. According to this reading, social 
research appears to be a linear process where the ‘questionable’ and the ‘feasible’ 




empirical is often limited to what should be researched in the space of the field. This is 
furtherly complicated by shared assumptions that recommend researchers identify 
methods which determine how research should be conducted at the very beginning of 
their inquiry: a research topic is followed by research questions whereby the use of a 
cluster of research methods is made necessary to ‘capture’ social realities. While social 
research cannot be reduced to a static template, it can be argued that this is its prominent 
model. This model can be ‘messy’ at times, but contingencies and disruptions within this 
research template often tend to be indebted to an ordered ‘sameness of thinking’ which 
includes: the formulation of research objectives; the choice over research methods; the 
selection of research participants; the collection, analysis and interpretation of data; the 
dissemination of findings.89  
Social research, however, operates within wider contexts that are not only 
normative or prescriptive but also personal and performative, or as I would suggest, 
within contexts that are above of all ‘lived’. When I began thinking about my research, 
my PhD project was informed by the following research question: What are the kind of 
politics that are emerging in the context of the European Union management of 
migration? Politics was declined in two ways: the politics of control and containment 
exercised over migrants, and the politics of migration exercised by migrants themselves. 
The management of migration from ‘above’, from the State, and the articulation of 
migrants’ struggles from ‘below’, gave content to my initial, abstract thoughts about what 
I was going to research: What was exactly the puzzle that I was attempting to solve? Was 
it even a puzzle to begin with? Thinking through what it had ‘yet to happen’ for me meant 
confronting theories about life, politics, migrants’ agency and (b)ordering with research 
that ‘could happen’ in the field - not to test ideas - but to rethink what ‘actually happened’ 
with others.  
 




Theory, as the corpus of what has been already thought by others, comes to define 
what must be thought by us. Similarly to research methods which tell us how to channel 
our thinking, theory tells us what to think so that often repetition takes the place of what 
St. Pierre calls “the creation of the not yet”.90 St Pierre’s engagements with the necessity 
to see the world through an ontology of immanence are extremely valuable to research 
processes in the field where “one becomes less interested in what is and more interested 
in what might be and what is coming into being”.91 What marks the post in a qualitative 
inquiry is the  “not yet”, “the yet to come”, what is always becoming and never is. In 
other words, it is the “future to come”92 that can be created, invented and learnt also 
through “people to come”.93 This ‘image of thought’94 takes shape through the refusal of 
prescribed procedures for doing research. For this reason, theory and research methods 
are both openly challenged once we embrace the necessity to reground thinking over the 
necessity to reproduce the conventional social research process itself. In an inquiry that 
is contingent, pre-empirical imperatives such as a clear research design, a specific choice 
of research methods and definitive research questions are all reverted moments that make 
thinking coherent to the process of research itself. Thus, my research has not just been 
motivated by the desire to ‘repeat’, but also to rethink responses to questions that I 
‘discovered’. 
In the thesis, I refer to the idea of theory as a modus vivendi to epitomise the 
continuous flux of thoughts that has characterised my PhD research. Theory as modus 
vivendi, means “reading, thinking, writing and living with theory”.95 While theory 
regulates discovery by inscribing relationships to narratives with a fixed meaning, what 
 
90 St. Pierre E. A., ‘Post-Qualitative Inquiry in an Ontology of Immanence’, Qualitative Inquiry (2019), (25)1, 3-16, 1. 
91 Ibid., 2. 
92 Derrida J. (1996). Archive fever: A Freudian impression (translated by E. Prenowitz), (Chicago, IL: The University 
of Chicago Press) qtd in St. Pierre E. A., ‘Post-Qualitative Inquiry in an Ontology of Immanence’, 4.  
93 Ibid. 
94 Deleuze, G., & Guattari, F. (1994). What is philosophy? (translated by H. Tomlinson & G. Burchell) (New York: 
Columbia University Press) 168 qtd in St. Pierre E. A., ‘Post-Qualitative Inquiry in an Ontology of Immanence’, 12. 




theory as a modus vivendi aims to do is to allow the encountering of the real to be 
analytically problematised as a possibility for intensifying thinking. Approaching theory 
as modus vivendi means making manifest the idea of “living theory” as a relation that the 
researcher establishes with the subject and object of his/her research. Theory, therefore, 
is always a beginning and never an ending per se’. In the thesis, I approach well-
established theories as a starting point for rethinking migrants’ life: what their life should 
be versus what their life can be. My work of framing through and reframing with is the 
result of a process where theory and the “not yet” are co-constituted as interdependent 
momentums. As such, this is not a conventionally written thesis but a thesis that has been 
written reflecting the idea of rethinking contingent practices of (b)ordering (and their 
wider re-articulations as everyday struggles) through my experience in the space of the 
field, in Rome and Calais where I have been, and in the space of borders/migration studies 
and political theory more broadly.  
It is within the interstices of these spaces that my research question(s) developed: 
Why it is crucial to consider (b)ordering practices in the study of migration? How does 
(b)ordering effect migrants’ life? What does rethinking ‘life’ and ‘politics’ mean outside 
the State? How do migrants articulate a self-positioning towards life and politics?  What 
does it mean to rethink the politics of migrants as relational? What is the role that aid 
grassroot organisations play within frames of ‘resistance’? Why it is important to consider 
artistic endeavours as linked to the reframing of migrants’ struggles? More importantly, 
why it is essential to reconsider the analytical depth of survival? Why do we need to re-
appropriate the meaning of survival as affirmative struggle for life as politics? These 
questions intermingle with the role of ‘living theory’ as my research methodology. This 
approach entails considering three main elements of my ‘lived’ research process: my 





• My positionalities: Who I am, Who I am Becoming 
In the double self-portrait The Two Fridas (fig. 2), Frida Kalho depicts two versions of 
herself seated together, holding hands with their hearts visible and a main vein that 
connects the two figures. Portrayed as identical twins, the two Fridas are differently 
dressed: the one on the left is shown wearing modern European clothes while the one on 
the right wears a traditional Tehuana Mexican dress. Both Fridas hold objects, the 
“European artist” on the left holds forceps while the “Mexican artist” on the right holds 
a small portrait of her then ex-husband Diego Rivera. Moving away from the particular 
symbolism of objects portrayed in the painting which refer to Frida’s emotional pain, 
personal history and life,96 what interests me to highlight is the engaged effort that the 
artist makes in expressing elements of her identity, her dual heritage and othering.97 The 
two Fridas look identical but are conciliatorily different despite being connected under a 
stormy sky. In other words, the two figures are the same person, made visible through a 
dual representation.  
 
 Figure 2. Las Dos Fridas (The Two Fridas), Frida Kalho, 193998 
 
96 Among other interpretations, The Two Fridas emblematises the artist’s pain after divorcing Diego Rivera. The 
‘Mexican Frida’ holds a portrait of Rivera while the ‘European Frida’ bleeds to symbolise Rivera’s rejection of the 
artist European connection and his strong nationalism. It is also believed that the painting is a reference to Frida’s 
childhood friend. 
97 Frida’s father was of German descendance while her mother was Mexican. 




Concomitantly, reflecting on, interrogating and fleshing out my dual positionality – like 
in Frida’s painting of her double self – means to represent, this time through words, 
elements of my identity as a person and as a researcher, who I am and who I am becoming. 
How do my personal and intellectual positionalities cohere with and/or diverge from my 
research? In what ways do I reify, resist or even disrupt my positionality through my 
research project? How do my positionalities influence my research at a ‘distance’ and in 
proximity to the field?  
 
Who I am: The way in which I see and interpret the world is highly motivated by my 
background and experiences.99 As positionality is itself a research tool,100 I recognise that 
some facets of my social identities have impacted my approach to the study of borders 
and migration. While sometimes positionality might appear intangible, I have always 
been aware of my position in relation to others due to intersectional factors such as my 
family working class background, my gender and the structural lack of opportunities that 
relate to it. Undoubtedly, my personal positionality has been crucial throughout my 
research especially when considering the double political meaning of survival not only as 
what migrants are allowed to do by political power but also what migrants reaffirm as 
political agents. Through my research, therefore, I have also attempted to disrupt my 
ordered and othered positionality as a person whose agency and ambitions should be 
limited to her class. By asking other possible questions and opening up to other possible 
answers, in the thesis I have attempted to consider how migrants can articulate a self-
positioning, also in alliance with aid workers and indirectly artists. As there are many 
layers of complexity involved in positionality,101 writing about who I am is not a 
 
99 Day S., “A Reflexive Lens: Exploring dilemmas of qualitative methodology through the concept of reflexivity”, 
Qualitative Sociology Review (8)1, 61-85. 
100 Jacobson D., Mustafa N., “Social Identity Map: A Reflexivity for Practicing Explicit Positionality in Critical 
Qualitative Research”, International Journal of Qualitative Methods, 18, 1-12, 2. 




straightforward task but a process that develops and changes over time as identities are 
multiple and always in flux.102 Who I am, in fact, confronts who I am becoming through 
and because of my research.  
 
Who I am becoming: Practicing positionality means to recognise how my personal and 
intellectual positionality intertwine in ways that are not linear. When conducting research 
in the field, but also at ‘distance’, understanding and accounting for my positions has 
been fundamental to recognise power relations imbued within my study. As a matter of 
fact, two questions in particular resonated throughout my work: How can I conduct my 
research without putting myself at the centre of it? How can I avoid personalising too 
much my intellect? Addressing these questions has been crucial to me, also considering 
the implicit desire of presence that constitutes qualitative research where the ‘Other’ is 
often reduced to categories of sameness.103 Reproducing the sameness of the researcher 
in respect to the subject/object of study is problematic precisely because the alterity of 
the ‘Other’ can be erased.104 In contrast to this, the researcher-as-author can attenuate 
his/her ‘desire for presence’, sameness and othering by focusing on an inquiry that is 
relational. A relational inquiry does not put the researcher at the centre but allows him/her 
to be in the middle, between research materials (the knowable) and research in the field 
(what has yet to come). Such attitude towards research involves a continuous re-
evaluation of how we relate to others and with ourselves. ‘Others’ are considered as co-
producers of knowledge that emerge through a politically engaged relational inquiry. 
Indeed, this approach underscores that researchers should embrace ‘becoming’ through 
the hybridity of their research and ‘quasi-militant’ engagements.   
 
102 See Naples A. N., (2003) Feminism and Method: Ethnography, Discourse Analysis, and Activist Research 
(Routledge: New York and London). 
103 De Freitas E., “Interrogating Reflexivity: Art, Research, and the Desire for Presence” in Handbook of the Arts in 
Qualitative Research: Perspectives, Methodologies, Examples and Issues (edited by Knowles G. J., Cole L. A.), (2012) 
(SAGE Publications), 470. 




Preferring the idea of refraction or diffraction over that of reflexivity, Barad and 
Haraway argue that it is essential to show how we as researchers are embedded within 
thinking processes.105 Our situatedness leads to critical reflection as we move away from 
a false dichotomy that perpetuates a sharp distinction between what researcher should do 
and what research subjects can say. There are not active or passive agents within research, 
but positions that interact together, “in which declinations between researchers, methods 
and others can become increasingly untenable, or at least open to change and differential 
distributions”.106 Translating this approach to my thesis, it means recognising the ways 
in which my position(s) developed by thinking with others.  
Talking of moving methods, Büscher observes that making methods mobile 
reinforces the emergence of new analytical momentums where methodological 
assemblages can happen.107 As such, moving with the subjects and objects of our research 
can generate important insights about our intellectual position which adds sensitivity to 
how reality becomes knowable. Thinking about how my approach to the study of the 
politics surrounding migration has been moved by others, implies appreciating the co-
constitution of my thoughts through theory and my experience in the field. In point of 
fact, while in Rome and Calais my theoretical ideas moved alongside those of people who 
I encountered. This collaborative research encounter allowed ‘live practices’ to come into 
being so to re-orient theory towards its lived political connotations. As such, I conducted 
my research in the field relying on multiple methods: unstructured interviews to aid 
workers, informal notes, participating in the organisation daily activities and training 
sessions, representing visual encounters. In other words, volunteering at the warehouse 
in Calais, talking with aid workers, going out for food distribution in the field, visiting 
 
105 Lammes S., “Engaging and Distributing” in Routledge Handbook of Interdisciplinary Methods (edited by Lury C., 
Fensham R., Helles-Nicholas A., Lammes S., Last A., Michael M., Uprichard E.), (Routledge: London and New York), 
145-51, 147.  
106 Ibid. 




the camp of Piazzale Maslax in Rome, sharing thoughts with others involved in the 




Deleuze wrote that thought is “the genesis of the act of thinking in thought itself. 
Something in the world forces us to think. This something is an object not of recognition 
but of a fundamental encounter…it can only be sensed”.108 The act of thinking in thought 
proceeds through encounters “that escape the dogmatic image of thought and its implicit 
assumptions about what thinking is, what the world is”.109 Encounters provoke what 
Siffrin calls an “ontological breach” where we attend real moments of disorientation.110 I 
experienced those moments of disorientation in Rome and Calais over the summer of 
2018 while conducting my fieldwork respectively in a makeshift camp located in the city 
hub and by engaging with networked solidarities in Northern France. When I reached 
Rome during the last two weeks of July 2018, I had already begun my research 
theoretically. I had previous conversations with the members of the aid grassroot 
organisation the Baobab Experience in Rome which initially were open for me to 
interview migrants in the makeshift camp of Piazzale Maslax. Once in Rome, the 
organisation seemed reluctant to grant me access to migrants as the aid workers felt they 
were not fully prepared to expose individuals to emotionally precarious journeys. In other 
words, there were not the conditions for me as a researcher to push boundaries rightly set 
by the organisation which was constantly monitoring the situation in the field. While the 
 
108 Deleuze, G., & Guattari, F. (1994). What is philosophy? (translated by H. Tomlinson & G. Burchell) (New York: 
Columbia University Press), 139, qtd in St. Pierre E. A., ‘Post-Qualitative Inquiry in an Ontology of Immanence’, 12. 
109 Ibid. 
110 Siffrin, N. (2017). The untimely: Post-qualitative inquiry’s machinic function (Unpublished doctoral dissertation). 




field managers for Help Refugees in Calais clarified to me this aspect before going to the 
field, in Rome I concretely encountered this problem of ‘access’.  
This moment of disorientation was tempered by the fact that I had begun my 
research, I was there and something else was already happening. In both sites, I 
‘discovered’ that there was another valuable perspective to consider, that of grassroot aid 
workers who were themselves subjected to state (b)ordering. The contingent practices of 
(b)ordering that I explored there involved not only migrants’ subjectivities but also their 
wider solidarity alliances. I was aware that this refocus implied investigating migration, 
also from the perspective of migrants’ struggles and politics, without representing 
migrants direct voices. Migrants invoicing, in fact, has been considered in the thesis 
through the testimonies of aid workers and my experience in Piazzale Maslax in Rome, 
in various encampments in Calais and in the Calais Warehouse. While it is absolute 
crucial to think about who should/can speak on the behalf of those most vulnerable,111 I 
did not conduct an inquiry with the aim of replacing migrants’ voices with those of aid 
workers, but one that emphasises the complex relation between migrants and aid workers 
in contexts where (b)ordering is confronted with, and challenged by, a different idea of 
life and situated politics. In the field, I have elaborated concepts such as mere survival 
and affirmative survival, the politics of perseverance practiced by migrants and members 
of grassroot organisations, and the implications of alliances that come into being out of 
necessity. Rethinking theory as lived inquiry for me has meant re-centring discourses and 
practices that oppose migration as mere survival and merely surviving as the only possible 
political goal of migrants’ politics. In the thesis, I also rely on artistic representations and 
 
111 See Krause U., “Researching forced migration: critical reflections on research ethics during fieldwork”, Refugee 
Studies Centre Oxford University, Working Paper Series 123, August 2017. Among others, see Qasmiyeh, Y. M. and 
Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, E. (2013), 'Refugee Camps and Cities in Conversation', in J. Garnett and A. Harris (eds.), 
Rescripting Religion in the City. Migration and Religious Identity in the Modern Metropolis (Farnham: Ashgate), 131-
148. Here it is developed a participatory-approach to the position of refugees through the concept of ‘third voice’: it is 
not about speaking for or about refugees as what matters is to speak with them. The ‘third voice’ emerges by 




images – paintings, murals and photographs – to visually signify what words alone cannot 
represent. 
 
• Artistic Forms and Images 
 
The contribution that art and visual images make to knowledge are multiple: visual 
images and artistic representations enlarge understandings of our shared human 
condition; they stimulate ways of discovering other representations of the possible; they 
generate emphatic feelings and address the qualitative nuances of a situation; modes of 
perceiving and interpreting the world are re-evaluated through art and images, helping us 
to connect with forms that are no longer only imagined, unshaped and/or always the 
same.112 In the thesis, paintings, mural art and photographs that I have taken of the Calais’ 
warehouse and the murals in my hometown, Orgosolo, are forms of knowledge that 
interact with the type and meaning of my research. Within my research design, these 
forms of representation are not simply ornamental or illustrative but articulate thinking 
by juxtaposing descriptive, evocative and participative moments.113 Photographs taken 
by me in Calais, for instance, enable the reader to experience a situation, a place, a lived 
reality that I inhabited and mediated it to others visually. In addition to this, at the 
beginning of each of the five chapters which compose my thesis I present photographs of 
murals that I took in Orgosolo which make visible many ‘angles’ of migration. Overall, 
these photographs revisit the context in which they have been viewed by me and expose, 
through personal experience, what can be seen by others too. With this in mind, the thesis 
also accounts for already existing visual interventions produced by others: the images of 
murals located in Venice, Sielma, Sapri and Melilla and the images of two temporary art 
installations in London. 
 





Among these kinds of image sources, in this study I also attempt to convey my 
abstract and concrete thoughts through the symbolism, surrealism, and ‘realistic 
precision’ of four paintings: Death and Life by Gustav Klimt; The Two Fridas by Frida 
Kalho; The Landscape with the Fall of Icarus by Pieter Bruegel; The Human Condition 
by René Magritte. These paintings transcend the contexts in which they are created, and 
the specific meanings assigned by the artists, in order to complement thinking and shape 
instead new ideas. As such, my research process makes use of these artistic 
representations to connect new ways of seeing with ways of doing things differently. Art 
articulates difference where the gap between words and seeing is reconciled to include 
what we mean with what we see. John Berger argued that “the relation between what we 
see and what we know is never settled”.114 The distinctive potential of art to forge 
connections with ourselves gives rise to knowledge that contributes to discovery. 
Returning to the idea of theory as a living and relational inquiry, art encourages 
imagination revealing to us that there is much more to methodology than methods which 
do not include thinking with art itself.  
 This thesis is therefore intended to make a contribution to the study of borders, 
bordering and migration in the context of the European Union, by rethinking the 
theoretical grounding of politics as a matter of ‘mere survival’. In this sense, this research 
not only aims to challenge the biopolitics of ‘bare life’, the well-established idea of 
‘survival migration’115 and the consequences of (b)ordering migrants, but it also rethinks 
notions and concepts by engaging migrants with their everyday ‘life’ and ‘politics’. In 
particular, by rethinking theory as a ‘lived inquiry’, I oppose debates which deny, mostly 
 
114 Berger J. (1972) Ways of Seeing (Penguin Classics, September 2008), 7.  
115 In taking issue with the idea of “survival migration’, I do not aim to disqualify works, such as Alexander Bett’s 
study where he highlights how people leave their country of birth out of necessity, that is because of deprivation and 
not just persecution, therefore engaging migration as survival. However, I believe that such framing of ‘survival 
migration’ – while critically separated from forced migration – expands general causes of mobility at the cost of 
migrants’ own politics and radical agency. This framing, in fact, does not fully engages with the situated politics of 
migrants giving more attention instead to the failed governance of states. ‘Survival migration’ is a state-centric category 
and the effect of the absence of legal systems and protection regimes in host countries. See Bett A. (2013) Survival 




through rigid theoretical constructs, migrants’ agency. In the thesis I focus on rethinking 
the effects of (b)ordering in order to re-centre migrants’ lived experience from a 
perspective that accounts for ways of being-with-others. I articulate these modes of living 
by engaging with the Autonomy of Migration approach and through the language of the 




This thesis unfolds in three parts and five chapters. The first part situates the thesis within 
a broader framework that interrogate (b)ordering and the biopolitical reduction of lives to 
mere survival and focuses on the making of borders, (b)ordering and migration in EUrope 
in theoretical terms. The second part interrogates how these processes unfold, can be 
framed, and are gazed upon from the external borders of the European Union in the 
Southern Mediterranean, and the atrophic reality of Calais. This part also accounts for aid 
workers’ engagement with and in support of migrants in Rome and Calais. The last part 
of the thesis shifts attention to the making of life as politics that is a wider reading of 
migrants’ politics of perseverance. Survival, therefore, is not only approached in the 
thesis as an (im)mobilising outcome of governance that reduces people to (only) survive 
as a measure of biopolitical life, but it is also complemented by an ‘affirmative’ reframing 
of struggles of survival as struggles for life as politics.  
Chapter one, Between Life and Death: Mere Survival and (B)ordering, sets out 
more broadly the theoretical underpinnings of the thesis. Specifically, it starts by briefly 
looking at biopolitics as highlighted in Foucault’s work but also at the relation between 
life and death through thanatopolitical and necropolitical forms of life, and then considers 
the figure of the “living-dead” and surviving bodies that exist outside the body politic. 
(B)ordering, understood as a processual relation with borders and migration, will be 




the human within it, create a tension that further qualifies (b)ordering. In this chapter, I 
argue that humanitarianism, and differential securitisation make life and death in need of 
minimal interventions that converge in a limbo of overlapping (b)orderings.  
Chapter two, The Making of Political Border-lines in EUrope: Negative Borders 
and Figures of Migration, aims to explore the complex intertwining of borders with 
(b)ordering processes, starting with considering what borders are, how they are 
demarcated and why they matter in our political life. It introduces figures of migration 
and deals with the current management of uneven mobility and borders within the space 
of the EU. In order to revisit borders as geopolitical lines of demarcation and reconsider 
them according to their distributive capacity to create social division within society, the 
core argument of this chapter is that (b)ordering contributes to the production of lives in 
excess and uneven possibilities of life as functions of life with death. These excesses 
cannot be only framed as bare life, that is life in death, but also as lives whose survival 
depends on conditions where only minimal interventions are possible. By introducing the 
idea of political border-lines, we reveal the effects of (b)ordering on these lives. This 
more-than-kinetic surplus is the result of the functioning of the borders of the EU, giving 
rise to processes of (b)ordering that are never complete but always in the making so that 
‘dangerous’ border crossers can be captured, relegated to camps and dispersed through 
circulations.  
While in chapter two I explore the relation of borders with (b)ordering at a more 
theoretical level, in chapter three, Floating Grounds: Scenes of Migration from the 
Mediterranean Sea to Rome, the construction of migrants as people to rescue and made 
un-rescuable at sea, and their channelling on land, will be better assessed. By looking at 
the entanglements of securitisation and humanitarianism at work in border points, I 
explore how this double focus is maintained. At sea, for example, this takes shape through 




made it a space of privileged intervention for exercising the politics of rescue. As 
migrants are confronted with practices of security that (b)order them as lives to rescue or 
pushback, this chapter looks at the relation between two imperatives: rescuing lives and 
securing borders. I present the Mediterranean Sea as a space whose infrastructure is 
confronted with the making of a military-humanitarian border at sea. Further on, I shift 
attention to strategies of (b)ordering mobility on land by considering three spaces of 
(im)mobility: hotspots, islands, and encampments of camps. At the end of this chapter, I 
consider a specific typology of camp, an urban (protest) camp by focusing on an informal 
camp, Piazzale Maslax, that was dismantled in Rome in October 2018. This particular 
case will help us understand a different kind of political (im)mobility, one that is often 
silenced by the condition of transit to which many migrants are exposed to. Moreover, it 
will contribute to account for migrants’ claims for political agency in alliance with aid 
workers, shifting attention from survival as a rationale for governing migrants to struggles 
that contest ways of living that delimit people’s lives. 
Chapter four, Policing Humanitarianism: Everyday (B)ordering in Calais, 
focuses on Calais after the dismantling of the main ‘Jungle’. This chapter considers 
everyday (b)ordering in Calais by looking at the policing of humanitarian interventions 
conducted by aid workers and the interactions between the police, local administrations, 
aid organisations and migrants. By addressing the role that police forces play in limiting 
migrant’s life to mere survival, this chapter highlights the paradoxes of a system of 
governing migration that tolerates and exhausts, rescues from and exposes people on the 
move to danger. I also consider infrastructures of solidarity, from the Warehouse to 
operational buses in Calais, the on-stages/off-stages of migration, and vital projects which 
engage migrants as being entitled to more than a bearable life. While the criminalization 
of migrants and aid workers contributes to the (b)ordering of a tolerated form of 




deserve a renewed attention as actively reject the idea of what is ‘acceptable aid’. I 
conclude this chapter by introducing what I call the politics of perseverance which are 
expressed in the ways in which strategies of (b)ordering are being redefined on the ground 
by migrants who persevere beyond their criminalization. 
In Chapter five, Life as Politics: Survival, Migration, Art, I discuss how mere 
survival is counteracted by the will to re-ontologise what life means for the many who 
have been cast as deserving to (only) live with death. Moving away from the reduced 
biopolitical notion of life attached to survival through (b)ordering, this chapter explores 
the making of life as politics. The idea of the politics of perseverance is here considered 
from an engaged theoretical perspective where the discussion shifts also to the potential 
of migration as a creative force of politics. I read migrants’ excesses of sociability through 
the framework of Autonomy of Migration and reflect on what their lived experiences 
bring to borders. What I refer to as ‘affirmative survival’ is intended to open up a 
conversation about practices of security, resistances, strategies of escape, autonomy and 
dissent that are not articulated according to traditional framings of agency. In the last 
section of this chapter, I engage with borders and art. More precisely, I look at how 
migrants’ struggles to life are given visibility through public installation artworks and 
murals. Focusing on the theatricality of borders as walls and on counter-spectacles of 
(b)ordering migration, I argue that art has the potential to highlight migrants’ politics by 
disturbing the framing of their struggle to just survive as their only option, an option 
which does not entail their recognition as political life or their ‘right’ to make a life. As 
spectators we are forced to confront these daily injustices, and to confront ourselves and 
our omissions, namely the fact that we fail to recognise the multidimensionality of 
survival. 
The conclusion summarises the argument and chapters of the thesis. It also adds 










Figure 3. I have a station, hope; I have a city, hope; I have journeys of hope… 
To the ‘migrant’. 





The entrance of life into the realm of politics, as Foucault reminds us, has transformed 
politics at its core.1 Foucault identified two poles of a power over life: the anatomo-
politics of the body and the biopolitics of populations, biopower and biopolitics. In 
 
1 See Foucault M. (translated by Graham Burchell) The Birth of Biopolitics: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1978-




Foucault’s analysis, the ancient right over death has been transformed by the advent of a 
new power over life: while the right of sovereign power consists in letting live and making 
die, biopower is primarily concerned with making live and letting die.2 Foucault’s thesis 
is that the sovereign power to take life has been complemented by the advent of a new 
productive force that seeks to maintain, develop and manage life. Death has not been 
expelled from life but is considered as serving the interest of a life that needs to be actively 
promoted. The paradox of biopolitics here is clearly revealed: biopower lets die but does 
not ‘kill’, strictly speaking, but in doing so makes life live by converging to some degrees 
with death. This life intermingled with death is considered by Agamben as bare life, a 
political and philosophical category that seems to be insufficient to understand 
configurations of life with death as far as the figure of the migrant is concerned. Agamben 
operates on the assumption that biopolitics is above all thanatopolitics, and that biopower 
cannot be affirmative; his analysis of biopolitical life, seen through the logic of 
sovereignty, will be visited in this chapter next to Mbembe’s conceptualization of 
necropolitics. The intertwining between forms of life and death, I argue, are better 
recognised if we pay more attention to the notion of survival in all its facets and 
dimension. 
The object of this chapter will be to explore how survivalist power mechanisms 
locate life with death as a part of a wider understanding of how life is made disposable 
and (im)mobilised in its political qualification. Today, the governance of life with death 
has become an almost a normalised way to contain complex problems, to the point that 
politics needs to increasingly appeal to its biopolitical roots to function and adopt 
exclusionary mechanisms.3 For the purpose of understanding the role of (b)ordering in  
 
2 See Foucault M., ‘Right of Death and Power over Life’, in The History of Sexuality: An Introduction, Vol. I (1978) 
(London: Random House, 1990), Part V. 
3 For a more detailed accounts of the multiple ways of governing through life and death, see Clough P. T., Willse C. 





strategies of governance, survival needs to be given centre stage as a tool in biopolitical 
assemblages of power. This reading views biopolitics as a technology of power for 
managing human life that reduces migrants’ lives but also aims to preserve their lives 
contracting governance with forms of mere survival. This framing allow a more complex 
reading of governance which casts migrants as disposable and not fully disposable at the 
same time. More than focusing on biology versus politics, I explore practices that, 
ultimately, are justified by the need of ‘negative’ biopolitical power that is that of 
reducing some forms of life to mere survival. While biopower, and biopolitics more in 
general, have been deployed as a means for decentring sovereign explanations of power, 
together they shape wider meanings of life by making available multiple ways of living 
and ways of dying. Biopolitical rationales will be considered as fundamentally enacted 
though processes of (b)ordering. This draws on the idea that life specified by sovereign 
power and biopower, and biopolitics more broadly, derives from entangled ways through 
which social order happens. (B)ordering will also be discussed at the intersection between 
practices and discourses about securitisation and humanisation of certain lives. 
Securitisation, as the embodied process of threat construction, and humanisation, 
as the process that accounts for the making of the human as political status, will be 
situated within the context of life as excess of neoliberal value. I will look in this chapter 
at the (b)ordering of surviving bodies, as people made to live with death. Surviving bodies 
are understood here as those who are helped and supported to continue living but also 
(b)ordered as threatening and as such in need to mere survive. I finally argue that survival 
interrogates the unsuccessful desecuritisation of the human which, reversing security 
processes puts into question more profound biopolitical categories of governance. On this 
understanding of biopolitical governance stand the foundations for a wider discussion 





Giving Form(s) to Political Life 
 
Arguably, state sovereignty has been long considered the most fundamental idea through 
which authority manifested in the modern era.4 Understanding sovereignty as a distinctive 
configuration of state apparatuses means to conceive authority, and the power that derives 
from it, “as a property of [the] already constituted entity” that is the State.5 However, 
sovereignty is not a given form of life, but one specific manifestation (albeit not the only 
one) of political life. Through state sovereignty political life becomes (b)ordered, juridical 
principles subdivide territorialities into jurisdictions and differently organise belongings. 
As Arendt noticed, such divisions are ideologically grounded and rely on a specific idea 
of what constitutes a nation.6 In line with traditional modernist thoughts, in fact, exclusive 
sovereignty is not only exercised over a determined territory, but also over a specific and 
permanent population, the citizens inside a delimited nation-state. These citizens are 
entitled to rights, and their political and juridical dimension is defined through their 
belonging to a particular system that provides them with identity, security and ensures 
their existence as qualified beings. As Walker highlights, when answering the question 
whether ‘we’ are citizens, humans, or somehow both, state sovereignty affirms an identity 
that is particular, while retaining a connection with ‘humanity’ as an aspiring concept.7  
It is through the application of law, that safety is institutionalised as a particular 
duty and as a particular right: “sovereign power is understood as a reciprocal relation 
between sovereign [institutions] and [citizens] regulated by one legal code”.8 Such 
relation is grounded on a power that is “legislative, prohibitive and censoring”9 when 
exercised in the name of sovereignty. For instance, as Foucault explained in The History 
 
4 Jackson R. (2007) Sovereignty: Evolution of an Idea (Polity Press: Cambridge).  
5 Chowdhury A., Duvall R., ‘Sovereignty and Sovereign power’, International Theory (2014), 6(2), 191-223, 191.   
6 Arendt A., The Origin of Totalitarianism. 
7 Walker R. B. J. (1993) Inside/Outside: International Relations as Political Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press),154 
8 Ibid., 219. 
9 Lilja M., Vinthagen S., ‘Sovereign power, disciplinary power and biopower: resisting what power with what 




of Madness, societies are constructed though exclusionary systems that normalise in order 
to legitimately divide and oppose the “abnormal”.10 Sovereignty shares a common 
historical trajectory in the sense that functions as a mechanism that regularises social 
constructed concepts such as the idea of the nation and that of exclusive belonging. Nation 
states, citizens and a defined political space are the tenants of sovereign power and the 
main elements that give authority to our politically “imagined communities”.11 The nation 
is always imagined as limited community where an “immemorial past” and a “limitless 
future” converge to give contingency and change an eternal comforting feature of 
topological belonging.12 The possibility of exercising power to protect a territory and its 
citizen is today being increasingly displaced by new processes that rely on biopolitical 
strategies of (b)ordering that control the body of individuals and the productivity of 
populations.  
In a series of ground-breaking lectures delivered at the Collège de France, Foucault 
expands the idea of power by identifying, besides sovereign power, two new kind of 
powers: disciplinary power and biopower.13 Of these three, Foucault asserts, it is the 
distinguishable “productive character” of biopower, recognisable since the modern era, 
that makes it “the pragmatic force that liberal rule assumes”.14 Sovereign power and 
biopower differ by their respective meaning and scope: “while sovereign power is 
deployed through means of repression, prohibition, punishment and ultimately death, 
biopower is essentially life enhancing. It is concerned with the generation of life, rather 
than its disablement or negation”.15 By liberating power from its sovereign constraints, 
Foucault transforms our understanding of power, its location, its referent object and 
scope. While it is noteworthy to emphasise that multiple and competing definitions of 
 
10 Foucault M. (1961) The History of Madness (Routledge, 2009). 
11 Anderson B., Imagined Communities.  
12 Ibid., 50. 
13 See Coleman M., Grove K., ‘Biopolitics, Biopower and the Return of Sovereignty’. 
14  Reid J., ‘War, liberalism, and modernity: the biopolitical provocations of ‘Empire’, Cambridge Review of 
International Affairs (2004), 17(1), 63-79, 71. 




biopolitics have since been deployed,16 the biopolitics of biopower is preoccupied with 
the fructification of life by “tak[ing] species life as their referent objects”.17 In other 
words, biopower is a form of power whose vocation is to “make life live”18 through its 
circulation, regulation and modulation.  
Since the 18th century, “the fundamental biological fact that human beings are 
species”, Foucault reminds us, has become the object of a political strategy.19 As a 
measure of how politics is invested in life, however, biopolitics also reduces some forms 
of life that need to be excluded. This power to ‘make live’ does not promote all forms of 
life, by only the life that is not a ‘threat’ to populations while other lives need to be 
marginalised and segregated. In other words, these lives are ‘let to die’.  These exclusions 
are always legitimised in the name of the general health of a population understood as “a 
sort of technical-political object of management and government”.20 Under these 
conditions, it seems important to remark Foucault’s classical statement on the transition 
from sovereign territorial power that works by making die and letting live to biopower, 
that functions by making live and letting die.21 In shifting from traditional power to 
biopower, from sovereign territorial power to biopolitics, governance becomes an 
exercise of power-over-life: life is both abstracted and practically reduced to imperatives 
of biopolitical control.  
Within the system of making live and letting die, the political body needs to be 
transformed first and foremost into a biological datum that has a demographic relevance 
 
16 Coleman M., Grove K., ‘Biopolitics, Biopower and the Return of Sovereignty’, 489.  
17 Dillon M., Lobo-Guerrero L., ‘Biopolitics of Security in the 21st century: An Introduction’, Review of International 
Studies 2008, 34, 265-92, 265. 
18 Idem. 
19 Foucault M. (translated by Burchell G.) Security, Territory, Population. Lectures at the Collège de France,1977-78 
(Palgrave Macmillan), 16. 
20 Foucault M., Security, Territory, Population qtd in Grondin D. (2012) War Beyond the Battlefield (Routledge: 
Abingdon), 30. Population as object of government is understood by Foucault by coupling it with the ubiquitous 
apparatus of security that rely on mechanisms of distribution and control. According to him, security becomes dispersed 
by mechanisms of security that are governmentalised in the sense that capacities of power to affect the population 
increasingly depend on what can be called “administrative security”. 




and “whose birth and death, health and illness, must then be regulated”.22 A hierarchy of 
belongings is created and people as bodies are differentially embraced by politics. The 
paradox of biopolitics becomes even more complex once we provide an answer to the 
question of how this power-over life is asserted. Mechanisms of security and power 
maximisation, racism, gender discrimination, biotechnologies of control and dissipation 
are deployed to manage sectors of the populations otherwise deemed as inherently 
inimical. Life, therefore, needs to be expanded but also reduced so that it can function 
biopolitically. A biopolitics of the human race needs technologies of power to control 
knowledge and use the same knowledge to qualify death.23 Here death, which comes in 
many forms of discouragement of life, is made an object of governance that assumes state 
racism (but of course this is also applicable to other forms of discrimination) at its core 
by “fragmenting the field of the biological that power controls”.24 Racism establishes a 
functional relationship of war -“if you want to live you must take lives, you must be able 
to kill” – so that biological caesuras separate the good from the bad. 25 This separation 
serves to substantiate the very fact that if you let more people die, you will live more.26 
Generalised and normalised racism distributes death: functions of death shift to degrees 
of death, as degrees of racism inspire degrees of political belonging. 
With his analysis on biopolitics and (bio)power Foucault did not try to develop a 
theory of biopolitics, strictly speaking, but to reveal mechanisms and rationales of power 
that relate to various phenomena, developments and discourses.27 Foucault’s lectures, 
 
22 Ibid., 84. 
23 On biopolitics and race see Yeng S. (2013) The Biopolitics of Race: State Racism and U.S. Immigration (Lexington 
Books); Macey D., ‘Rethinking Biopolitics, Race and Power in the wake of Foucault’, Theory, Culture & Society, 
26(6), 186-205; Giroux A. H., ‘Reading Hurricane Katrina: Race, Class, and the Biopolitics of Disposability’, College 
Literature (Summer 2006), 33(3), 171-196; Fassin D., ‘The Biopolitics of Otherness: Undocumented Foreigners and 
Racial Discriminations in French Public Debate’, Anthropology Today (February 2001), 17(1), 3-7. 
24 Foucault M., Society must be defended, 254-55. 
25 Ibid., 255. 
26 Idem. 




biopower, and the political significance of life and death, in fact, have been widely 
explored in a wide range of disciplines.28 As Lemke reads it: 
“biopolitics [that takes life at its referent object] stands for a constellation in which modern 
human and natural sciences, and the normative concepts that emerge from them, structure 
political action and determine the goal of politics […] biopolitics stands for a fundamental 
transformation in the order of politics”.29  
 
 
Ultimately, this order is political because it makes life the object of calculations on which 
rely modes of politics that biopolitics represents.30 These modes of politics have given 
rise to very important debates about how bodies and populations are being managed in 
the context of neoliberal economy.31. Many authors have attempted to grasp how life 
could be rescued from and for biopolitics,32 and more attention has been given to how life 
functions through death as a measure of how biopolitics works today. What is interesting 
to note is that such works seem to have polarised the debate between vital and negative 
accounts of biopolitics, without qualifying life through the idea of survival.33 In the 
context of the Nazi camps, survival has been defined by essential works which often 
highlighted survival as the production of mere survival34 or as a specific experience of 
‘overcoming’35 (a concept that briefly resonates with the argument of chapter 5). I am 
proposing, in fact, here that the idea of survival needs to be explored outside the absolute 
 
28 Lebovic N., ‘Review Essay: Biopolitics among the disciplines’, History & Theory, Studies in the Philosophy of 
History (June 2019), 58(2), 284-92; Liesen L. T., Walsh M. B., ‘The competing meanings of ‘biopolitics’ in political 
science: Biological and postmodern approaches to politics’, Politics and the Life Sciences (Spring/Fall 2012), 31(1/2), 
2-15. 
29 Lemke T. Biopolitics: An Advanced Introduction, 33. 
30 Lemke T., ‘From state biology to the government of life: historical dimensions and contemporary perspectives of 
‘biopolitics’, Journal of Classical Sociology (2010), 10(4), 421-38. 
31 Mavelli L., ‘Governing the resilience of neoliberalism through biopolitics’, European Journal of International 
Relations (2017), 23(3), 489-512; Willse G., ‘Surplus Life: Biopower and Neoliberalism’, Gender, Justice and 
Neoliberal Transformations (Fall 2012/Spring 2013), Barnard Center for Research on Women Issue, 11(1)-11(2). 
Available at: http://sfonline.barnard.edu/gender-justice-and-neoliberal-transformations/surplus-life-biopower-and-
neoliberalism/ [accessed 10 March 2020].  
32 Levinson B., ‘Biopolitics in Balance: Esposito’s Response to Foucault’, The New Centennial Review, Michigan State 
University Press (Fall 2010), 10(2), 239-61. For a deeper understanding of biopolitics through the paradigm of 
immunisation, see Esposito R. (2017) Immunitas: The Protection and Negation of Life (Polity Press). 
33 Redfield P., ‘Doctors, Borders, and Life in Crisis’. 
34 Bettelheim B., Surviving and other essays. 




conditions of existence in extremity, such as those of the Holocaust, in order to put into 
focus the more generalised biopolitical border that it creates.36  
 What I refer to as mere survival serves to recognise ways of governing life without 
letting people die as they are ‘allowed’ to (only) survive. Moving away from Foucault’s 
binary formula making live and letting die, I consider a series of mechanisms that regulate 
life and intertwine it with more complex modes of governance that aim to reduce certain 
lives to a matter of mere survival. In other words, all these readings help us to put into 
focus an idea of survival in the context of (b)ordering politics which ensure that a lower 
threshold of life can be established and normalised as such. Survival is understood in this 
thesis in two ways: it is a (b)ordering strategy where life and death are made to coexist in 
the management of migrants and as an ‘affirmative’ process of ‘overcoming’ which 
resides with migrants themselves and their alliances (in the thesis I consider alliances 
with aid workers and, indirectly, with artists). This framing allows us to reframe survival 
as not only what the migrants is ‘allowed’ to do by power structures (to live on), a way 
of surviving death which cannot be called fully living. While experiences of keeping-on-
living-making-life will be better considered later in this work in terms of politics of 
perseverance, developing also a different analytic of survival serves to bring to the fore 
lives who are considered unworthy and, as such, relegated to ‘limbo spaces’. In these 
spaces, migrants are reduced to (only) survive by making a diminished way of ‘living’ 
acceptable, ‘living’ by parading ‘dying’ as a possibility. 
For the aim of rethinking what mere survival means and does for the many who are 
subjected to it, we need to first engage with the idea of (b)ordering. In Bordering Yuval-
Davis and others look at the de-territorialisation and re-territorialisation of borders in 
order to diagnose the growing centrality of bordering dynamics operating today.37 
 
36 Vaughan-Williams N., ‘The generalised biopolitical border? Re-conceptualising the limits of sovereign power’, 
Review of International Relations (October 2009), 35(4), 729-49. 




Located at the intersection between the political and the sociocultural, bordering, or 
rather, (b)ordering, is a process that is continuously happening by maintaining social 
order connected with notions of material borders and migration.38 In particular, the 
authors insist, bordering matters because it runs across everyday discourses and practices 
of intersectional differentiation.39 As such, “crossing borders […] is only one way in 
which bordering has come to play a major part in people’s everyday lives”.40 Most of the 
time, in fact, these borders are ‘lived’. (B)ordering, therefore, does not only regard the 
effects of the implementation of state policies, but it also concerns the complex ways in 
which these boundaries are embodied so that people themselves are made to carry borders 
within society. Yuval-Davis and others emphasise four major complementary arguments 
about bordering:  
“1) contemporary borderings are central and constitutive of a myriad of political, economic 
and social processes; 2) different and contesting political projects of governance and 
belonging make up bordering; 3) these processes produce and are produced by intersectional 
inequalities; 4) differently situated social agents make bordering relevant to a wide range of 
bordering scapes”.41  
 
(B)ordering as a power technology makes social relations that are continuously 
extended to practices of governing bodies by giving them precise identities and value.42 
The governing of bodies is closely related to re-territorialised processes that aim not only 
at maintaining sovereignty but also at preserving regulation through space.43 As territory 
is itself a power technology,44 the distribution of fears and unfears through bodies is 
mapped through markers that are bordered in the everyday political arrangements of 
governance.45 (B)ordering is then a medium that expands geographies of border-making, 
and the body represents the limit of new possibilities of life with death. It is the body that 
 
38 Ibid., 22. 
39 Ibid., 24. 
40 Ibid. 
41 Ibid., 160. 
42 See Elden S. (2017) Foucault: The Birth of Power (Polity Press). 
43 Jones R., Johnson C. (2014) Placing the Border in Everyday Life (Ashgate), 141. 
44 Elden S., ‘Land, terrain, territory’, Progress in Human Geography (2010), 34(6), 799-817. 




carries the border, and this embodiment is situated within territories that serve to govern 
life in society. Drawing on this, (b)ordering is understood as a key aspect for thinking 
how people on the move are kept (im)mobile, securitised and ‘humanised’ by maintaining 
crucial relations with linear borders. These relations are political and spatial at the same 
time. Aspects of life and death intersect with survival so that both are maintained as 
possible, and (b)ordering is the mean for grounding this political project. With reference 
to people on the move in the context of the European Union, we are faced with new ways 
of targeting both ‘their safety’ and ‘our security’ so that borders are now being managed 
by reducing migrants to (only) survive. It is not just about othering and ordering people 
but also making these processes of (b)ordering coincide with the territorial limits of nation 
states so that people can continue to exist in excess within them. When biopolitics is 
understood as thanatopolitics as in Agamben’s view, or death is considered as a 
necropower, as in Membe’s view, people can exist (in excess) respectively giving rise to 
the figure of “bare life” and that of the “living-dead”.  
 
Thanatopolitics, Necropolitics and the Body Politic 
 
The lethal dimension that biopolitical life takes has been the object of contention for many 
authors who aimed to rethink biopolitics as biopower that serves to intensify death. Death 
comes in the form of expulsion, abandonment, denigration or even “killing without 
committing homicide”.46 Foucault did not develop the relationship between the two 
dimensions of biopower, its vitality and its negation, as he also avoided to ontologise life 
as he conceived it at the service of technologies of power. Agamben, instead, has 
extensively considered death as a mechanism of biopolitical power. For Agamben 
biopolitics is above all thanatopolitics that is politics as the work of death. While Foucault 
 
46 This is represented by the figure of the Homo Sacer understood as a sacred figure whose killing is permitted without 




highlights how life as an object of government has to become productive by disallowing 
some forms of life, it is Agamben who maximises a lethal dimension of biopolitics by 
positing the production of bare life and death at the centre of operations of power. On the 
account that “politics is always a matter of the body, and the body is always already a 
biopolitical body”,47 Agamben sustains that sovereign rule and biopolitical exception are 
inherently instrumental to the political functionality of power that works through the 
negation of some strata of human existence. According to this, thanatopolitics is not only 
an integral part of biopolitics, but is its dominant expression. 
Agamben disputes Foucault’s claim that biopolitics emerges since the modern era 
arguing instead that it is the very essence of politics, and as such, it finds its manifestation 
through the “structure of exception”.48 As he puts it: “the production of a biopolitical 
body is the original activity of sovereign power”, and the politicisation of bare life, “mere 
life”,49 which is evident if one considers how sovereign power expands itself in the form 
of exception. Here, law is suspended but not transgressed. Bare life comes into the domain 
of sovereign power, therefore “putting the originary fiction of modern sovereignty in 
crisis”.50 It is through the idea of the camp as a paradigm of the state of exception that 
Agamben highlights the perpetual complicity of political and natural life: “the state of 
exception ceases to be referred to as an external and provisional state of actual danger 
and comes to be confused with juridical rule itself”.51 By governing through emergency, 
sovereignty has internalised the exception as a constitutive part of its way of ruling. In 
 
47 Agamben G. (1997) Homo Sacer, 178 qtd in Norris A., ‘Giorgio Agamben and the Politics of the Living Dead’, 
Diacritics (Winter 2000), 30(4), 38-58, 53. 
48 According to Agamben, sovereignty poses the naked life of the individual as a presupposition of its governability. 
“Vita nuda” – bare life – is posed as a form of life that is without appeal once the human is de-humanised as a biological 
entity. The human within biopolitics, is opposed to its own humanity that can only be promoted through the biological 
existence of others. While Agamben considers disposed lives as irreducible to their biopolitical condition, more 
attention seems to be needed to understand how thresholds are crossed and movement is created in this field of the 
political. For more on the idea of humanity thanatopolitics promotes. See Agamben G. (1997) Homo SacerIbid., 8. 
49 Idem. 
50 Ibid., 126. 




these (bio)political spaces, political and natural life are made indistinguishable as bare 
life that exists in death. 
However, death can be also considered a more general mechanism of power that, 
according to Mbembe, now functions as necropower. This form of power: 
 “account[s] for the various ways in which, in our contemporary world, weapons are deployed 
in the interest of maximum destruction of persons and the creation of death-worlds – new 
and unique forms of social existence in which vast populations are subjected to conditions of 
life conferring upon them the status of living dead”.52  
 
 
Understood as “the subjugation of life to the power of death”, necropolitics not only 
constitutes the limits of sovereignty but also puts into question the limits of categories of 
the political itself.53 Mbembe presents a reading of politics as the work of death that 
moves away from death as an exclusive field of biopower, through a concatenation of 
politics as a state of exception and as a state of siege.54 In particular, Mbembe takes as a 
starting point of analysis the racial practices that are at play in the biopolitical 
fragmentation of life: a set of differential mechanisms are deployed as determinant 
condition for the management of life. Moving away from the absolute materialisation of 
negative power exemplified by the Nazi camp, Mbembe refers to the slaves’ colony and 
to the contemporary colonial occupation of Palestine as the spatialization of the state of 
exception/siege.55 These two examples are of particular importance as biopower here only 
partially accounts for the political and juridical arrangements of space and life. These are 
defined, instead, by the manifestation of a different kind of power. While biopower is 
another “domain of life over which power has taken control”,56 ‘murder’ is made relative 
to political power in the sense that what makes the murder of the enemy its absolute 
 
52 Mbembe A., ‘Necropolitics’, 40. 
53 Ibid. 
54 In this essay, Mbembe refers to what it calls “topographies of cruelty”, from the plantation to the colony. The idea is 
that under conditions of necropower, death is elevated to a point that conceptual boundaries and practical forms of 
existence blurry to accommodate various ways in which life is lived in death. In particular, he examines the plantation 
system by stressing how ramifications of power work at the service of subjugating slaves through a state of 
unconditional immobility. This power over the life of the slave is described as a crucial concatenation of race, biopower, 
state of siege and terror. Ibid., 22. 
55 Idem. 




objective is the sovereign ‘right to kill’ that not only comes from a biopolitical necessity.57 
Mortality is not only part of a biopolitical fraction of the insurability of the life of ‘all’, 
but also a problem for political ontology that has elevated death to its inconclusive 
negation. In other words, death has become the condition of possibility of contemporary 
political life, a condition that is not only determined by its probabilistic presence, but also, 
and more importantly, by the intensity through which it operates.  
Under necropolitics, death is operationalised by a combination of interventions 
that deny life: the conceptual validity of the figure of the “living-dead” lies precisely in 
its ability to represent different degrees of political mortality that are the equivalent of the 
sovereign capacity for governing biopolitical and other forms of life. Moreover, this 
figure facilitates our way of thinking about our very political coexistence: we are made 
to live, let to die, made to die, and let to live according to an imperfect analogy that 
sustains itself not by promoting a purity of life versus an impurity of death (and vice 
versa), but by stabilising both. Life and death are now a matter of degree and not an 
ending per se. The “living-dead” represents the correlation of what natural and political 
life cannot exhaust and for this reason needs to be made (im)mobile for the time necessary 
to its reconsideration.  
From this perspective, more layers are added to the legitimate life of the body 
politic that is always already the residual manifestation of proper stratifications. In this 
respect, a focus on the body politic is of explanatory value for our understanding on how 
bodies are produced, reproduced, vilified and stretched according to mechanisms of 
power that are also mechanisms that suspend life and death, and differently appeal on 
their discretional utility. Thinking about the body politic unavoidably involves positing 
these so-called layers of legitimacy into a frame of reference where bodies are differently 






to belong to a polis. While the Greek idea of polis as community is today more diversified 
than ever, the core principle of including by means of exclusion persists in ways that are 
relevant for the expression of an order that is more than ideological. In our contemporary 
world, this involves thinking about what Arendt refers to as the old trinity of state-people-
territory and their exclusionary political relevance.58 It is worth reflecting on the 
composition of the body politic at this stage as it contributes to the materialisation of in-
between bodies. Complementing the idea of the subject understood as a derivative of 
sovereign power whose individuality and equalising difference is legally recognised and 
promoted, with what Arendt calls the “production of corpses”, 59 one should note that 
between these two extremes, between the ‘living’ and the ‘dead’, the juridical liveable 
body and the disposable one, lays the surviving body. What it is interesting about this 
body is not its life subjugated to its (absolute) biological form but its life as politicised 
biopolitics. Especially since Foucault’s analysis on how species being come into the focus 
of political power with the emergence of the population as a biological datum, the body 
has been, and it is being, re-politicised and de-politicised. As Wilcox remarks, it is power 
that always produces the subject that purports to regulate, a power that is not simply 
reflective of pre-existing subjects but that expands and extends subjectivities making 
them more or less vulnerable.60 Thought in terms of security or humanitarianism, as we 
will see, the body also becomes a problem with a double-focus.  
 
Surviving Bodies: “Life as Surplus” and Bioeconomy of Life  
 
In A Zombie Manifesto: The NonHuman Condition in the Era of Advanced Capitalism, 
Lauro and Embry propose a passionate reading of the zombie as a Derridian entity that is 
 
58 Arendt A., ‘The decline of the Nation State and the End of the Rights of Man’, Chapter 9, 268-332 in The Origins of 
Totalitarianism. 
59 For Arendt the “fabrication of corpses” is at the centre of totalitarian domination. In The Origin of Totalitarianism, 
she refers to the “insane mass manufacture of corpses”. The arbitrariness of mass death in the camp produces bodies 
that are the intelligible manifestation of absolute destruction. Ibid. 




neither a being nor a non-being. The zombie reveals a general crisis in subjective 
embodiment that is mainly anti-subjective.61 The disability of human embodiment is what 
allows the zombie to be seen “as a body without a mind” and as a “boundary marker” that 
enacts the negative dialects of life: the zombie does not strive for self-affirmation but is 
rather the very actualisation of its denial.62 Inspired by Horkheimer and Adorno, Lauro 
and Embry analyse how under capitalism the illusion of the self is made ineffectual to the 
point that our subjectivity is merely a fiction that allows ideological control. While we 
are made to believe that we count for the simple fact that we exist as such, the zombie’s 
body is there to remind us that the corpse can only negate itself. The two authors go so 
far as to affirm that “even the zombie’s survival of death is anti-celebratory, for it remains 
trapped in a corpse body”.63 The monstrosity of the zombie is sanctioned by the fact that 
“it has not life to end” and its enslavement to the market expands according to strategies 
of annihilation.64 Under advanced capitalism, we might be aware of not-being but we 
have no other choice than stage ourselves into a vain survival. The vision of humanity 
that emerges from thinking boundaries between life and death in terms of the emergent 
figure of the zombie takes us to a new terrain that is not just, strictly speaking, that of 
post-humanity, thanatopolitics or necropolitics. The zombie is not simply the negation of 
humanity but an embodied reminder that life can cease to exist. As such, the zombie can 
be dead while living or can live while being dead. In both circumstances, the zombie is 
survives as a variant of a biopoliticised body.  
Moving away from the radical embodiment of death that the zombie represents, it 
can be argued that today life also engages with death in ways that maintain survival 
possible as a measure of biopolitical rationales of containment. Focusing only on the 
 
61 Lauro S. J., Embry K., ‘A Zombie Manifesto: The Nonhuman Condition in the Era of Advanced Capitalism’, 
Boundary 2 (Spring 2008), 35(1), 85-108. 
62 Ibid. 
63 Ibid., 97. 
64 Here, the two authors are quoting a line for Max Brook’s piece on The Zombie Survival Guide: Complete Protection 
from the Living Dead. This is a humoristic piece that provides some guidelines for defending in the occurrence of a 




theorizations of bodies as natural organisms, as bodies who can be already dead in their 
political potential, as lives which humanity can only be denied, fails to consider how 
bodies are politicised and how they confront limitations through decisions taken upon 
their ‘utility’.65 In this respect, a body has a functionality that is not only, and merely, 
recognisable as a form of biopolitical objectification but more importantly is inserted into 
a bioeconomy of life that connects the commercialisation of life sciences with that of 
capital, goods, services and people. As Cooper, who investigates neoliberal biopolitics 
by providing an account of the commodification of bio-life, argues, we are embedded in 
the era of biotechnology, a time where life and neoliberalism have coupled to create an 
emergent economy of life sciences organised around the principle of the market.66 As 
Cooper remarks, “neoliberalism and the biotech industry share a common ambition to 
overcome the ecological and economic limits to growth associated with the end of 
industrial production, through a speculative reinvention of the future”.67 This speculation 
about the future means that what has yet to come is pre-emptively made knowable in the 
present thanks to a bio-economic control over life.  
A new culture of the living is being fashioned that no longer looks at the right-to-
live as a legalist right-to-be but replaces it with a bio-determined dimension that charges 
life with its very biological intelligibility. Bodies are being transformed into a process of 
expenditure and “life as a surplus” emerges by re-emerging from the re-adaptive 
capacities of market production. This “surplus”, that is both an addition and a subtraction 
of utilitarian values, is the result of scientific interpretations of problems that are part of 
a broader economy where life science, people, technologies and capital intersect. As 
Rifkin highlights, the relationships among “elements of life are today made classifiable 
 
65 See Bauman Z. (2003) Wasted Lives: Modernity and its Outcasts (Polity Press); Moira G. (1996) Imaginary Bodies: 
Ethics, Power and Corporeality (Routledge: New York). 
66 Cooper M. (2008) Life as Surplus: Biotechnology & Capitalism in the Neoliberal Era (University of Washington 
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through biotechnologies that target biological systems” as systems of reality.68 The union 
of computer technology and genetic engineering, is the starting point for thinking the kind 
of reality that can be constructed and promoted. This is not, in fact, a reality expressed as 
a value-free projection of biological bodies, but an expansion and extension of constraints 
that are creative in the sense that biotechnologies enable “increments of power, a way to 
exercise an advantage over the forces of nature and each other”.69 Biotechnologies 
intervene directly into frames of reality redesigning the production and circulation of 
death by subjugating life to a political and economic currency of controllability. 
Technologies are making visible the effects of certain dynamics that reconfigure 
existence, namely life and death,70 creating excesses about how the human is projected 
into economic life as a form of techno-politicised existence. Scientific, technological and 
economic interventions, therefore, aim to further border humanity where the rhetorical 
and practical gap between natural and political life are co-opted into mechanisms of 
power that securitise life and death accordingly. In the same way, survival can therefore 
be understood as a strategy for (b)ordering subjects who are valued as far as they can be 
inscribed in a world of value exchange.  
The governance of life with death understood as a practice of (b)ordering 
surviving bodies, intertwines survival with biopolitical governance whose subjects are 
thought to be not just natural lives but as subjects who are caught between more complex 
relationships with ontological and epistemological articulations of the ‘human’ and 
practices and discourses that securitise them. Analytically, this thesis does not deploy the 
category of survivors understood as those who overcame death;71 it refers to surviving 
migrants as those who are condemned to be victims to be saved or threats to be securitised, 
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70 In order to better understand Rifkin’s argument, see Chapter 4, ‘Eugenic Civilisation’, 116-47. 
71 Particularly interesting in this discussion is the difference between the language of ‘victim’ vs ‘survivor’. See Gupta 
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but also to those who are struggling to be recognized as people not only in need of 
humanitarian interventions or securitisation. The effort that this work attempts to make, 
therefore, is that of considering the ways in which the lives of people on the move 
interrogate processes of survival as a strategy of governance. Surviving bodies, in fact, 
are not survivors who have defeated death, but they are always in the process of 
overcoming life with death. Strictly speaking, survival, therefore, is not understood to be 
simply an ‘achievement’ but a condition that, however, from the perspective of 
governance makes mere life coexist with death. This is how bare life is distinguished from 
the making of surviving subjects who are in need of interventions in order to preserve 
their mere survival. The in-between of life and death is survival in the sense that people 
are ‘allowed’ to survive only if their engagements with life are reduced. Surviving 
subjects are not only those who are rescued and tolerated while also being criminalised 
and conceived as a threat. Surviving subjects, in fact, always exist in excess, but also 
refuse to be bordered between the necessity to care for them and that of controlling them.  
Throughout this work it is argued that relationships of (b)ordering are maintained 
by modes of governance that take ‘hold’ of migrants’ lives ‘allowing’ them to mere live 
with death. Migrants strive to survive due to the injustice and violence of borders but are 
also caught between processes of (b)ordering that reduce their engagements with life: on 
the one hand, migrants are framed as humans in need of protection; on the other hand, 
they are deemed as subjects of security concern. In both cases, migrants are bordered, 
othered and ordered through polices, practical arrangements and discourses that not only 
create a gap within the reality/rhetoric of border management but drive on such ambiguity 
to ensure acceptable (to the State) modes of survival. While these aspects will be widely 
explored in the thesis, we need to first engage with framings of security as securitisation 
and humanitarianism as humanisation to set the foundation for rethinking the effects and 




Lost in Translation: Humanitarianism and Security  
 
For long, security seemed to be an easy concept to grasp. Security was mainly about 
protecting territories, remodelling a state of nature, insuring and guarantying safety. This 
is not to say that security has never been an “uncontested concept”,72 but that its meaning 
possessed some sort of univocal stand. Classical theorizations of security were based on 
an idea of fixity: the fixity of a territory (the nation); the fixity of an apparatus (the state); 
the fixity of a purpose, namely the protection of the state from external threats (defence). 
In addition to this, the fixity of these traditional elements of security was complemented 
by a modernist idea of emancipation: security was also a mean for empowerment insofar 
as its full state of safety was idealised as the enabling defensive measure of a state of 
freedom from fear.73  In contemporary life, climate change,74 poverty,75 health,76 
territorial integrity77 and human suffering,78 have all become part of legitimate concerns 
that frame security through a concatenation of different approaches. Everything is a 
matter of security but not all can be considered a priority for security. Nowadays security 
has become many things, none of which is univocal. The potential for security is today 
constantly being redrawn by new ideas of what matters for security, in particular in terms 
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of what constitutes a security threat, which is its referent object and what interconnects 
human suffering and states national interests. The relevance of security is a matter of 
political understanding, a matter that is increasingly being re-directed towards its 
biopoliticisation. In this scenario, the humanity of security, or alternatively the need to 
target humans within security, intersects with securitising discourses that socially 
construct and stage threats. In order to locate life within a biopolitical paradigm of 
survival, humanitarianism and securitisation need to be shown for what they create: a 
political and moral impasse. It is within this insurmountable deadlock that survival is 
presented as the acceptable and necessary synthesis of life with death.  
 
Security as securitisation  
 
Since the 1990s, Critical Security Studies challenged mainstream security theories calling 
for a rethinking of traditional analysis of what constitutes security and its privileged 
referent object. Wǣver’s idea of securitisation can be considered as part of such 
rethinking. First outlined in 1995, it is with the publishing of Security: A New Framework 
for Analysis in 1998 that the concept has received wider attention.79 By proposing 
different conceptual developments to the study and framing of security,80 the book, which 
sees also the contribution of Buzan and de Wilde, is mostly important as it stresses the 
need to look at security processually. In particular, is Wǣver’s argument that security 
needs to be seen as a securitising measure that deserves more attention. Generally 
associated with what will be later named as the Copenhagen School of Security Studies, 
the concept of securitisation refers to social constructivist ideas of how security is not 
 
79 Buzan B., Wǣver O. and de Wilde J. (1998) Security: A New Framework of Analysis (Lynne Rienner Publishers). 
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simply a matter of objective reality, but a reality that matters through its construction.81 
According to this, security is no longer about ‘real’ problems that concern ‘safety’ or a 
differentiation of issues, but the validation of threats that are always socially constructed. 
As Wǣver highlights, security is a discursive performance: “[it is] by labelling something 
as a security issue that it become[s] one”.82 The main argument is then that security is a 
speech act that stages threats and makes some of these threats more relevant than others 
according to a securitisation process that includes three main steps: the identification of 
a threat; its framing as emergency; the operationalization of what is constructed as 
pressing and legitimate breaking of rules.83  
Nevertheless, security calls for emergency measures that stretch beyond an 
‘illocutionary’ composition of the problems of reality. Securitisation as a political method 
informs the politics of security in ways that are processual in the sense that no stable 
formulas can be deployed to sustain security claims.84 As a matter of fact, these claims 
are politically significant once security works to politicise and depoliticise issues that 
become hyper-dramatized as life-threatening priorities that call for action. In other words, 
securitisation works to subvert legally democratic practices in order to function outside 
their normal framing once exceptional circumstances are elevated to unconditional 
necessity. Despite some analytical ambiguities that characterise the concept,85 the way 
security justifies more security can be inserted into a general framework of securitisation 
that is heavily reliant on discursive dynamics that stress the necessity for some sort of 
political intervention. Such framework is sustained by a political construction of a threat 
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and the consequent need for political answers that are limited only by what security calls 
for. The contents of security become the unlimited limits of any security measure that 
needs to be taken to fulfil the claims made at the beginning of any securitisation process. 
For instance, it can be said that political discourses based on abstract notions of national 
interest strictly depend on this volatile notion of security that is shuffled from the level of 
threats to matters of life. 
This mattering of security turns out to be a biosecurity problem that adds to the 
securitisation of bodies. As we will see when looking at the biopoliticization of borders, 
biosecurity works by keeping bodies in motion, controlled through the predisposition of 
making their possibility to be securitised a rationale exercise of politics. In particular, 
biosecurity attaches to the migrant a higher possibility to carry threats that are not only 
reducible to the (b)ordering of its identity or behaviour, but also pathologizes bodies as 
biologically dangerous.86 Migrants are not only securitised as potential criminals but also 
considered to be dangerous for public health in general. Through narratives that articulate 
the body of the migrant as carrying diseases, pervasive discourses that medicalise people 
on the move contribute to the making of bodies whose conditions of life are de-politicised 
and re-biologized.87 Systemic attempts to establish connections between insecurity and 
objectivity of threats through medicalised frames fail to engage with migrants as subjects, 
making them exist solely as security objects.88 Biosecurity, therefore, further qualifies 
migrants by adding reasons for (b)ordering them. On the one hand, securitisation imposes 
control over the care of people deemed to be, in various ways, a risk. On the other hand, 
humanisation calls for care over people who are at risk, and because of this, controlled. 
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It seems clear, therefore, that securitising moves tend to expand ideas about what 
constitutes security for the time necessary to their political assessment. Securitising 
frameworks totalises security attaching to it a significance that goes well beyond the need 
to respond to a threat per se, giving to it instead a wider normative qualification. In other 
words, securitisation actualises insecurity. Securitisation turns out to be a self-referential 
governmental apparatus of ideas, carefully conceived and politically synthetized. This is 
not to say that objective threats do not exist. Rather than dismissing dangers or perils as 
social construct, practices of securitisation reveal that the degrees by which objective 
threats are capitalised by security – or are not capitalised by security – are directly 
correlated to the kind of politics that are pursuable in the name of security. The different 
ways in which speech acts create security is what matters for the diversification of modes 
of security.89 While McDonald reminds us that the complexity of the construction of 
security in today’s world cannot be reduced to a series of determined acts,90 the 
importance of the analysis of the Copenhagen School of Security Studies and its followers 
lies precisely in the will to reveal logics of security that would be otherwise naturalised 
and normalised. Once security is inserted into a discursive container of emergency, where 
national interest and life-threatening issues collude, we are in the position of losing sight 
of what security has to be about beyond its construction. The main argument is then that 
responding to threats is often equated to how that threat has been priory constructed and 
intentions previously legitimised.  
 
Humanitarianism as humanisation  
 
The making of security as securitised rationale is in perpetual tension with the making of 
the human within humanitarian rationales. Today, we think of the human according to its 
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many variants: as an object at the service of the production of life,91 a liberating cyborg 
that promises a new life to come,92 a victim of anthropocentric circumstances,93 a 
bordered individuality whose value is politically defined,94 and so on. Despite such a 
conceptual fog, what seems clear is that the human is never, and not exclusively, the result 
of its imminent humanity but a category that always needs to be qualified. Contestations 
over what constitutes the human itself revolve around the value of the human and its 
making. If we consider being human a political status, we must consider that the human 
is constantly politically qualified from ‘above’ so that hierarchies of (b)ordering can be 
established.95  
In principle, the doctrine of humanitarianism is what informs discretional 
universal ethics and contributes to define what constitutes the human that selectively 
needs to be saved, to be empowered and to be protected. Behind humanitarianism, lay 
moral imperatives and some sort of shared ethics that are the dominant foundational 
essentials that are supposed to transcend ideology, identity, belonging and cultural beliefs 
more in general. Humanitarianism is often thought as having the intermediating function 
of re-framing issues towards their empathic, compassionate and more humane purpose. 
The need to uphold the principle of humanitarianism is inextricably bound to the need to 
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mobilise to bring justice and ‘save lives’.96 The question of state responsibility is 
extremely important to understand how humanitarian principles inform humanitarian 
politics today in ways that are always discursively sustained. Humanitarianism is a 
doctrine, a guiding principle, an “act of charity” or an “act of duty” which might be better 
understood when considered through its rhetorical potential.97 The analytical importance 
of looking at how the human appears and disappears from political discourses is directly 
correlated with the intentionality of making it relevant to its own humanity. In so doing, 
humanitarianism that relies on its own definition and ‘making’ of the human.  
The conduct of humanitarianism, therefore, constructs subjects and delimits their 
relations towards political power. When thinking about humanitarianism at the border, 
for instance, Ticktin reminds us that “it provides little room to feel and recognise the 
value of particular lives (versus life in general), or to mourn particular deaths (versus 
suffering in general); and little impetus to animate political change”.98 As a form of 
politics, humanitarianism takes the category of the human and makes it self-evident to 
pre-political ideas that naturalise action in the name of moral interventions. The rhetorical 
practices of humanitarianism aim not only at the activation of grand emotions but aspire 
to create consensus for the subsequent legitimisation of strategic emotional suffering.99 
All these elements together provide the full expression of humanitarian politics that are 
always premised on an “emergency imaginary” that justifies interventions as 
necessary.100 As a generalised mode of governing, humanitarianism claims the universal 
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through discourses of human rights, but it perpetuates the particular by differentiating 
rights to lives in particular.101  
Humanitarianism reveals that the human is bounded to politics of instrumental 
necessity whose discursive ethos is ideal for the production of more or less strong 
narratives for the security of all. It is noteworthy to emphasise that quests for security on 
humanitarian grounds are always premised on a political rhetoric that aims to transcend 
the political for the sake of the human so that feelings become more important than 
rights.102 This aporia within humanitarianism often functions to legitimise unequal lives 
as more or less human lives in need of intervention. The moral takes hold of the legal and, 
as Feldman and Ticktin remind us, the ‘making’ of humanity dilutes the meaning of 
humanity so that humanitarianism can become an empty signifier.103 Humanitarianism 
concerns the human insofar as the human is at risk due to its own condition of suffering. 
The threat to the ‘human,’ instead, is recast as ‘inhuman’ and in this process differences 
are justified in the name of the governance of the whole humanity.104 The defence of 
humanity, therefore, becomes the reason for perpetuating an idea of humanity that is 
secured only though the de-humanisation of some of its components. Humanitarianism is 
no longer the promotion of human welfare per se, but the process through which the 
making of the human within securitised discourses takes place.  
The managerial orientation of humanitarianism today is what makes the human 
part of a process whereby reducing suffering is a general act of power, but also an act of 
‘saving’ the human from its own limitations. The autonomy of the modern subject as a 
human, in fact, is also re-problematised as a threat to life itself. The ‘autonomous subject’, 
‘the man of rights’ of modernity, is differently conceptualised in biopolitical framings: 
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subjectivities are organised according to the domain of life itself and their biological 
features. Under the imperative of guaranteeing biological order, the biohuman is not 
‘saved’ as bare life but securitised as a life that struggles to self-secure itself.105 In 
biopolitical terms, therefore, what it means to be human is tied to notions of species life 
that promote humanitarianism and practices that encourage “adaptation, learning, co-
evolution and information sharing”.106 These ways of conceiving politics transform 
humanitarianism in ways that transcend the division between the rule of law/territory and 
the rule of life towards the imperative to equip the human with what is needed to carry 
on living. 
Humanitarianism, therefore, aims to capture all these complex rationales for 
governing bodies who are deemed to be in need of interventions which concomitantly 
redefine (and reduce) their human needs. It is not just about identifying who counts as 
human in need of protection, but also about making processes of (b)ordering necessary 
because of it. (Nevertheless, and this will be made more explicit in the last chapters of 
the thesis, I also argue that exist forms of humanitarian activism and grassroot initiatives 
that are redefying on the ground the terms of these interventions both politically but also 
challenging the kind of aid that should be (only) provided to migrants to survive as such.) 
At this point of the discussion, therefore, this more theoretical engagement with 
constructions of the ‘human’ and articulations of security helps us to put into focus modes 
of governing that are in perpetual tension and that contribute to (b)ordering: how people 
should deserve to live and why they should not deserve more. Besides stressing the 
importance of how such framings of securitisation and humanisation legitimise political 
actions of different kinds, it is their construction that is more relevant to explaining how 
threats are embedded into the very idea of individual humanity. Migrants are securitised 
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but also ‘humanised’, yet they cannot be fully ‘humanised’ if they are securitised. What 
lies in between?  
 
Desecuritising the Human, Compromising Survivability 
 
In this scenario, some have suggested that a more useful way to look at securitisation is 
through desecuritisation --the unmaking of the process through which threats are 
identified or constructed-- which has been considered by some as a better attempt to look 
at security politically rather than analytically.107 Politically speaking, in fact, it is how a 
threat is constructed that matters: as Huysmans remarks, while threat perception “is a 
perception of something externally given, a speech act only refers to itself, that is, the 
very act of uttering ‘security’”.108 What is interesting to consider is that securitised 
security is not only a performative modality of sorting out threats but also a prescriptive 
way to reinforce degrees of ideological risk. This is remarked by Huysmans who suggests 
that securitisation leads to the pragmatic re-proposition of elements of political realism 
and a resurgence of the politics of enmity as theorised by Schmitt.109 This political re-
ordering, Huysmans insists, becomes a “technique of government which retrieves the 
ordering force of fear of violent death by a mythical replay of variations of the Hobbesian 
state of nature”.110 In other words, securitisation creates the place for democracy to 
delegitimise itself without being seen as doing this. In particular, Huysmans 
problematises the securitising of societal issues through discursively constructed 
narratives that reinforce othering: racialized threatening classifications of insecurity are 
 
107 Aradau C., ‘Security and the democratic scene: desecuritisation and emancipation’, Journal of International 
Relations and Development (2004), 7(4), 388-413; Huysmans J., ‘Revisiting Copenhagen: Or, on the Creative 
Development of a Security Studies Agenda in Europe’, European Journal of International Studies (1998), 4(4), 479-
505. 
108 Huysmans J., ‘Revisiting Copenhagen’. 
109 In The Concept of the Political Schmitt makes the distinction between friend and enemy as a distinctive marker of 
the political. In this sense, Schmitt claims that this distinction substantiates the political determining which form of life 
is functional to their respective belonging. See Schmitt C. (1932) (translated by Schwab G.) The Concept of the Political 
(Expanded Edition) (University of Chicago Press, 2007). 
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made more acceptable.111 Security reinstates exclusionary politics giving them a new face 
that is effective both discursively and managerially. What it lacks is then a political 
validity which is something that differs from its political validation. By also spelling it 
out, security is performed and perceptions about it are operationalised taking security 
beyond its idealistic and indistinguishable necessity. It is in this framework that various 
attempts to deconstruct security, and articulation of humans within it, have been made. 
Strategies of desecuritisation are reflective of a process of deconstruction that 
aims to re-normalise what has been deemed as exceptional. While securitisation sustains 
performative acts of security also through its illocutionary filters, in order to shift politics 
towards its necessary legal and moral crossings, desecuritisation faces the limits of 
political realism once these bounds are set to stretch fields of intervention. Constructivist 
securitisation is opposed to deconstructivist desecuritisation. Because “securitisation is 
not simply a speech act [but an] enactment of exceptionalism in political life”,112 re-doing 
security means reversing its exclusionary logic by re-making political processes. The 
ambiguity of normalisation is tempered here by the fact that what is re-normalised is a 
state of affair that does not rely, strictly speaking, on deviation from a given normative 
reality, but one that has the ambition to put into question ideas of stabilised order. 
According to this, desecuritisation could be emancipatory insofar as it enacts processes 
of re-appropriation. As Aradau points out, the potential of desecuritisation is made clear 
once it allows us to aspire to different politics to come where principles are universalised 
in a process of dis-identification.113 While emancipation and reconstructing security are 
not necessarily reconcilable,114 approaching security backward might be important even 
 
111 See Huysmans J., ‘Migrants as a security problem: dangers of “securitising social issues”’, 53-72, 57-8 in Miles R. 
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113 Idem. 
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if it its emancipatory potential in not capitalised upon but for the simple fact that it  reveals 
the false premises upon which security is predicated upon. 
In this framework, discourses about the human and discourses about security do 
not simply converge in discourses about human security. In today’s world, 
humanitarianism and securitisation have become increasingly indistinguishable 
narratives to the point that the human who needs to be protected and the human who 
threatens us often collude. This is evident if one considers how often societal issues such 
as migration and borders are securitised to the point that security becomes a mean and an 
end to itself. More worryingly, humanitarianism and securitisation prove to be mutually 
exclusive once governing life with death becomes normalised as the only way to bring 
security to society and the migrants themselves. The inherent tension between these two 
narratives materialise by functioning almost as a vector. Borrowing from biology, the 
analogy between vectors and the tension between security and humanitarianism is made 
clear in negative terms. While a vector in biology is an organism that carries a parasite or 
an agent of disease - and spreads it from one host to another - humanitarianism and 
security mimic these problematic patterns of transmission. Caught up between their self-
referential potential, the human within security and the construction of security as 
‘humanly’ insecure, become the one the exclusionary content of the other. In so doing, 
human articulations of security that tends to normalise life with death, ensure 
interventions that can only be kept to the minimum.  
The fact that the politics surrounding death are being regularised - normalised as 
such – find their conjectural synthesis in making acceptable forms of mere survival. Here, 
survival is grounded in narratives of humanitarianism and security and becomes their 
normalising constant. Security is about identifying risks, and humans subjected to risks 
must have their political reality (im)mobilised. Overwhelmed by complexities, politics is 




substantiate the limits of desecuritisation: reversing securitised identities means re-
humanising them and this cannot but put into question political rationales that are 




This chapter has set the theoretical foundations of the thesis in an attempt of rethinking 
the relationship between life and death according to (b)ordering processes of survival. 
While the governance of life has been mainly explored through the uses of death as a 
mechanism of power, from thanatopolitics to necropolitics, I argued that more attention 
needs to be paid to the intertwining of life and death in survival. By looking at survival 
as a technology of (b)ordering that maintains crucial relations with borders, the analytical 
goal of this chapter has been that of bringing to the fore the concept of survival as one of 
fundamental importance for exploring not only (b)ordering conditions, but also for 
revealing how visions of humanity and visions of security make a reduced form of 
survival acceptable. Survival as a strategy for governing “troubling mobilities”,115 was 
considered as a political, philosophical and methodological category for grounding our 
thinking about modes of (b)ordering. I have acknowledged that this strategy operates in 
the background of a bioeconomy of life where value has become instrumental to the 
production of exploitable bodies. Biopolitically, these are surviving bodies who are 
reduced to (only) survive as a measure of a less fully formed life also through discourses 
and practices which rely on specific justifications for securitisation and humanitarian 
‘rescuing’. Survival, however, needs to be considered the point at which death and life 
can coexist within, but also in response to, the processes of (b)ordering and this will be 
investigated in what follows. In the next chapter, I will complement my theoretical 
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underpinning with a reading of borders and the processes of (b)ordering as far as 






























The Making of Political Border-lines in EUrope: Negative Borders and Figures of 
Migration 
 
Figure 4. Name: Jesus; Nationality: Palestinian; Religion: Jewish; Illegal Migrant.  





This chapter aims to explore the theme of mobility, bordered realities and biopolitical 
(b)orderings in context, beginning with identifying the shift from a methodological 
understanding of borders as bounded to nation states, to borders understood, in the words 
of Mezzadra and Neilson, as “method”. I briefly consider what borders are, in which way 




from geopolitical lines of demarcation to their distributive capacity of (b)ordering, the 
core argument is that different processes of (b)ordering unevenly distribute life and death 
and, ultimately, reduce life to its biopolitical form, as mere. These possibilities are the 
result of a calculative way to govern mobility that relies upon the making of expendable 
lives and a particular understanding of survival. Moving beyond a dialectical discussion 
between inside and outside, the main frame of reference will be understanding (b)ordering 
processes by paying attention to how inequalities in security create inequalities of life 
with death. Such inequalities give form to what political power considers to be in excess 
to legitimate life by dispersing borders and creating zones of stratified existence. As we 
will see, because the inside and the outside become blurred within such zones, political 
power generates excesses that are the product of the uneven governance of mobility in 
EUrope. Referring to the effects of the management of current migratory dynamics in 
terms of a crisis of uneven mobility, instead of refugee, migration or border crisis, has 
important implications for understanding the kind of politics that are emerging in EUrope. 
By creating different kinds of illegality, biopolitical borders are being redrawn not just in 
terms of space and time, but also by generating more pervasive asymmetrical realities of 
life with death.  
On the assumption that security and migration are two side of the same coin,1 
Migration Studies and Security Studies have offered substantial explanations of the ways 
through which political power securitises mobility by reducing, and expanding it, 
according to the needs of governability. With this in mind, the aim of this chapter is also 
that of retracing such steps by understanding how migrants can be securitised and 
differently ‘humanised’ through distributive (im)mobilisations. While migration has 
always been in excess to the need to contain it, what is important to consider is how such 
excesses are also the result of a way of administering political life. Incapable of capturing 
 




a multiplicity of complexities, political power increasing relies on the same “human 
waste” that it produces, as a way to justify measures that are taken for the security of all. 
In order to better situate this, in this chapter I draw on the work of Thomas Nail 
in order to discuss how borders constitute society itself. Nail’s work provides a 
springboard for moving beyond classical theories on borders towards social processes 
that happen on spaces of (b)ordering. I also consider the in-between of borders to 
highlight their kinetic functions as more than states’ limits but as ways in which they re-
distribute lives in excess that are kept in circulation. This move is made visible when 
highlighting how a biopolitical reconfiguration of borders is othering and virtualising 
subjects of mobility. These subjects, ‘generic humans’ who become migrants and 
therefore less human through an inverse process of humanisation, are thought to be 
carrying borders within society making survival a matter of political border-lines. 
Political border-lines capture the securitised and ‘humanised’ project of making people 
whose life in death, bare life, is now framed as life with death, that is surviving migrants 
whose life is delimited to (only) survive. By rereading camps as “liminal porocratic 
institutions” and as “speed boxes” in the governance of migratory fluxes, this chapter will 
end by considering the figure of the migrant through the different categories that are used 
to qualify people on the move.  
 
From Methodological Borders to “Borders as Method” 
In an article published in 2007 entitled ‘The Cosmopolitan Condition: Why 
Methodological Nationalism Fails’, Ulrich Beck looks at social science’s failure to 
understand the complex problems once it confronts due to its methodological limits. 
These limits, he sustains, refer to the fact that the study of society is irreducible to that of 
the nation state, confining disciplines of study to a pre-determined view. In particular, 




law, justice, and history and considers them as nationally bounded entities.2 Unavoidably, 
this state-centric outlook informs the methodological approach through which we try to 
understand society as a fundamental geopolitical category in which events are already 
structured. As Beck remarks, equating societies to nation-states has detrimental 
consequences for the study of phenomena that are rooted in the sociological imagination. 
This equation, in fact, functions more as organising technique rather than as 
“cosmopolitan medium”3 for reading political life. What methodological nationalism 
assumes, therefore, is that “humanity is naturally divided into a limited number of nations, 
which on the inside, organise themselves as nation-states, and on the outside, set 
boundaries to distinguish themselves from other nation-states”.4 According to this, 
nation-states are not only the condition for normalising possibilities of being but are also 
the only widely validated technology through which borders are given methodological 
importance. “Methodological nationalism” traps our thinking about borders, failing to 
recognise that humanity cannot be naturally divided into nations. Nations, in fact, exist to 
concretely separate our humanity from the world.5 
How can we then think borders beyond and besides the exclusive methodology that 
makes them exist in the first place? This is the object of a re-focusing of borders that 
Mezzadra and Neilson present by investigating “borders as method”. As the two authors 
remark:  
“We understand method to emerge precisely from the material circumstances at hand, which, 
in the case of borders, are ones of tension and conflict, partition and connection, traversing 
and barricading, life and death. Borders as method thus entails not only an epistemic 
viewpoint from which a whole series of strategic concepts as well as their relation can be 
recast. It also requires a research process that continuously accounts for and reacts to the 
 
2 Beck U., ‘The Cosmopolitan Condition: Why Methodological Nationalism Fails’, Theory, Culture & Society (2007), 
24(7–8), 286–90. 
3 Idem. 
4 Ibid., 287. 
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and of nature itself.” This inhumanity functions as regeneration for the reorganisation of life through the rights of some 
to participate to life “in one’s own flesh”. See Deranty J-P, ‘Witnessing the Inhuman: Agamben or Merleau-Ponty’, 





multifarious battles and negotiations, not least those concerning race, that constitute the 




While methodology serves to justify the use of a particular research method, the very idea 
of border that this method makes thinkable is reversed by positing the border at the centre 
of any investigation prior to accounting for it through specific research tools. In this 
context, method is not understood as a particular procedure for channelling our thinking 
about borders, but as a way to adapt thought to the materiality and immateriality of 
physical, emergent, and ubiquitous borders: in other words, a border is itself a method. 
Most importantly, it is conceiving “borders as method” that allows us to explore what 
cannot be contained by national borders. As essential devices for the management of 
circulation, geopolitical borders are proliferating in terms of their heterogeneity. Borders 
are an ambivalent force of containment, circulation, and repression that are being 
constantly recalibrated according to transformations of modes of power and governance. 
This idea that the reading of borders is univocal to those of nation states is internally 
contested once such boundaries function as a national demarcating point, but also evade 
their inner limits that make them coincide with a territorial space as “borders establish 
multiple points of control along key lines and geographies of power […] in a continuum 
with exclusion”.7 Power, within these geographies, extends to the hierarchical capacity 
that borders possess to stratify and regulate relationships of belonging. These 
relationships are unequal as are organised around biopolitical caesuras and the uneven 
distribution of life and death.  
In line with this, accounts of ‘flat’ lines on the map intersect with the dynamism 
of borders increasingly taking migration outside the space of border installations. “Border 
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elements”8 are dispersed throughout society and help us to further understand how power 
cannot be exclusively conceptualised by making geopolitical borders the main frame of 
reference of political life. While it is important to acknowledge the political realism of 
boundaries, it is also significant to think of how spatialities in migration politics have 
become extensively important – bringing routes and journeys to the centre of border-
making. As Walter points out, shifting attention to routes allows us to reflect on the ways 
in which the state, the idea of illegality, and that of resistance converge with a network of 
stances where movement is differently made legible and illegible.9 What then is important 
to consider is that those who experience life with death as a measure of their bordered 
existence are the central focus for recognising that national borders are always crossed by 
“borders as method”. This framing considers borders as method as a technology for 
reframing the relation between the two poles of borders and migration. The rendering of 
borders as a technology for filtering what should be in excess to political life cannot be 
understood if the social relationships that people establish with borders is not taken into 
account.  
 
Which Borders? Kinetic Surplus and the Redistribution of (In)Security  
As already discussed, sovereignty and borders are often considered prominent in 
discussions of political life. If we rethink “borders as method” we cannot rely solely on 
sovereignty, national borders, and forms of (b)ordering that delimit political life but we 
also need to consider the borders of the nation-state as inescapable reality of living in a 
world that is dominated by nation-states. The concept of sovereignty, in fact, is strictly 
related to that of territoriality, making nation-states the ultimate authority of power that 
also guarantees the orderly existence of other nation-states in the international system. A 
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common historical trajectory of the nation-state is the idea that sovereignty is exclusive, 
and it always entitles a specificity of configurations in the deployment of power. 
According to Weber, states assert their power by claiming a monopoly of the use of 
physical violence in a given territory.10 Such territory is not only a geographical reality 
but also the starting point for understanding the ideological configuration of the nation-
state. From this, it comes the idea of nationalism which, according to Agnew, is: 
 “the most territorial of political ideologies based on cultural beliefs about a shared space 
occupied by a kin-like, ethnic, or affinity group who face common dangers and bring to these 
a social bond forged through the trials and tribulations of a common history brought about 
by a common geography”.11  
 
 
As a program of political action, nationalism sees the nation and the state through popular 
sentiments of belonging rooted in the expression of a dominant national identity. The 
political landscape of the nation-state is geopolitical and cultural. Such categories are 
furtherly delimited by boundaries that are physical and juridical, but also moral: they 
delimit our political materiality and come to define means for keeping some people out 
the main community of an imagined nation. Political communities construct places in 
ways that are then reinforced by the physical presence of borders. This activity of 
collective imagining is initiated by a relationship that the State establishes with its citizens 
based on a Hobbesian contractual politics of mutual responsibility.12 Borders mark the 
limits of contractual politics. 
In Theory of the Border, Thomas Nail provides a rich account of the ways through 
which social motion is today divided by borders. Through an analysis of the many 
 
10 Weber M., ‘Politics as Vocation’, published as “Politik als Beruf,” Gesammelte Politische Schriften (Muenchen, 
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at the present time, the right to use physical force is ascribed to other institutions or to individuals only to the extent to 
which the state permits it. The state is considered the sole source of the ‘right’ to use violence. Hence, ‘politics’ for us 
means striving to share power or striving to influence the distribution of power, either among states or among groups 
within a state”.  
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significations of borders, Nail explores a series of phenomena in social history that led to 
different significations of political boundaries. The fence, the wall, the checkpoint, and 
the frontier, are all precise concepts that answer the more elusive question of what the 
border is.13 According to Nail, the border is the commonality that all these limiting 
representations assume: borders introduce a division or bifurcation of some sort – and 
while it can be represented in many ways - what the border produces has always 
something to do with social division.14 For this reason, Nail continues, while an 
exhaustive study of the border needs to take into account the multiplicity of its 
representations – territorial, juridical, economic, moral and political – more attention 
needs to be paid to the ways borders exceed these significations. The way the border has 
been made relevant, both historically and in our present times, needs to be understood as 
a more than a necessary condition for the governance of space. The border is not reducible 
to the fact that it connects with other states, or it is in-between other states, as nowadays’ 
realities put into question the ways through which the border is constitutive and 
constituted by society itself.15  
Following Nail’s analysis, a traditional understanding of the border is today being 
broadened by a more inclusive study of boundaries that emphasises the importance of 
looking at liminal points of division through the social forces that borders enable and 
disable. A border theory that prioritises social processes of division over space considers 
the border to be in-between not just states, but social realities: “the ‘in-betweeness’ of the 
border is not lack or absence […] the border is an absolutely positive and continuous 
process of multiplication by division – the more it divides social space the more it 
multiplies it”.16 Intensive and extensive divisions discontinue place creating change on 
the whole system of societal order. Such bifurcations produce continuity and 
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discontinuity of experiences that redirect mobility elsewhere. On the assumption that 
“society is first and foremost a product of the borders that defines it, and the material 
conditions under which it is divisible/dividable”, the border is also in motion: it moves 
itself and is also moved by others.17 The binary categories of inclusion and exclusion are 
now reconfigured by processes of circulation that aim to sort, manage and maintain new 
re-articulations of movement. By looking at the history of the border as a history of 
movement, what he calls a kinopolitical analysis of borders, Nail focuses on the social 
function of motion by identifying the ways through which modern borders function to 
redistribute mobility. More precisely, he individuates four functions of the border: the 
border marks a bifurcation point in a continual flow; it sets a limit; it compels part of the 
outside to the inside; it gives rise to the frontier, a clear delimitation where social flows 
are expelled or disjoined.18 Taken together, these four functions of the border produce a 
different history that is not simply that of the state. Undoubtedly, borders in our political 
life capture the essence of nation-state politics but they are more than a function of the 
state. Understood as geopolitical devices: 
“borders produce territories (countries) by delimiting and securing spaces and their 
contents/populations […] they produce an inside and an outside, insiders and outsiders, and 
establish a system of control whose movement is accepted and whose is not. They create 
categories (the migrant worker, the skilled migrant worker, the asylum seeker, the refugee…) 
and through the process of categorization, create a group of people who carry a label of non-




Understood as more than a function of the state, biopolitical borders circulate divisions 
that exceed the linear manageability for the scope of their containment.  
While according to traditional realist accounts borders mark the limits of 
sovereign jurisdiction and represent the manifestation of intelligibility of power, therefore 
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separating what is inside from the outside,20 in biopolitical understandings borders would 
not have meaning unless the frontier encountered the human and its activities.21 Borders 
transcend sovereign power in a way that the regulation of the flows of life becomes more 
important than the legal limitations related to their demarcation. It is in the name of life 
that borders are now made to work with functions of death: matters of life are 
operationalised by more than lines of divisions that exclude per se, to a matter of perpetual 
re-balancing of security and humanitarian interventions that produce inequalities. Borders 
are now understood as redistributing a life that is always in surplus to its containment. 
When such a kinetic surplus, namely a surplus of mobility, cannot be expanded, borders 
are made to stretch to their (im)mobilising counterpart. As Nail remarks, in fact, “as long 
as society is capable of producing and mobilising its surplus and deficits, it will be able 
to achieve an elastic equilibrium or expansion”.22 The modern border takes a shape that 
is not only the result of mechanisms of security deployed for the control of populations, 
as Foucault would suggest, but it is also the outcome of a more pervasive logic of power 
that confronts its fabric of excesses in terms of necessities of life with death. Borders 
transcend the limits of their function once their ‘cherished fiction’, that grounds their 
existence, is contested from within. In this scenario, security as a technology of control 
is complemented by its engendering ambitions to capitalise on different lives. It is then 
possible to see how the distribution of (in)security within society proceeds through 
borders of unequal social and political mobility. Indeed, problematisations of the function 
of contemporary borders need to take into consideration both movements that decelerate 
and accelerate but also ‘humanise’ and securitise migrants, giving rise to new (b)ordering 
needs. These movements can be recognised among the strategies for governing migration 
and borders in the context of EUrope.  
 
20 Singer C. L. B., Weir L., ‘Politics and Sovereign Power: Consideration on Foucault’, European Journal of Social 
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Negative Borders: The EUropean’s Crisis of Uneven Mobility 
The fall of the Berlin Wall seemed to give rise to a new era of globalisation. In the early 
1990s, the main narrative shifted from protecting borders to how take advantage of the 
gains that an interconnected world was bringing. It was under this rationale of necessary 
interdependence and unity that in 1995 the Schengen Agreement became effective, signed 
a decade before by five of the then ten members of the European Union. This treaty was 
constitutive of the European’s Schengen Area that now counts 26 countries, including EU 
non-members states.23 The main implication for the creation of such an area for human 
mobility has been the removal of internal border checks among European countries: a 
visa-free system of movement was introduced that seemed also to carry a symbolic 
connotation of political and cultural integration. The priority given to mobility, by 
liberalising space, has had complex effects on the way migration coexists with control of 
circulations and exchange, both within and outside EUrope. 
 The necessity for the European Union to constitute a more cohesive economic 
and political block, however, did not signify that domestic borders were simply abolished. 
As a matter of fact, rigid borders exist at the external frontiers of the European Union.24 
As Jones highlights, we need to keep in mind that at that point internal borders were not 
removed from Europe but were merely moved to the perimeter of the European territory.25 
This is important as it explains the extension of contemporary borders’ jurisdictions that 
go beyond the territorial states of EUrope. This is also remarked by Vaughan-Williams 
who notices that contemporary border management practices are putting into question the 
very idea of what borders are, where they are located and why their securitisation matters 
also through their sovereign exposure to external projections of containment.26 In 
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particular, Vaughan-Williams refers to the current practices of spatial and temporal 
displacement that make borders spectral and pervasive. The offshoring and outsourcing 
of the borders of the European Union, which involve the transferral of governance from 
the EU to states in the North Africa,27 amplifies this paradoxical reality of borders that 
are limited but also stretched to their shared (geo)political dimension. While border 
enforcement is still a prerogative of the nation-state, security across EU borders is carried 
out by the European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the 
External Borders – Frontex – created in 2005.28  
Since 2015, more than a million and a half migrants reached EUrope. According 
to the UNHRC, the Mediterranean Sea arrivals increased to 216,054 in 2014 to 1,015,078 
in 2015, giving rise to the biggest mass migration since WWII.29 In 2016 such arrivals 
dropped to 362,753. Despite this, 5,096 migrants were counted dead or missing in 2016, 
a superior number than 2014 – 3,771 – and 2015 - 3,538.30 On the 3 October 2013, a 
vessel capsized direct to Italy carrying migrants from Libya. Of the 500 migrants on the 
boat, more than 130 people were reported dead while an increasingly number of migrants 
went unaccounted for.31 Such event, and many other ‘tragedies’ that followed with the 
progression of arrivals, were given centre stage in public debates rebalancing discourses 
of security, identity, and national interest with the need to uphold humanitarian and 
solidarity values that flagged the European Union since its birth as more than 
geographically integrated entity. The Mediterranean Sea, now referred to as “the 
graveyard” and the “watery tomb” of EUrope, has come to mark the maritime limits of 
‘humanitarian disasters’ that are not to be seen as accidental to the governance of 
 
27 On the territorialisation and de-territorialisation of borders in Europe, see Bialasewicz L., ‘Off-shoring and Out-
sourcing the Borders of Europe: Libya and EU Border work in the Mediterranean’, Geopolitics (2012), 17(4), 843-66. 
28 For a more detailed account on Frontex genesis and activities consult: Frontex – European Border and Coast Guard 
Agency. Available at: http://frontex.europa.eu [accessed 22 December 2017]. 
29 Operational Portal Refugee Situation in the Mediterranean, UNHCR, data available at: 
https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/mediterranean [accessed 23 December 2017]. 
30 Idem. 
31 Italy boat sinking: Hundreds feared dead off Lampedusa’, BBC News, 3 October 2013. Available at: 




migration.32 The sea and the land, water and ground, are the repository of a violence that 
traps death but does not lock it up in the history of today’s border and migration 
management. Borders qualify life and initiate the very reason of their spatial, temporal 
and deadly requalification.  
As Jones emphasises, in fact, borders need to be seen as producing the very 
violence that they attempt to deter.33 By disputing the idea that borders are inherently 
natural to the human world, Jones stresses the fact that borders are structurally violent 
and their potential for conflict is reinforced by the role that death plays in their policing. 
More precisely, Jones refers to the borders of the EU as being the deadliest in the world.34 
As a consequence of the problematic framing of a crisis of excessive mobility that peaked 
in EUrope in 2015, the borders of the EU have been militarised through new practices of 
security that have revealed the decade-long issue of deaths at its borders.35 The hardening 
of borders, the closing down of migration routes and the re-introduction of checkpoints 
among European member states has made movement difficult and dangerous for the many 
who embarked themselves on desperate journeys towards safety.36 This paradoxical 
search for alternative paths for security that migrants put in place through their journeys 
colludes with new deadly insecurities that this very search entitles. Borders are negative 
as they function by exposing many migratory figures to death. The entry of death within 
the biopolitical field, in fact, needs to be understood within the shifting re-
territorialisation of nation states.37 As EUrope shifts its borders beyond territory, it 
 
32 Lucht H., ‘The Watery Tomb Europe Tolerates’, The New York Times, 7 October 2013. Available at: 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/08/opinion/the-graveyard-at-europes-doorstep.html [accessed 26 December 2017]; 
Piet R., ‘The Mediterranean: Graveyard of European Values’, Al Jazeera, 23 April 2015. Available at: 
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150422050428476.html [accessed 26 December 2017].  
33 Jones R., Violent Borders. 
34 Ibid., Chapter 1. 
35 Idem. 
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biopolitically re-territorialises them by making mobility also a matter of survival. 
Biopower expands the liminal points of sovereignty making visible a life that is neither 
fully ‘secured’ nor fully ‘protected’ but treating it as being in excess to what (material) 
borders can do.  
In this regard, understanding the systemic conditions that reduce migrants to 
(only) survive, means looking at the ways in which their life is primarily rendered 
biopolitical.38 Foucault’s analysis of the different ways in which the function of life and 
death change in modern time is now revisited by recasting survival as the new political 
limit of mobility; while death can kill, survival is facilitated to create zones of political 
(im)mobility. Survival is not the limiting point of life but the exemplification of what life 
turns to be about when people are merely ‘allowed’ to survive. This different 
problematising of the politics of life with death is the synthesis point between 
securitisation and humanitarianism. These two aspects, as already discussed, stabilise the 
discourse about what Vaughan-Williams calls the “gap” between the humanitarian 
“rhetoric” and the “reality” of ‘irregular’ migration that represents, above all, migrants’ 
movements and bodies as issues to securitise.39  
In the context of European migration management, push-backs, acts of omission 
and abandonment in hostile environments are forms of (b)ordering practices that 
exemplify not only operations of the ‘sovereign ban’.40 The ways in which political power 
mobilises rhetoric versus reality to create different kinds of (im)mobility is not simply 
letting die or a matter of the government of life, as Rose would suggest.41 What has 
become a priority for the governance of ‘fortress Europe’ is neither making live nor letting 
die, but ‘allowing’ people’s mere survival (which, as we will see, inadvertently create 
 
38 Foucault M., Society Must be Defended, 256. 
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40 Vaughan- Williams N., Europe's Border Crisis. 
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zones of different political potentiality). This is not to deny death as such. Death as 
expression of a finitude of life is recognised by the fact that what is not made to die is not 
necessarily made to live either. What figures of migration now come to embody is a nexus 
of spaces and temporalities of survivability that transcend rigid thresholds of exclusive 
mobility. Such mobility is exclusive in the sense that only some are legitimised in their 
movements, the trusted citizen-traveller for instance, while the rest is inclusively 
(im)mobilised through negative borders.42 These (im)mobilisations are managed through 
a modulatory sorting that relies on temporalities and spaces of aleatory containment. 
Insecurities are being redistributed within society as a measure of excesses of control of 
a new kind of disposable life, that is a life whose temporality and spatiality of existence 
is being rewritten by reducing both life and death to survival. Mere survival is (b)ordered 
and normalised as necessary for the containment of migrants. 
 
The Biopolitical Reconfiguration of Borders: Virtual Security and Mobile Threats 
 
Biopolitical understandings of security differ from traditional geopolitical discourses to 
the point that its conventional protective and preservative character is re-problematised 
in terms of promotion and regulation of life. Life takes centre stage and becomes the 
referent object of security practices, therefore determining the emergence of new 
rationales of security. Ontological and epistemological ‘truths’ of the past are 
reinterpreted from a biopolitical perspective in terms of unpredictability of threats, 
emergencies and contingency. This changing character of life in the 21st century impacts 
security discourses to the point that their regulation and monitoring requires a shift of 
attention from the territorial sovereignty of states to characteristics concerning 
 
42 See Guild E., Carrera S. (2013) ‘EU Borders and their Control? Preventing unwanted movement of people in 
Europe?’, CEPS Essay, 6(14), November 2013, 1-14. Available at: 
https://www.ceps.eu/system/files/No%206%20EU%20Borders%20and%20their%20Controls%20revised.pdf 




populations: demographic, molecular, organic, digital and virtual aspects of life in their 
biological form.43  
Bigo emphasises the importance of looking at mobilities and networks instead of 
frontiers and isolation.44 Through (b)ordering, therefore, borders are progressively being 
reconceived as biopolitical mediums for managing life. While according to traditional 
realist accounts borders mark the limits of sovereign jurisdiction, therefore separating 
what is inside from the outside,45 in biopolitical understandings “borders would not have 
meaning unless the frontier encountered the human and its activities”.46 Borders 
transcend sovereign power in such a way that the regulation of the flows of life becomes 
more important than the legal limitations related to their demarcation. Through 
circulation and exchange, life is promoted and power “as an ideology of right” expands 
in form of networks.47 From this perspective, borders represent a vital point of 
intersection where life is regulated “by allowing certain types of entry while denying the 
passage of others”.48 Movements and flows are ordered in accordance to national 
affiliations but also on the basis of lives who are considered insurable and not, in order to 
optimise everybody’s biological existence.49 For instance, the governmentalisation of 
racialized techniques of discrimination, data information gathering, profiling and 
morphing are all part of bio-strategies of security where life is made governable through 
its reduction into information and biological codes.50 Biopolitical order is constructed 
through biometric classifications of populations in a never-ending system of modulation 
where through circulation life changes.  
 
43 Dillon M., Lobo-Guerrero L., ‘Biopolitics of Security in the 21st century’, 269. 
44 Bigo D., ‘Security: A Field Left Fallow’ in Michael Dillon & Andrew W. Neal (eds.) (2008), Foucault on Politics, 
Security and War (Palgrave Macmillan). 
45 Singer C. L. B., Weir L., ‘Politics and Sovereign Power’, 443. 
46 Evans B., Liberal Terror, 152. 
47 Foucault M., Society must be defended, 36. 
48 Evans B., Liberal Terror, 55. 
49 Idem.  





This harmonious activity of filtering and sorting lives through borders seem to be 
challenged by contemporary migration flows. While migration is an integral part of the 
biopolitical constitution of society, it is only through its regulation that becomes a 
productive feature of life. As Lilja and Vinthagen remind us, biopower is threatened when 
its ability to direct, organise and cultivate population behaviour in general is 
jeopardised.51 In order to optimise the welfare of populations, also in its anatomo-political 
form, biopolitics has to be able to make life governable by deciding which lives are worth 
and which are not. Hence, to reduce the possibility for migrants to question and resist 
their own (b)ordering, their agency needs to be delimited as “any activity that diminishes 
the ability for governance [represents] a problem to biopower”.52 Biopower, in fact: 
 “creates a binary categorization between ‘us’ and ‘them’, or between the ‘normal’ (e.g., 
legitimate citizens) and the ‘abnormal’ (e.g., illegal immigrants, un-qualified refugees or 
bogus asylum seekers). The former deserves to live, while the latter are expendable”.53  
 
 
These biopolitical re-(b)orderings function through the complicity of sovereign power re-
territorialisation: borders are being patrolled, fences and walls are being raised all around 
EUrope and nation-states are increasingly defending their frontiers and denying access to 
many. The politics of borders have entered into the realm of biopower, not subordinating 
sovereign power to its needs, but complementing it as a more complex version of 
biopolitics. While relationships of domination and subordination between the two are 
often contingent, sovereign power and biopower function to totalise governance so that 
control and care over migrants’ life can guarantee (only) survival.  
Accounts about biopolitics of security are revisited by contemporary bio-moves 
that make apparatuses of security more sophisticated and determinant tools within 
governmental politics. Such apparatuses have changed in accordance with new 
specifications of life. According to Dillon we have shifted from the biopolitics of 
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population of the 20th century to the recombinant biopolitics of security of the molecular 
age, to the virtualisation of many aspects of security concern.54 By attempting to develop 
a theorization of biopolitics “with Foucault and beyond Foucault”, Dillon looks at a 
different logic of formation of life where its empirical referent changes from “population 
to heterogenesis”.55 In the past traditional security discourses were related to the 
capitalisation of certainty, establishing causal laws of effect; the epistemologies 
associated with contemporary biopolitics are now concerned with surveillance and big 
data: sets of power/knowledge make reality known by “establishing profiles, patterns and 
probabilities”.56 From prophylactic measures of containment to the proliferation of 
biotechnologies of security, emergent life is made knowable through complex 
mechanisms of digitalisation and virtualisation.  
What we are to understand for security in our times, therefore, is a rather 
morphogenesis of control that promotes at its core regeneration, contingency and 
change.57 For this purpose, Dillon remarks that virtuality becomes more important than 
actuality as mode of governing life, that is the biopoliticised reduction of life to the scopes 
of governmentality. We can then see that biopolitical rationalizations of life reduce it to 
technological governance. This produces the virtual as the yardstick of the real. This 
politics of security takes life and digitalises it by making it furtherly (in)tangible as 
“informational code”.58 In the age of digital security, everything becomes a potential 
threat. Even the way in which we think about politics has been entirely appropriated by 
imperatives to secure.59 The virtual now divides people among an infinity of dangerous 
being-becoming-dangerous that have to be secured differently:  
 
54 Dillon M. (2015) Biopolitics of Security: A Political Analytic of Security (New York: Routledge), 45.  
55 Idem. 
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“as the subject of virtual security is the post-vital subject of inscription and code, rather than 
the vital subject of rational self-interested will and consciousness, the virtual science of 




The digital virtualises the real by introducing different significations of lives whose 
security and insecurity is differently problematised. Biopolitics is the contextual political 
driver that enables us to see how virtual security targets subjects of mobility through their 
movement. From demographics to biometrics, mechanisms of differentiation are now 
pre-inscribed in the circulation of life making migrants the biopolitical device of 
algorithmic equations that distribute fear and safety. 
It seems clear, therefore, that in the context of migratory movements the biopolitical 
control of mobility is strongly influenced by what virtual apparatuses of surveillance pre-
inscribe as dangerous. According to Rose, contemporary forms of governance operate on 
a binary division where identity is securitised by inserting some people within “circuits 
of security” while others are located within “circuits of insecurity”.61 From protection to 
abandonment, such circuits perpetuate the inclusion and exclusion of individuals assumed 
to be worthy or unworthy of these qualifications. As Topal notes when analysing the case 
of immigrants from Turkey to Germany, surveillance over migrants “concerns the 
production and control, through registration and checking procedures, of knowledge 
pertaining to individuals and groups”.62 By referring to it as necropolitical surveillance, 
Topal argues that the identity of the excluded is now reduced to an assemblage of risky 
conditions. Both life and death are defined within a “complex institutional network”63  
that regulates the distribution of the (un)safe. The attempts to secure the spatial and 
temporal borders within communities, and at the gates of a sovereign territory, rely on a 
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biopolitical bifurcation that is marked a-priori by the assignment of different values to 
lives. Since security is obsessed with the survival of the sovereign order,64 the rights of 
citizenship and the non-rights of the non-citizens are now increasingly inserted within a 
different ontology of code that abstracts the real to make differences substantial within 
the virtual. These differences are then made relevant in the daily (b)ordering of migration. 
This is strictly related to the fact that biometric re-(b)ordering reinstates a “differential 
treatment of migrants according to their positionality in socio-political power relations of 
class, race, gender, age and sexual orientation”.65  
The specific technology of biometrics “refers to the technology of measuring, 
analysing and processing unique biological characteristics such as fingerprints, eye 
retinas, irises, facial patterns, hand geometry and body odours”.66 Biometric technologies 
furtherly validate the identity of an individual through its digital representation stored in 
a database.67 This is visible at physical borders, such as airports, where those travellers 
classified as risky undergo deep screening processes of validation while the “trusted-
citizen-traveller” trades his/her speed for privileged mobility: “by sorting individuals into 
fast-moving, low risk ‘kinetic elites’ and slow-moving, high risk ‘kinetic underclasses,’ 
biometric borders actively produce mobile subjectivities”.68 More importantly, such 
technologies render migrants hyper-controllable as their body is transformed into data. 
As Amoore calls them, these “digital alter egos” alter the power relations and encounters 
between migrants and border security apparatuses bringing security closer to the realm of 
the virtual.69  
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The process of migration itself is nowadays made more visible than in the past 
thanks to the advent of biosecurity where borders are not simply patrolled but have also 
become points of identification where migrants are profiled according to their biometrics. 
Efforts to secure borders draw a (blurred) line between the virtual and the real, for the 
sake of the selective security borders perpetuate. Such a line makes us see the negative 
effects of border control as a necessary precondition for the containment of disruptive 
identities. As Amoore notices, the “visualization of unknown features” is datified in terms 
of what has not been seen yet but will be visualized as coming risk for the many.70 In 
analyzing contemporary forms of attentiveness, Amoore recognizes that the screen has 
now come to assist sovereign maneuvers of power. The identification, localization, 
naming, and depiction of mobile targets is othered and pre-othered by the actualization 
of the possible.71  
The implications of deploying a projected picture of an unseen reality as a 
measure of a ‘real’ risky life, impacts subjects to the point of questioning their agency 
and status. Now techno-scientific visualizations make reality knowable but also pre-
conceals to prevent its contestation. The increased technological sophistication of security 
produces continuous performances dividing practices that rely on pre-calculated 
algorithms. Under such conditions, it is the “potential of the virtual” that functions as a 
model for the risk management of people deemed as “dangerous”.72 Smart borders, 
predictive policing and data knowledge are now what allows algorithmic security to 
reconfigure borders in terms of their biopolitical engagement with circulation.73 These 
technologies of the border are the technologies of diffuse sorting that make the body a 
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from the technology that reads it”.74 The way in which migrants are governed and 
managed is deeply influenced by the emergence of these biotechnologies of surveillance. 
It is not only material borders that are changing shape, through border patrol drones and 
mediatizations, but it is also the mode of selective security that is shifting toward the 
abstraction and diffusion of mobile threats. This biopolitical reconfiguration of borders 
means that now borders logics run throughout society and can change the way through 
which the subjects of mobility experience their condition of movement. Specifically, 
biometric identification strategies are what links the body of the migrant with that of 
his/her projected digital biography, that includes an approximation of algorithmic risk.75 
This “corporeal turn”76 within geopolitics and security studies, posits biometrics at the 
core of a programme of governance that verifies identities and makes them a securitised 
issue of controlled circulation.  
This process of linking bodies and identities is stored in form of data. For instance, 
the European Dactyloscopy (EURODAC) is the European Union fingerprint database that 
allows the identification of asylum seekers and registers illegal border-crossing. Such 
data becomes a cartography of people’s movement and allows member states to take 
decisions on the legal jurisdiction of a case-by-case procedure, while retracing whether 
an asylum application has been already previously filed in another member state.77 The 
problem with such a mechanism lies in the fact that the overflow of biometrics never 
serves a univocal purpose, often expanding into a different mapping of inequalities of 
security. This is well exemplified by the way migrants are registered at hotspots and often 
abandoned to their circumstances of survival, becoming a mobile controlled threat: what 
matters is that their bio-graphical features are stored and with them their unique digital 
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identity. The targeting of the mobility and behaviour of migrants, in fact, aims to typify 
their biopolitical calculative chance of being a risk to the urge to optimize ‘life’. In 
relation to the diffusion of political borders within society, the biopolitical 
reconfiguration of measurements of life and death are the inductive ‘truth’ of an 
algorithmic reality of datified mobility. The consequence of mediating personal narratives 
of words in terms of digital and extractable subjects of auto-referential ‘truth’ has become 
itself a political datum that orders and filters bodies without necessarily pledging any 
commitment to listening to other narratives of the possible.78 This causes a fundamental 
difference of recognition between what the law and politics say what a data is and what 
the data tells us about the subject. As Agamben writes “law is not directed toward the 
establishment of justice”, neither is it directed towards the verification of truth, “law is 
solely directed toward judgment, independent of truth and justice”.79 In line with this, 
besides being physical, imaginary, material, and fragmentary, borders are biopolitical 
tools of deterrent truth that reduce the human to a form of irregularity that is pre-given 
virtually. This contributes to the making of different constructions of the migrant as a 
subject to be governed both humanly and securely.  
 
Carrying Borders Within Society: Dispersing Political Border-lines 
We now need to shift our attention from digitalization and virtual borders to biopolitical 
declinations of borders with the aim of reconsidering and understanding how certain types 
of circulations, exchange and security are bound up with the question of political border-
lines as (b)ordering. The theme of political border-lines change the terms of our analysis 
as it broadens our analytical imagination at play in the study of boundaries. Rather than 
imagining borders as fixed or resembling a cartographic space, border-lines liken them to 
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dispersed thresholds within society. Referring to political border-lines allows us to look 
at the abstract imaginary of boundaries in ways that are diffuse, (im)mobilised and as a 
compromising point between securitised and ‘humanised’ bodies. While retaining the 
metaphor of the line and linking it to borders that connect and separate at the same time, 
border-lines ensure the existence of borders that are ‘in-between’. Political border-lines 
can be defined as the state of being in an intermediate (or borderline) position that is not 
still transcended, but in the process to. The (b)ordering of surviving migrants happens at 
the edge of classifications that reduce their lives to what can be considered acceptable 
ways of living. Once borders expand within society, the position of migrants who ‘carry’ 
them is (im)mobilised as their humanisation and their securitisation cannot allow them to 
fully be seen only as subjects of rights/care but also as subjects that might represent a 
threat to individuals and communities more broadly. Humanitarian interventions and 
securitisation compromise in survival and bring political borders closer to the verges of 
our everyday lives.  
As Balibar convincingly notes, “borders have a polysemic nature” and are 
“dispersed a little everywhere […] wherever the movement of information, people and 
things is happening and is controlled”.80 Border areas, in fact, have become central to the 
constitution of the public space. The fact that borders can be of many forms, and operate 
across different groups, means that their mode of inclusion and exclusion is no simply 
one that divides but also one that connects conditions of survival. While we have to be 
cautious in treating borders as an ‘everywhere’ reality that easily falls into an ‘anywhere 
of everything’, it seems indispensable to consider how (b)ordering is nonetheless enacted 
through devolution strategies that maintain complex relationships with circulation. What 
is in excess to what has been previously filtered or not captured at the borders of nation 
states, becomes a matter for (b)ordering to deal with.  
 




Projecting the effects of geographical borders inside countries means to create 
what Vaughan-William calls a “security continuum” where everywhere is turned into a 
border site.81 This striation of space gives rise to new borders that reinforce the way 
through which life is regulated by power. Such a power no longer only disciplines life but 
regularises it in order to achieve “an overall equilibrium that protects the security of the 
whole from internal dangers”.82 While discipline works by isolating and segregating 
threats, biopolitical apparatuses of security work now through expansive space that 
encourages the circulation of the ‘good’ and exhausts the movement of what it deems to 
be ‘bad.’ Under conditions whereby migrants are securitised throughout society, people 
are not just made to circulate per se, but are first of all qualified through their political 
disqualifications.83 Such a decision is prior to circulation, it is not circumscribed to the 
‘exception’ and constitutes what now can be seen as generalised biopolitical borders. 
Situating the exception beyond the rule helps us to escape from “the totalising vision of 
sovereign space”84 that Agamben proposes.  
On this reading, the ways in which security produces not just bare life, but reduces 
migrants to (only) survive, needs to be connected with the ways in which migrants who 
carry borders and are othered as political border-lines exceed and interact with decisions 
for their containment. Here we can clearly see the biopolitical nature of the political 
border-lines in question that emerge in the public space. The dispersal of borders traced 
by Balibar helps us to understand how different types of (b)ordering practices spread 
within society and produce different kinds of inequalities. Taking borders out of their 
comfort zone allows us to look at key dimensions of (b)ordering processes that would 
otherwise be minimised. A multiperspectival study of borders, that takes borders from 
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the periphery to the centre (and vice versa), is what Rumford refers to as a better way to 
challenge some core assumptions that border studies still retain, such as the idea “that 
(state) borders require mutual recognition (consensus) in order to exist and function”.85 
In particular, Rumford stresses the fact that borders are beyond consensus because they 
do not necessarily work to enhance national security, identity or material gains.86 Freeing 
borders from a natural relation with territories takes us away from thinking that such 
limits are natural to the world. This is the reason why consensus (wider recognition) and 
institutionalised visibility (capturable/simplified life) restrict our thinking on political 
border-lines.  
In this regard, political boundaries are now seen as disaggregated divisions that 
spread what is in “surplus” within society. Such “surplus”, namely migrants whose mere 
survival is promoted, is redistributed as (in)security and actualised as “dangerous’ by 
decentring borders and re-escalating them to their biopolitical classifications. This is 
evident if we consider the ways in which the EU border regime manages lives that are 
considered to be worthy of basic interventions. Based on a politics of excesses, the 
governance of migration is today reorganising the border regime through a politics of 
dispersal that expands the border within spatialities and temporalities of manageable 
movement.87 Such politics aims to rebalance the barometer of security and mobility 
within a category of redistribution that works through speed. The construction of this 
normative order, where mobility is controlled through keeping things moving at a 
differential speed, is based on techniques that criminalise solidarity,88 discourage 
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associationism89 and abandon life to an ontological destiny of necessity. In other words, 
it relies on the creation of hostile environments for the precarization of migrants.90  
Despite the fact that interstate borders are regaining large attention in our lives, we 
need to avoid what Agnew calls the “border trap” 91 of territorial thinking if we want to 
account for the political dispersal of lives that are reduced to survival. This is not to deny 
that these lives are not mapped within a territory, rather to affirm that territory is itself a 
power technology92 that relegates migrants not only in camps. Hospital parking spaces, 
airports, train stations and other places of policing now represent the ungated reality of 
political border-lines. The creation of graded forms of life with death is what is at stake 
within these biopolitical assemblages of movement. As Tazzioli has argued, the 
transitivity of migration is not contemplated in the European legal system where people 
have to be qualified and unqualified, that is they should be objectively determined in their 
movement.93 She looks into the dynamics that lead to the dismantling of the so called 
‘Calais jungle’, a migrant camp close to Calais which was shut in October 2016, to show 
how migrants evicted from the camp were subjected to two complementary and somehow 
inverse spatial strategies of control: 
“The first is a politics of dispersal deployed to prevent and neutralise the formation of 
autonomous migrant camps, dividing up and separating migrants from one another. The 
second contains, constrains, and directs the mobility of those migrants accepting to stay 
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A politics of dispersal and division is giving rise to new thresholds of life with death. 
Such thresholds become the substance of what the subject of mobility comes to represent: 
a life that needs to be rescued and from which we need to protect ourselves from. The 
lives of migrants come to represent the manifestation of what survival constitutes 
according to biopolitical governance as migrants are made to live with death, always 
shadowed by the possibility of the camp. 
 
From Camps to the ‘Smooth’ Reality of Political Boundaries 
 
The logic of sovereignty, homo sacer and the camp are central to the analysis of Giorgio 
Agamben. The link between bare life and politics, according to him, can be found in the 
biopolitical production of lives that are reduced to their bare. The inclusion of such lives 
through means of exception guarantee their exclusion from the polity and come to 
determine the nucleus of sovereign power. This “bestialization of man achieved through 
the more sophisticated political techniques”95 is for Agamben based on the natural 
reduction of western politics to a fundamental structure of exclusion that brings bare life 
and political existence into the realm of the politics of life. Homo sacer – a sacred man 
“who might be killed and yet not sacrificed” – is a figure of the roman law that Agamben 
deploys to explain the ways in which human life has always been included in the juridical 
order through its very exclusion.96 The peculiarity of our contemporary times, Agamben 
continues, is that “the realm of bare life – which is originally situated at the margins of 
the political order – gradually begins to coincide with the political realm – and 
exclusion/inclusion, outside and inside, bios and zoe, enter into a zone of irreducible 
indistinction”.97  This is a zone of inclusive exclusion that operates through the logic of 
the ban, that is the suspension of the law by the conservation of its power. Who has been 
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banned from the law maintains a relation to it that is legally binding as a rule for the 
preservation of political life. In so doing, those who fall into the structure of the ban are 
abandoned and exposed to the consequences of their biopoliticisation. Their naturalised 
life is made intelligible by a series of displacements. As Agamben remarks: 
“If there is a line in every modern state marking the point at which the decision on life 
becomes a decision on death, and biopolitics can turn into thanatopolitics, this line appears 
today as no longer dividing two stable orders/zones. This line is in motion and moving into 
areas other than that of political life”.98 
 
 
The contiguity between natural life and political life is then not settled at once: in 
the age of biopolitics the control and care over lives is never assumed as a constant. While 
the exercise of sovereignty runs through borders, such borders are now being made 
relative to topos, corpus and nomos. What remains absolute is the potential for 
disallowing lives through the relative presence of the camp. Agamben sustains that while 
the Nazi camp embodies the totalising nature of such a power, many other places are 
coming into being where life is contained as bare. As Agamben argues, life is now 
contained through a “dislocating localization” to the point that we “must learn to 
recognise in all its metamorphoses”.99 The materialization of bare life is the relative form 
of an authentic politics over life that cannot be reduced to the space of the camp. 
More than two decades have passed since Agamben’s analysis on the fundamental 
activity of sovereign power and the biopolitical production of bare life, and yet political 
space seems more fragmented. As Lemke reads it, Agamben comprehends camps in the 
form of a line that differentiates bare life and political existence.100 This seems to be 
problematic as Agamben cannot analytically engage with forms of bare life beyond the 
materialisation of this line. Agamben establishes a border that is structural to the 
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impossibility of its trespassing.101 More importantly, Lemke continues, bare life today is 
not simply subjected to death and it cannot be reduced to the rule of law or sovereign 
decisions.102 The very possibility of differentiating political border-lines from camps, 
therefore, needs a different emphasis that recognises the distribution of life and death not 
only through the camp but through circulations that manifest themselves not only as the 
camp. As Evans puts it, nomological order does not help us to fully understand the 
extension of current biopolitical logics that expand within forms of planetary 
circulation.103 This is also observed by Dillon who argues that we have passed from a 
geopolitical reality of distribution to a biopolitical security of circulation.104 From this 
perspective, it can be argued that the very idea and functions of the camp have changed 
with it. Under the inscription of life as managerial activity, camps are not only the 
permanent space of an ‘everywhere exception’ but also the spatiality and temporality of 
circulation. Political border-lines make the subject of mobility to live with death, and 
camps are coming to be understood as more than containers of this dispersed circulation.  
Papadopoulos, Stephenson and Tsianos discuss the political constitution of the 
present and look at the current regime of mobility control in Europe pointing out that 
movement has extended beyond policy. What the authors call “liminal porocratic 
institutions” have now come to extend transnational governance to include the protection 
of the space of the European nations.105 More precisely, these institutions: 
“lie and operate beyond public negotiations and beyond norms and rules instituted through 
governance. […] [as such,] can be understood as a flexible regime of control which attempts 
to regulate mobility flows by forging contingent border zones wherever the routes of 
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On this account, the aim of this migration regime is to re-direct people flows by making 
excessive movement a matter of a new expansive and transitory politics of sorting. While 
the implications of the creation of these zones of graded sovereignty will be better 
assessed later in the thesis when discussing circuits of (im)mobility, it is the meaning of 
the camp that needs first to be explored, in accordance with the emergence of porous 
governance.  
To discuss camps nowadays is to understand that Agamben’s vision of them - as 
a “catalytic converter” of an order based on a lawful exclusion can no be longer be upheld 
as the most important measure for governing life. This legalistic understanding of the 
function of the camp is rearticulated by Papadopoulos and others in terms of “timescapes” 
that connect mobile subjectivities with the regulation of migrant’s time.107 Camps as a 
function of time work to recalibrate space by making mobility relevant to the temporality 
of migration. The ‘temporary’ and the ‘permanent’ are now differently conceived. Rather 
than looking at camps solely as a legalised space in which life is rendered unproductive 
for the aims of regularised governance, camps now represent the locus of temporary 
movement. It is in camps that migratory movements are temporalized by dynamics that 
are mobile and immobile. Drawing from Virilio, Papadopoulos and others question how 
people are included differently in camps by using the notion of “decelerated circulation 
of mobility” to explain how camps now “appear as the spaces which more drastically 
attempt to regulate the speed of this circulation”.108 In a nutshell, camps decentre mobility 
and reinsert it to society through time. In these conditions, decelerated migration manages 
mobility by controlling it through speed. As the authors eloquently show by looking at 
the Schengen process of temporally regulated movement, the camps of “liminal 
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porocratic institutions” are now understood as “speed boxes”.109 This shift from 
considering camps as the markers of spatial and legal regulation of mobility to their 
temporal centrality in today’s life posits a different set of problems for the governance of 
migration.  
The precarious conditions of life in camps are now to be seen as the synthesis of 
a time-managed mobility that reinserts productivity into “a global temporal regime of 
labour”.110 Such mechanisms are further reinforced by institutionalising fluxes to create 
differences between “sanctioned, cross-border labour migration on the one hand, and 
asylum law and juridical protection measures on the other”.111 Linking this to the politics 
of dispersal that is taking place in the contemporary governance of migration in EUrope, 
we can see that Agamben’s idea of camps as spaces outside the law, while being within 
it, tells us little about the porosity of camps themselves. Moreover, Agamben’s reading 
of the function of camps is restricted to the suspension of the law but is not problematised 
next to the speed of absorption that is required to make the labour market, and the system 
of rights claimers, converge under the same rationale of productivity.112  
The camp as a tool to govern mobility, otherwise inaccessible, is now seen as a 
compression machine that re-directs speed to the need to equalise it to the containment of 
people deemed to be in excess. Borrowing from Hardt and Negri’s idea of the smooth 
space of the Empire, camps come now to be understood as an everywhere and nowhere 
of circulation where space and time converge through modulations of entry.113 In fact, 
different modalities of entry are now sorted in camps where migrant labour, asylum 
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seekers, and their securitised and required mobility come to inform the politics of 
excesses. Understanding camps as “speed boxes” is an important step in understanding 
survival as biopolitical strategy of governance. Migrants in camps are now made to (only) 
survive a condition that is in-between, both contingent to speed and time and are kept 
circulating because of that.  
Departing from Agamben’s thought of the biopolitical production of “zones of 
indistinction”, but also more broadly about his idea of bare life in death, camps are not 
only the space of a bare life produced by a state of exception sanctioned by law. Camps 
are now the places where the (b)ordering of surviving migrants takes place. Agamben’s 
notion of bare life, in fact, fails to account for the stratification of lives: not all disallowed 
lives are subjected to the same level of violence, or even serve the same purpose.114 
Human hierarchies are established in camps based on a principle of biopolitical schism. 
This schism justifies the exposition of certain populations to danger political death, 
expulsion, or deportation.115 Based upon racism, border regime produce lives that exist at 
the margin of what can be ‘let’ to survive. As borders are essential for the administration 
of the life of the many - the population - the regulation of life maintains a relation with 
boundaries that is uneven. Such relation between the Global North and the Global South 
operates in Europe through a migratory regime of disqualifications.  
As Balibar argues, with the birth of the European Union and the making of the 
category of “European citizen”, reserved to those who already possess a nationality of a 
member state that is “the immigrant population permanently residing in Europe”,116 more 
divisions have been established. As result of this, “the population contained in the EU 
territory is [today] assembled in a stratified manner, according to the rights outlined in 
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the EU border regime”.117 These divisions predicated upon the right to exclude have given 
rise to a “global apartheid regime” sustained by class, gender and ethnicity as broader 
markers of belonging.118 Those who are excluded from the benefits of this system live in 
“death zones” that are characterised not only by the total disregard of human rights, but 
also by the full disposability of the utility of the lives that it contains. Refugees, asylum-
seekers and migrant workers – among others – are institutionally disempowered and made 
to live only in the wait. Close to the “death zones” lie the “life zones” that are moreover 
stratified through further qualifications.119 New forms of power emerge that no longer 
operate simply through violence per se, but also through the distribution of people whose 
life is deemed to be superfluous in zones of graded governance. The survival of subjects 
of mobility is now a matter of modulatory sorting within society. As borders are layers as 
well as lines,120 layer upon layer, migrants’ lives are shaped by political (im)mobilisations 
that promote people’s mere survival as a measure of how their life should be lived 
politically. These circumstances impact different migrants differently. 
 
The Border Crossing of ‘Dangerous’ Beings 
 
Migrants have mainly been understood from the perspective of states, and it is from this 
perspective that we should start to explore the ways in which these figures have been 
conceptualised. According to Nail, the ‘migrant’ is less a person than a “political concept 
that identifies the common points where people are socially expelled or dispossessed as 
a result, or as the cause, of their mobility”.121 Mobility is not only to be understood 
through the linearity of migrants’ extensive movement, from point A to point B, but also 
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for the intensive and qualitative transformation that they bring to society as whole.122 The 
migrant changes place and status as he/she encounters “points of exclusion” that are 
territorial, political, juridical and economic. These ‘barriers’ give rise respectively to the 
nomad, the barbarian, the vagabond and the proletariat.123 Such figures are the result of 
what the history of social motion has made relative to the crossing of national borders. In 
this respect, as Nail remarks, there is not only one figure of the migrant, but many and 
they are the correlative of different degrees of mobility that are, therefore, the product of 
different forces of expulsion.124 Every society produces migrants, but their position is 
never empirically fixed as it is the condition of their mobility that define changes in their 
status. Such conditions are not predictable and stable, and while different figures of the 
migrant emerge in social history, contemporary figures need to be explored in relation to 
their mobility. As political power embraces these figures otherwise, it is their juridical 
construction that sanctions how a regime of mobility re-orders lives unequally. 
One of the most substantial distinctions that is made is the one that distinguishes 
the migrant from the refugee. According to the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR) refugees 
are persons fleeing armed conflict or persecution on grounds of race, religion, political 
views and other affiliations, and cross national-borders in the hope of finding a safe 
sanctuary. The recognition of the status of refugees is defined by international law, in 
particular by the 1951 Refugee Convention and 1967 Protocol, that sets out the legal 
principle that inform the protection of refugees and its many aspects.125As they are forced 
to leave their country of origin, they need protection from individual states and countries 
of reception are bound to accept asylum claims, conduct hearings and verify the 
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principle of non-refoulement.126 In the context of the European Union, the Dublin 
Regulation compels member states to examine asylum seekers applications according to 
the principle of the first country of arrival. Applicants seeking protection under the 
Geneva Convention, and other EU laws, are not allowed to choose the state where to 
present their asylum request but have to apply for asylum in the first European country 
that they reach. Such a system has proven to be particularly problematic in the case of 
contemporary migratory fluxes as the volume and concentrations of arrivals has further 
stretched extra-legal criteria for allowing claims to be filed.  
Broader figures of migration and their mobility are being differently qualified, 
almost contingently, politically rather than legalistically. Migrants are those who choose 
voluntarily to leave their country of origin mainly to improve their conditions of life, 
finding work, reunite with their family etc. Unlike refugees, the protection of their country 
is not denied to migrants in case they decide to go home.127 This distinction is important 
as the commitment required by the protection of refugees is not the same as that for 
migrants who are managed according to a discretionary processes and migration laws of 
nation-states. Put differently, the protection of refugees is a matter of international law 
and global concern, while that of migrants is a domestic issue of sovereign states 
relevance.128 Beside these legal and jurisdictional markers, both categories have 
undergone significant change, conceptually and empirically, becoming part of the same 
assemblage of risk. This is evident when considering how the legal definition of refugees 
and the more general idea of migrants have come to be conflated under the language of 
emergence and security.129 The sizable number of people arriving in EUrope in recent 
years has had the paradoxical effect of blurring the difference between these two figures, 
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refugees and migrants, while at the same time appealing on their very distinction. 
Facilitated by a massifying and statist language that promotes flows over individuals,130 
the construction of a precise migratory experience pre-qualifies these figures of migration 
who are both associated with situations of ‘irregularity’. 
The use of different categories to describe people on the move, especially in the 
context of the most recent migratory ‘emergency’ in EUrope, is reflective of a migration-
asylum nexus problem. The politicisation of migration, in fact, has led to the 
naturalisation of categories of mobility that position some experiences as real, therefore 
in need of international protection, and some others as fake, that is when detention and 
deportation become a responsibility of the state. As Crawley and Skeplaris have widely 
shown in their study on migrants crossing the Mediterranean to Greece in 2015, there are 
complex drivers to migration, none of which is reducible to forced or voluntary movement 
per se.131 The pre-legitimisation of these drivers reduces figure(s) of migration to what 
the two authors call “categorical fetishism” that differentiate between migrants and 
refugees.132 Hence, drawing lines between those who could be refugees and those who 
should be migrants pre-inscribe legitimacies of movement that are in constant change. On 
the other hand, such distinction is essential as the risk could be that of failing to recognise 
the specific reasons from which international protection needs to be granted: if every 
refugee is a migrant, and vice versa, no distinction on their priority and channelling of 
claims could be recognised, reducing their right to claim rights. As any use of categories 
has limits, so the use of ‘refugee’ and ‘migrant’ as singular or interchangeable terms pose 
some problems as these are not neutral ordering classifications.  
This considered, there seems to be the need to move beyond opposing binaries 
and acknowledge the fact that people cross categories, renegotiating their status across 
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different spectrums and territories. While policy pre-identifies who deserves more and 
who is entitled to less, challenging the boundaries between these categories can be very 
difficult. However, in thinking of migration in terms of movement it can be argued that 
as migrants include also yet to be recognised refugees, it is implied in the use of the term 
that drivers of migration include those of international humanitarian protection. By 
privileging the use of migrants to describe people who cross borders and negotiate 
borderscapes, in this thesis and beyond it, the reasons of their mobility are not pre-empted: 
instead, the term acknowledges that we cannot, a priori, disqualify mobility at large. 
Referring to migrants, therefore, does not mean reducing the rights of refugees. On the 
contrary, it aims to confront policies, discourses, and state practices which are rooted in 
constructing fine lines between regular and irregular mobility, between ‘universal 
humans’ and ‘particular migrants’, between international protection and illegalisation. 
As the movement of migrants puts in question the given order of nation-states, a 
hierarchy of figures of migration makes such a movement conflate into an heterarchy of 
undeserved mobility. The political question raised by refugees in EUrope has shifted 
moral hierarchies of reception into their very negation, to the point that ‘economic 
migrants’, ‘asylum seekers’ and ‘refugees’ are all potentially redundant to the legal value 
that they possess. As their value is prescribed in their securitisation, their humanity is` 
differently stratified beyond a legal paradigm of protection from risk. We can see then 
that the paradox of bestowing juridical and political qualifications by granting rights of 
asylum does not soothe the inner tension between the necessity of protecting human lives 
within what is a securitised framework. As Fassin notes, the current management of 
refugees in EUrope tells us more than we can initially grasp on the “moral crisis” that we 
are facing. What emerged at the end of WWII as a right of international protection is now 




political economy of migratory redundancy.133 Such hypocrisy is revealed in the EU-
Turkey joint-statement of the 18th of March 2016. This deal prescribes that for one Syrian 
Refugee relocated from the Greek Islands to Turkey, one Syrian asylum seeker in Turkey 
will be found a home in EUrope. Such resettlement cannot exceed 72,000 people, which 
is the equivalent of one fifth of the total of Syrians who have applied for asylum in EUrope 
in 2015.134 This demographic redistribution, or even the more exasperated discourses on 
refugees’ quotas, do not tackle the moral imperative of protection but rather expand the 
exceptionality of their legal disqualifications.135  
As we can see then, political and moral priorities are not given to the possibility 
to assert the ‘truth’ on the claims that refugees make, but they serve the purpose of 
discouraging people from speaking their ‘own truth’. The deadly journey that migrants 
need to make before claiming their rights is symptomatic of this systematic attempt to 
filter stories that do not ‘need to be told’. The hierarchical necessity of producing different 
kinds of “human waste” create heterarchical structures of meaning that shadow wider 
political significations of lives. The policy of securitisation is what allows such a 
controversial meaning to persist, leading to what Bauman refers to as “adiaphorization”, 
that is “exempting [migrants] and what is done to them from moral valuation”.136 What 
such a “moral blindness” creates is the product of the arrival of “strangers at our doors” 
in numbers that outbid their previous securitisation.137 We are now confronted with all 
kinds of ‘undesirable’ bodies, bodies that transcend the figures of migration in which they 
are inserted.138 As a rights-based approach to the management of migration in EUrope is 
 
133 Fassin D., ‘From Right to Favour’. 
134 Idem. 
135 To better understand the controversy surrounding the deal between the EU and Turkey, see Collett E., ‘The Paradox 
of the EU-Turkey Refugee Deal’, MPI- Migration Policy Institute, 16 March 2016. Available at: 
https://www.migrationpolicy.org/news/paradox-eu-turkey-refugee-deal [accessed 21 January 2018]. At the time of 
writing this thesis, Turkey’s president Erdoğan threatened the EU has ‘opened’ the Turkish side of the border shared 
with Greece. While more migrants find themselves trapped before reaching Greece, the failure to agree to a common 
migration policy has further worsened the conditions of migrant in transit at the borders of Southern Europe. 
136 Bauman Z. (2016) Strangers at Our Door (Cambridge: Polity Press), 35. 
137 Idem. 




being dismantled by a culture of excesses and security, the presence of ‘irregular’ 




Political border-lines, the virtualisation of security, and the dispersal of migrants within 
society are all components of a broader process that biopoliticises, securitises, delimits 
and differently ‘humanises’ figures of migration by strategizing their existence in terms 
of survival. In this chapter, I have considered the complex intertwining of borders and 
(b)ordering processes from the virtualisation of identities to categories of migration, and 
how these affect migrants’ mobility. I also focused on places of (b)ordering such as camps 
in order to highlight how they contribute to the management of migration more broadly. 
When considering figures of the migrant we have seen that it is through the construction 
of categories that make and remake migrants as ‘humans’ with different needs that 
migrants can become ‘dangerous’ figures of crossing that need to be feared at the same 
time in which they are in need of protection. Migrants are made to exist and forced to 
circulate whilst being disempowered and subjected to (b)ordering.  
(B)ordering processes exist to redistribute people who are deemed to be in excess 
so that the kinetic functions of borders can be maintained. It is possible to confront these 
excess once we recognise how biopolitical configurations of borders give rise to more 
complex processes of (b)ordering. Borders are more than material and juridical 
boundaries. Rethinking borders in terms of political border-lines, dispersed thresholds of 
life with death, involves gaining a deeper understanding of qualitative complex changes. 
Here, (b)ordering is revisited by positing the negative management of the borders of the 
European Union as a centre of inquiry. From borders to social processes of (b)ordering, 
this negative management is maintained by dispersing those who carry borders within 




management and ways of governing migration delimit new (b)orderings from the 






























Floating Grounds: Scenes of Migration from the Mediterranean Sea to Rome 
 
 
Figure 5. ‘We are all Illegal Migrants’. Italians migrating to the U.S. after WWII. 




In this chapter, I discuss the governance of migration through the construction of migrants 
as people to rescue and made un-rescuable in the Mediterranean Sea, and their 
channelling within the need to create new forms of survival on land. Starting this journey 
at the border between sea and land and then follow fragmented routes on land enables us 




of EUrope where fragmentary journeys are less visible.1 We need to stress the fact that 
migration routes are changing continuously, that journeys are fractured and complex, and 
never linear.2 Therefore, the intention here is not that of reducing migrants’ journeys to 
EUrope from point A to point B, but to follow movement in places and spaces that reveal 
how political technologies operate by exposing actors and rationales of containment. 
Rather than simply reproducing the inconsistent ‘linearity’ of travellers’ routes, I want to 
start from an acknowledgement that linear routes are always already disrupted by 
migrants’ mobility and the difficulties in tracing it. 
By looking at the entanglements of security and humanitarianism at work in 
border points, from the Mediterranean Sea to what I call circuits of (im)mobility where 
migrants are contained, I reveal how (b)ordering works to delimit migrants’ lives under 
the imperative of rescuing, channel them on land and secure borders more broadly. At 
sea, for example, this takes shape by a re-ordering of forces that has militarised the 
Mediterranean and, at the same time, has made it a space of privileged intervention for 
the exercising of the politics of rescue. In this chapter, I argue that migrants are confronted 
with practices of security that (b)order their lives so that rescue becomes a possibility for 
some while others are barred from putting themselves in the condition to be rescued. I 
start the chapter by looking at the relation between two intertwined imperatives: rescuing 
lives and securing borders. I present the Mediterranean Sea as a space whose 
infrastructure is confronted with the making of a military-humanitarian border differently 
perceived at sea. I then shift attention to strategies of (b)ordering mobility on land by 
considering three places of (im)mobility: hotspots, islands, and encampments of camps.  
At the end of this chapter, I discuss a specific typology of camp, urban (protest) camps, 
focusing on a specific informal camp that was dismantled in Rome in October 2018. This 
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particular case will help us understand a different kind of political (im)mobility, often 
silenced by the condition of transit to which many migrants are reduced. At the same 
time, this camp represented a very important space of political activism where migrants 
struggles to life were recognised by the aid workers who appreciated the need to politicise 
their demands. Survival will be here concretely revisited and rather than being seen only 
as a broad strategy of (b)ordering that accounts for modes of governing migration, it is 
recast as a shared experience of politically engaged life. 
 
Rescuing Lives/Securing Borders: Crafting “Shipwrecked Lives” 
 
Rescuing lives and securing borders, reducing suffering and enhancing border controls 
are mechanisms that call into question individual safety and the collective existence of 
states that can only protect their frontiers through ‘ways of war’. The field of security and 
that of humanitarianism have undergone a spatial, moral and strategic rethinking. We are 
faced with a blurring of their respective constitutive conceptual boundaries but also of 
their intrinsic values of abstract universality and practical separations. In particular, it is 
the securitisation of humanitarianism, and the abandonment of politics to its managerial 
ratio, that have reconfigured discourses, practices and embodiments of mobility. While 
acknowledging the importance of considering humanitarianism as historically conceived 
interventions made in the name of alleviating suffering,3 I focus in this chapter on a 
different kind of spectre that is haunting the immediate present of EUrope, one that sees 
the justified displacement of humanitarian reason for the aim of securing borders and 
protecting migrants at once.  
According to Fassin, “humanitarian government can be defined, in the widest 
sense, as the introduction of moral sentiments in the political sphere”.4 Government here 
 
3 On humanitarian justifications deployed to justify armed interventions, see Wheeler N. J., Saving Stranger. 
4 Fassin D., ‘The moral economy of humanitarian intervention’, in Fassin D., Pandolfi M. (2010) Contemporary States 




is understood in terms of governmentality where humanitarian acts are a technology for 
governing an ensemble of institutions, actors, practices, agents and rationalities. Such 
technologies intertwine with political asymmetries that aim to govern precarious lives by 
both caring for and controlling them and their mobility. This entails both “compassion” 
and “repression”.5 At the core of humanitarian government, in fact, lies a tension between 
humanity and security that manifests around the figure of the migrant/refugee and the 
governance of migration more in general.6 Humanitarian care and security concerns 
situate interventions no longer along the limits of state jurisdiction but across all those 
categories that are deemed as vulnerable and threatening. Paradoxically, vulnerability, in 
its broader terms, also represents a threat.  
The treatment of migrants, therefore, moves from the margins of national frontiers 
to the reasonable and moral heart of humanitarian actions. As Fassin convincingly 
investigates, the politics of compassion as politics of inequality and solidarity rely on a 
condition of universality that can only be translated in terms of assistance.7 Assistance is 
rooted in a discourse of rights, such as the right of asylum and protection, that is always 
a discourse of domination insofar as those who are incorporated among human beings 
without rights need to be separated from those who cannot claim any. In so doing, 
“suffering” is both inclusive and exclusive when read through the lens of rights. 
Humanitarian reason is not underpinned by a discourse of rights, strictly speaking, but by 
a discourse of reasoning about rights that activates a moral order where care and control, 
both as security and humanitarian discourses and practices, become means with ends. 
The humanitarian politics of European border policing, as Pallister-Wilkins 
writes, are bounded to the increase in human justifications for addressing the movement 
 
5 Fassin D., ‘Compassion and Repression: The Moral Economy of Immigration Polices in France’, Cultural 
Anthropology (August 2005), 20(3), ‘Ethnographies of the Biopolitical’, 362-87. 
6 Fassin D. (2012) Humanitarian Reason: A Moral History of the Present (University of California Press: Berkeley), 
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of ‘illegalised’ migrants and saving people.8 The duality of care and control within 
humanitarianism, while being historically intrinsic to forms of power,9 has become a 
revitalised feature for governing unruly mobilities within the moral jurisdiction of 
EUrope. As the paradox of protection intersects with the policing of bodies as borders,10 
bodies as biopoliticised others,11 and borders as a security continuum,12 rescuing the lives 
of the ‘undesirables’ of the world cannot be emancipatory.13 Here survival becomes the 
key for understanding why the kind of interventions on migrants lives allowed by 
humanitarianism and securitisation can only result in disempowering forms of 
governance if they do not factor in migrants’ struggles, forms of activism and their 
alliances within these struggles. As epitomisers of the impossibility of life and 
possibilities of death, security and humanitarianism are being articulated as ‘relative 
irreducibles’, separated in scope only abstractedly but deployed in conjunction exactly 
because they work better together. In a preliminary attempt to unpack the multifaceted 
elements that contribute to the making of securitised borders and bodies as merging 
practises where ‘aid’ and ‘rejection’ are both enabled, “the war of words that surrounds 
the issue of immigration”14 deserves our attention. 
When discussing displacement and people who seek refuge, understood as a 
political relation initiated by (unwanted) mobility, the pure fact of being human, Hannah 
Arendt reminds us, is not enough.15 The reality of the in-betweeners, those who cross 
borders without permission, comes into being through a language that places people into 
categories before even starting their journeys. As explored in the previous chapter, 
 
8 Pallister-Wilkins P., ‘The Humanitarian Politics of European Border Policing: Frontex and Border Police in Evros’, 
International Political Sociology (2015), 9, 53-69, 54.  
9 See Foucault M., Security, Territory, Population. 
10 Mbembe A., ‘Bodies as Borders’, From the European South (2019), 5-18. Available at: 
http://europeansouth.postcolonialitalia.it/journal/2019-4/2.Mbembe.pdf [accessed 15 October 2019]. 
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figure(s) of the migrant are often subjected to what Crawley and Skleparis call 
“categorical fetishism” that differentiate between migrants and refugees.16 This need to 
categorise, to simplify, belongs also to those who attempt to challenge the boundaries 
between categories. People shift among categories subverting roles and rights attached 
and denied to them.17 Failing to recognise this would mean to perpetuate a state-centric 
myopic outlook based on pre-emptive and fixed sorting. As these categories are entitled 
to different treatments, the very system of classification established to protect the most 
vulnerable somehow already classifies them as deserving or undeserving, therefore 
charitable/legit and/or deportable/disposable.18 On the basis of nationality-based 
categories, dominant representations of migration as a crisis19 and the politics of 
indifference towards ‘illegalised’ migrants,20 a diversification of migrant profiles is 
serving the scope not of capturing the complexity of their movement but that of reducing 
it to pre-established reasons of voluntary/forced crossings.  
Such interventions can also be located within the spectacle of migration 
management in the Mediterranean Sea. Approaching humanitarianism/‘humanisation’ 
and security/securitisation of migration in the Mediterranean allows us to see how human 
relief is being conceived in terms of emergent measures where human life is framed in 
terms of protecting life through rescue or push-backs: the lives of migrants are protected 
by rescuing them from the sea but also by deterring them from reaching EUrope. The 
same lives are also risked in the Mediterranean, this time this responsibility is assigned 
to migrants themselves who cross it by boat. Between protection and risk, migrants’ lives 
can also become un-rescuable in the sense that their survival depends on the humanitarian 
 
16 Crawley H., Skleparis D., ‘Refugees, Migrants, Neither, Both’. 
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18 On the legal production of ‘illegal’ migrants and the logic of ‘deportability’. See De Genova N., ‘Migrant ‘Illegality’ 
and Deportability in Everyday Life’, Annual Review of Anthropology (2002), 31, 419–47.  
19 See De Genova N., Garelli G. and Tazzioli M., ‘Autonomy of Asylum? The Autonomy of Migration Undoing the 
Refugee Crisis Script’, The South Atlantic Quarterly (April 2018), 17(2), 239-65. 
20 See Basaran T., ‘The saved and the drowned: Governing indifference in the name of security’, Security Dialogue 




assistance of agents, from the sea to the land. Here the signifier of humanitarian 
government is assistance both understood as a duty of rescue and a norm of solidarity. By 
translating the very notion of human into a “life to be rescued”, the scene of rescue brings 
attention to moments at sea where migrants are ‘saved’, and because of that, in need to 
have their mobility re-channelled. As Tazzioli convincingly notes, saving and capturing 
movement is a two-sided function of humanitarian government where migrants become 
both objects of detection and border surveillance.21 
It is possible then to recognise a double engagement with humanitarian techniques 
as they reinforce border activities and make migrants safe by taking ‘hold’ of their life.22 
It is the moment of rescue that informs wider aspects about the very identity and needs of 
migrants at sea: “from being asylum seekers they turn out to be shipwrecked lives, i.e. 
from being subjects who should benefit from protection [they] become people to 
rescue”.23 The crafting of “shipwrecked lives” as Tazzioli calls them,24 responds to the 
need of making the unauthorised crossing of borders, understood as “artefacts on the 
ground,”25 more affective and effective only temporarily.26 The temporary humanitarian 
protection that is devoted to rescuing people in distress at sea hides extratemporal 
interventions where those who are governed through a logic of rescue are still put at risk 
once rescue fails to be considered ‘salvific’.27 The depiction of migrants as lives to be 
rescued contributes to their becoming ‘rescuable’ or/and ‘un-rescuable’. This leads to the 
blurring of the line between interceptions and rescue operations as humanitarian and 
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23 Tazzioli M., ‘Border displacements’, 8. 
24 Ibid. 
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power produces particular subjects who are object of care through, for instance, the act of confession. Here saving is 
commisurated to an act of correction that is based on individual conduct. This individual attention to people’s life is 
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securitarian tasks are made to belong to the same terrain of intervention.28 Rescuing lives 
and stopping boats will both secure subjects and borders. Lost in a sea of words, policies 
and practices, become enmeshed with power and privilege.  
 
“The Sea is History”: From Abstractions to Legacies in the Mediterranean 
 
“Where are your monuments, your battles, martyrs? Where is your troubled memories? Sirs, in 
that gray vault. The sea. The sea has locked them up. The sea is History” 
Derek Walcott29 
 
In the first lines of the poem The Sea is History, the poet and playwright Derek Walcott 
tells us of a sea that holds memory, and questions how history exists only in the wake of 
monuments and events that make it matter. These lines are printed on the walls of the 
National Maritime Museum in Greenwich, London. In this museum dedicated to the sea, 
memories are made to live by navigating a maritime world in which artefacts, 
manuscripts, portraits, ship models and nautical equipment merge with accounts and 
representations about ‘discoveries,’ trade routes and journeys. While walking around the 
galleries and rooms of the Museum, the boundless vastity of the sea is perceived in terms 
of the many interconnections that it has created with land and people. The potential for 
memorializing the sea and its histories is ensured here by looking at the museum as 
monument, powered by the waves of what water brought to its shores and settled as a 
common space of remembrance. However, the display of events at sea is quite different 
compared to the liquidity of its continuous flowing waves. The flowing waves of the 
Mediterranean Sea, like those of any other sea, are in continuous movement becoming 
spectacularised and visible especially trough migratory movements. While the links 
between racial capitalism, imperialism and colonialism in the Black Mediterranean have 
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been widely exposed,30 the history of today still renders populations in surplus and 
disposable through and because their movement (by boat). Without graves to mourn 
“ungrievable lives”,31 death in the Mediterranean is often framed as a peculiar 
humanitarian emergency, a crisis that is the result of fatalistic and tragic experiences of 
crossing.  
Borders, both historically and in the present, are in the making: they follow the 
movement of migrants through the enactment  of controls in different routes;32 they are 
sites of identification through the implementation of hotspots dispersed in islands;33 they 
are externalised as pre-emptive frontiers in Africa;34 they are conceived as spaces of 
governmentality where unequal mobility needs to be diverted.35 More importantly, 
borders are being fabricated as abstract sites of law enforcement where authorities 
confront enemies whose ‘histories’ are not recognised. In such a scenario, the European 
project36 brings to the surface its own history as a time beyond place in which the colonial 
North-South relationship is reduced to a logic of exception. The mattering of lives is 
disconnected from border imperialism, or connected to it otherwise, in ways that reinforce 
the policing of bodies reduced to races that do not matter.37 The exception here renders 
invisible the drawing of the global colour line38 that reproduces EUrope as a benevolent 
power that cannot do more because too many strangers are knocking at its doors. Such 
discourses are encoded within a Visa border regime and policies that make very hard for 
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the many to reach EUrope legally and safely.39 The sea is itself implicated in the violence 
of interventions conducted in the name of border management.40 These interventions are 
making the Mediterranean an “empty space that separates Europe from Africa and 
Europeans from Africans, erasing the historical identity of the Sea as a place of 
connection and movement”.41 This empty space is being filled by dominant discourses 
that re-colonise movement, and drain the historical meaning of water as matter that does 
not matter:42 the waves of the Mediterranean are made to wash away alternative markers 
of history and erase present and past voices: as Walcott puts it, ‘the sea has locked them 
up.’ 
The Mediterranean Sea and its abstractions are also organised as an infrastructure, 
one of the deadliest in the world,43 that controls and polices uneven movement. 
Constituted as a frontier,44 the maritime borders of the EU are not systematically drawn 
but considered a wider domain of intervention where rights and responsibilities for coastal 
states are tight up to some sort of politics of experimentality.45 Water in its original 
condition is “fluid, circular, universal, a unifying element where borders are difficult to 
trace, to grasp, to see”.46 The closed space of the Mediterranean is circular, compared to 
other land infrastructures, ruptures can happen without creating disruptions. The maritime 
order distributes the territorial fear of the land by connecting human communities to an 
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archipelago of possibilities and risks. The sea also needs to be approached as a digital 
archive,47 a technologically mediated space of thick governance in which infra-structural 
violence oscillates between fluidity and solidity.48 The “visual culture of 
humanitarianism”49 that the datafication of movement produces while monitoring 
clandestine trips expands this “scopic regime”.50 In this space of patchy maritime borders, 
the responsibility to intervene to deter smugglers and the duty to intervene to rescue lives 
are both called into question. This questioning involves a multiplicity of engagements 
that these interventions establish with life. Policing and rescue are both understood as a 
technology of governance for the co-making of human mobility as an uncertain and 
unequal field of intervention at sea. 
Such uncertainty has been addressed legally. In 1982 the United Nation 
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) are established the various degrees of 
sovereignty of nations with respect to their jurisdiction of world’s oceans, setting 
guidelines for the use of marine natural resources, for business and for the protection of 
the environment.51 The conceptual division of the maritime boundaries establish specific 
spaces that form the architecture of the sea: internal waters; territorial sea; contiguous 
zones; exclusive economic zones; fisheries and ecological protection zone; continental 
shelf; the high seas (a ‘terra nullis’ in which no states exercise sovereignty as it is 
“reserved for peaceful purposes”).52 Search and Rescue (SAR) zones have been 
established across the high seas where coastal states have the duty to organise operations 
for assisting people in distress and coordinate rescue operations.53 Within the limits of 
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operational safety, people at sea have to be rescued regardless of their identity or zonal 
status so that “sovereign jurisdiction takes second place to international law, customary 
law and universal norms concerning the aid and rescue of people in peril at sea”.54 The 
lack of conceptual clarity about concepts such as ‘distress’, ‘assistance’, ‘rescue’ and 
‘disembark’ in a ‘place of safety’, which entails responsibility for processing potential 
asylum applications in accordance with the principle of non-refoulement, has led to 
disputes over which states should intervene in different stages of rescue.55  
This is further complicated in the Mediterranean by the existence of overlapping 
SAR zones (such as those of Malta and Italy that are signatory to different versions of the 
Convention or Greece and Turkey) while other coastal states, such as Libya, “officially 
accepted the existing SAR regime and the obligation it entails only in July 2017, but it 
has not yet signed the SAR Convention and remains unable to independently conduct 
effective operations”.56 This has led to repeated standoffs where different claims are 
continuously being made about which state should be rescuing people, and in which port 
people should be disembarked.57 These conflicting maritime legal regimes often clash 
with states practices in a context where the 1951 Refugee Convention, International 
Human Rights Law, the Law of the Sea, and the human smuggling and trafficking 
frameworks intersect. The space of  the Mediterranean Sea, a liquid terrain of floating 
grounds of unbundled and unequal sovereignty, is “speedy and secure for certain goods 
and privileged passengers, slow and deadly for the unwanted”.58 The unwanted are not 
only migrants but also the self-organised network of ships that intervene in rescuing lives 
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at sea: NGOs, fishermen and other vessels. Their constant criminalisation works to recast 
humanitarian agents as facilitators of illegal migration especially when conducting SAR 
operations:  “the humanitarian purpose of SAR has become compromised in the name of 
border security with ensuing consequences”.59 The submission of humanitarian 
intervention to border control requires a deeper engagement with practices of rescue and 
processes of capture through the entanglement of military and humanitarian articulations 
of security. Before doing this, the structuring of elastic sovereignties60 in the 
Mediterranean starts with the different treatment of ‘boat people’. 
The term ‘boat people’ has been first used in the 1970s to describe people who 
fled Indochina in fishing boats during the Vietnam War. The scale of the exodus was so 
pronounced and deadly that the images of ‘boat people’ raised an international outrage.61 
Since then, the phenomenon of people travelling by boat seeking safety has become more 
visible in the global and more regional contexts: from Cuban and Haitian ‘boat people’ 
trying to reach the United States;62 to those seeking refuge in Australia;63 to the Southern 
Mediterranean boat migration and those who cross the Channel from France in a 
desperate attempt to get to the UK.64 As the aesthetic of border crossing have changed 
according to the sophistication of controls,65 ‘boat people’ in the Mediterranean are often 
“portrayed as gypsies of the sea […] readily corralled into the securitisation project which 
fabricates a threat to the identification of the settled ‘self’ with a particular spatial 
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organisation – the territorial state – as homeland”.66 As Pugh has observed, ‘boat people’ 
often get lost within a securitised mould where their humanity is veiled by discourses that 
centre on movement as a metaphor, especially the “dehumanising equation of voyagers 
with ineluctable forces of nature.”67 It is, therefore, possible to recognise how the 
‘making’ of migrants, and migration more broadly, is complex and accounts for ways of 
governing identities so that (b)ordering can be considered a natural activity.  
 ‘Boat people’ are forced to embark on deadly journeys to reach EUrope. Caught 
within a securitised and ‘humanised’ gaze at sea, migrants are often dehumanised and 
made to exist as part of a collective of individuals who can only be gazed upon, 
objectified, and neutralised. Since being detected is not the same as being protected as 
the Left-to-Die-Boat case,68 among others, remind us, the European ‘gaze’ is often almost 
self-serving as it acknowledges bodies but not as fully-fleshed ‘human’ presences. What 
we see is bodies who have left their homelands; what we do not see is how difficult it is 
for people to assert their rights. This is further complicated by the fact that even within 
international law, “the human right to mobility is not fully protected […] it remains an 
asymmetrical right, as it is not complemented by a corresponding right to immigrate”.69 
As such, this asymmetrical right creates people whose rights and possibility of belonging 
are conditional and who have to ask (or beg) to be ‘rescued’.  
 
‘Sharing is Caring’: The Military-Humanitarian Border at Sea 
 
Death by crossing, or better put, death by policy70 in the Mediterranean Sea is not a 
novelty of current times. Since the 1980s migrants from the Global South embarked on 
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perilous journeys in an attempt to reach the European shores.71 Due to a toughening of 
legislation designed to deny entry,72 migration was restricted by the imposition of further 
controls on seaborne movements. Such controls have externalised the Mediterranean as 
a place of passage, a “path”,73 where the possibility of death is part of a journey to life. 
The increasing crossing of the Mediterranean Sea by boat has determined a significant 
rise in the number of (un)recorded deaths.74 In particular, the events of October 2013 
where many people coming from Libya died, became highly mediatised.75 In the 
aftermath of these events labelled as ‘tragedies’, Italy launched the military-humanitarian 
Operation Mare Nostrum with an explicit focus on rescuing migrants at sea, preventing 
deaths and controlling the external borders of the European Union.76 
Operation Mare Nostrum had a proactive focus on conducting SAR operations 
close to the Libya coast, rescuing about 15000 migrants before ending on October 2014 
due to a growing concern that it represented a pull-factor of migration within the maritime 
environment.77 The more humanitarian policing of ‘our sea’ was superseded by Frontex 
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Operation Triton with a more explicit focus on securing external borders.78 While Mare 
Nostrum was coordinated by the Italian Navy and Air Force with some financial support 
from the European Union, Operation Triton involved the voluntary contribution of 15 
European States operating with a limited budget compared to the Italian mission.79 Both 
operations deployed military assets exercising a form of “militarised humanitarianism” 
where the securitisation of borders was legitimised by large investments for the military-
industrial system80 and the protection of the meta-borders of EUrope.81 It is on the 
grounds of humanity that military and private actors contribute to the rescue of people at 
sea and the necessary push-back of their boats.82 
 
Figure 6. (Operation Themis) supports Italy with border control, surveillance and search and rescue in the Central 
Mediterranean83 (screenshot: Antonella Patteri) 
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This doubled focus is evident in a series of operation that Frontex has launched in the 
Mediterranean on February 2018, one of which is Operation Themis (fig.6), with the aim 
of supporting coastal states with “a law enforcement focus while continuing to include 
search and rescue as a crucial component”.84 This is a consistent shift from the military-
humanitarian focus of Mare Nostrum where “the aim [was] to increase the level of human 
life security and the control of migration flows”.85  
According to this, SAR is now framed as being incidental to border patrolling as 
it is considered to be beyond the agency’s mandate, therefore discontinuing the 
humanitarian spirit of the maritime conventions by turning rescue into a matter of 
customary law.86 If, on the one hand, the humanitarian foundations of SAR prescribe a 
humanitarian order at sea, on the other hand, the conflating of SAR with migration/border 
control has securitised the scope for conducting search and rescue operations in the first 
instance. These tensions between alternative responses to migration are increasingly 
merging, making it apparent that they are both functional to the integrity of (b)ordering.87 
As many scholars have argued, the hyper-securitised context in which responses to boat 
migration take place is justified on the basis of the fact that migrants are at risk and a 
risk.88 In this sense, to enhance the possibility of making the “war on smugglers”89 more 
visible, a double rationale of governing unruly mobilities is at work, linking ‘illegalised’ 
movements to ‘threatening’ and ‘victimised’ circumstances of the “war on migration”.90 
The militarisation of responses to curtain migrants’ mobility in the Mediterranean 
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answers this need of making two wars, fought on different fronts, converge as the same 
object of containment: enhancing border controls and deter migrants from reaching 
EUrope will result in saving lives. 
The militarisation of controls in the Mediterranean is exemplified by the launch 
in 2015 of EUNAVFOR MED Operation Sophia, formally European Naval Force 
Mediterranean. This operation was launched as a part of the Common Security and 
Defence Policy of the European Union, in line with NATO engagement in the Aegean 
with Operation Sea Guardian91 (and the rise of shooting-to-kill polices at sea).92 In 
particular, Operation Sophia is organised around implementation stages93 where, in the 
name of dismantling networks of (human) smuggling, member states can take offensive 
measures, such as the search and seizure of migrants boats so to disrupt human 
trafficking.94 In 2016, the mandate of Operation Sophia has been extended to include the 
training of the Libyan Navy and Coastguard and to help implementing the UN arms 
embargo on Libya. In 2017, the Council of the European Union further extended 
Operation Sophia’s mandate in terms of surveillance activities, sharing of information 
about agencies and the training of Libyan Coastguards in more effective ways.95 
Functioning as a pre-emptive barrier for migrants to exercise their right to leave and claim 
asylum, the targeting of ‘protectors’ of the ‘protected’ also reduces the chances for the 
EU principle of non-refoulement to be triggered. The direct effects of Operation Sophia 
are that migrants face more risky journeys and rely on alternative and risky routes.96 
While these activities should be conducted in compliance with International Human 
 
91 This is the first time that NATO and an EU civil agency (Frontex) cooperate in the field. Available at: 
https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2017_03/20170313_SG_AnnualReport_2016_en.pdf 
[accessed 14 October 2016].  
92 Moreno-Lax V., ‘The EU Humanitarian Border and the Securitisation of Human Rights: The ‘Rescue-Through-
Interdiction/Rescue-Without-Protection’ Paradigm’, Journal of Common Market Studies (2018), 56(1), 119-40, 127. 
93 See EUNAVFOR MED Operation Sophia’s mission. Available at: https://www.operationsophia.eu/about-us/#story 
[accessed 16 October 2019]. 






Rights Law, the indirect effects of this operation concern the moralisation of reasons 
through which this modality of governing mobility is perpetuated. As humanitarian 
government ‘cares through control’ and ‘controls through care’,97 what we are witnessing 
is the enactment of responses that are cast as mutually achievable goals.98 Border security 
and migrant safety, deterrence and rescue, are not only two sides of the same coin,99 but 
are also shared rationales for governing multiplicities in which caring is mutual and equal 
from both parts.  
The growing use of military technology, assets and personnel within the maritime 
context are the by-product of escalations where border enforcement and irregular border 
crossings intensify according to their respective engagements with containment and 
mobility.100 Justified both on security and humanitarian grounds, the expansion of police 
forces with a military status is made visible at sea where warships and other military 
hardware is deployed to stop migrants and criminals.101 For instance, in Italy the Guardia 
di Finanza, a law enforcement agency responsible for patrolling illegal drug smuggling 
and prevent financial crimes, can be considered a kind of militarised police force whose 
activities are entangled with economic checks and the vigilance of people at sea.102 In 
patrolling the southern borders of EUrope, naval operations led by Frontex and member 
states operate within a military-strategic field of intervention. While this military regime 
of justification might be contested,103 missions and mandates that aspire to protect a 
political order also allow for coercive action. The border assemblage works through 
dispositions that are activated/disactivated directly from the field of military strategy: 
“killing is inhibited while containment and deterrence are activated, as well as 
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indifference to the lives of individuals around”.104 The presence of the military at sea, 
therefore, might not discriminate between good civilians and (alleged) threats once 
containment is made relative to the geopolitics of borders. These geopolitics of the EU 
borders are also biopolitical in the sense that they act as a form of governing that targets 
people for the well-being of European citizens. In the name of enhancing the welfare of 
Europeans, a form of neo-pastoralist rationale of governance is constantly deployed.105 
While, as Bigo observes, biopolitics cannot be the dominant analytical grid for 
understanding border controls,106 the specific biopolitics mobilised onto subjects are of 
fundamental importance for reading practices of border management as being in excess 
to policing. These practices, in fact, cut in two life distinguishing between acceptable and 
unacceptable ways of living (and this is particularly visible in the context of life in 
camps). 
Even though the militarisation of borders cannot be reduced to the maritime 
context, the interstitial space of the sea is increasingly giving rise to new re-significations 
of security and humanitarianism trough lives that are being rescued by military actors. 
The “rescue-without-protection” and “rescue-through-interdiction” practices that 
Moreno-Lax identifies107 are closely connected ways in which migrants’ subjectivities 
are limited to lives who are rescuable and lives which are not. The politics of rescue/un-
rescue force us to rethink acts of rescue through a rationale of survivability. People who 
are rescued in the Mediterranean survive but their survival is further defined as political 
(im)mobility once their access to rights is denied when they are disembarked on land. As 
Ignatieff convincingly writes, “rights are inescapably political because they tacitly imply 
a conflict between a rights holder and a rights withholder”.108 The rights holder is often 
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deprived from accessing rights and limited in his/her possibility of articulating political 
demands. While rights, at least normatively, cannot be confused with aspirations,109 it is 
important to stress that the political movement surrounding claims for rights go beyond 
the failure to get formal recognition, and give rise instead to vital forms of resistance. The 
scene of rescue at the edges of the military-humanitarian borders at sea provides us with 
a privileged position for understanding practices of (b)ordering migrants as they  are often 
pre-empted from making claims to rights, and when they are rescued and enter within the 
reach of the state, their freedom and autonomy are graded in different ways. From the 
space of the sea as a continuum, practices of channelling, filtering and sorting extend to 
the land where an archipelago of fundamental exclusions and inclusions, paired with 
rationales for governing ‘the unwanted for the wanted’, take place. Those who can escape, 
who do not escape, who stay, who cannot stay, who are encouraged to leave or to stay, 
who are fingerprinted, who are allowed to claim asylum or are made ‘deportable’ and 
disciplined otherwise, as we will see, put forward a specific claim as they want to be 
recognized as people who matter or ‘count.’ They want to count not simply, in biopolitical 
terms, as a subject that needs to be contained, made (only) to survive and discouraged 
from living politically, but as subjects whose mobility is first of all political.  
 
Mapping Circuits of (Im)mobility: (B)ordering Movement 
 
In answering the question of what a border is, Etienne Balibar writes: 
 “The idea of a simple expression of what is a border is by definition an absurdity. Making a 
border means staking out a territory, declaring its frontiers and therefore defining and 
imposing an identity. But likewise, defining and identifying in general is nothing more than 
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Thinking about borders, therefore, means reproducing their very possibility of existence 
as their definition and representation are not immune from border-making. The 
responsibility of producing accounts that are representative of multifaceted borders then 
is felt as an epistemological imperative. In my view, a fair representation of ‘borders’ can 
only be achieved when complex ideas are thought beyond the supposed determinism of 
what borders are by giving more attention to what borders do. When moving away from 
the maritime borders of the EU to its territories we can see more explicitly the effects of 
(b)ordering on migrants’ lives. As spaces are imminently productive of differentiations, 
there is nothing ‘objective’ about borders if not that they function to connect and divide 
at the same time. The different nature of borders, such as the ones at sea and those on 
land that I will consider in more detail in this part of the thesis, represent a continuum in 
border-making. Border-making is a process of (b)ordering where the migrant and its 
engagements with political boundaries are often reduced to containing them in spaces of 
(im)mobility. These spaces are governed in ways that ensure the survival of people so 
that they can continue to live only in minimal terms. Migratory trajectories to EUrope are 
always shifting in relation to more pervasive and sophisticated ways of controlling 
borders to the point that borders are now better understood as mobile devices of control.111  
While this work also considers (human) mobility in relation to politics, it explores 
ideas about (im)mobility as a way of governing migrants’ ways of life (by a biopolitical 
specification of life) to be of fundamental importance for making manifest the effects of 
(b)ordering. (Im)mobility is thought here in relation to mobility and not as its opposite, 
as immobility. In particular, (im)mobility as a political concept and state rationale refers 
to the continuous shifting of mobility as a condition that constraints people but also allows 
them to exercise a form of calculated autonomy.  
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According to Schewel, migration studies suffer a mobility bias as immobility is 
only rarely accounted for.112 Incidentally, on this reading of immobility, those who don’t 
migrate are unavoidably cast as lacking the resources and agency to leave and the fact 
that people do not necessarily want to migrate in not properly accounted for.113 I would 
revisit this mobility bias by considering (im)mobility not as an analytic tool for non-
migration,114 but as a concept that enables us to better grasp how migrants are both 
allowed to be mobile and immobilised (also politically), and focus on the ambiguity 
between forms of calculated autonomy and control. Migrants who are kept (im)mobile 
can engage with life as far as they keep living with death, surviving in the sense they 
should keep on living as such. As a political concept, instead, (im)mobility captures the 
liminality of the politics of survival that are exercised upon migrants in terms of 
promoting both a reduced autonomy and control. Migrants move in space, when not 
detained, but are restrained in their political actions and practical engagements as they 
are reduced to a life that needs to be survived and not fully lived. However, migrants and 
their alliances actively contest the terms of their (b)ordered existence, and this will be 
evident when considering a (protest) camp in Rome. Mapping circuits of (im)mobility 
then means taking a closer interest in thinking of ways in which migrants are immobilised 
and mobilised while kept at distance from the possibility of engaging with a different idea 
of life and make politics of their own. These circuits contain, disperse and reduce migrants 
to remnants in excess. They remain in excess if they are not channelled within the legal 
frameworks of asylum and for the state which decides who counts as human and as object 
of threat; yet-to-be full political subjects, however, strive to persevere no less than full 
political subjects. 
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Mbembe talks of ‘borderization’ as: 
 “the process by which certain spaces are transformed into uncrossable places for certain 
classes of populations, who thereby undergo a process of racialization; places where speed 
must be disabled and the lives of a multitude of people judged to be undesirable are meant to 
be immobilised if not shattered”.115  
 
Borders, as Mbembe puts it, have been transformed in the name of security into 
accelerating and decelerating practices that generate value according to the principle of 
dissimilarity rather than affinity predicated on separation and division rather than mutual 
coexistence.116 The circuits of (im)mobility where migrants transit through (in accelerated 
or decelerated fashion) result in certain racialized or otherwise discriminated subjects to 
be (kept) still in different degrees and borders become places of sorting, places of 
condensation and places of containment.117 These are overlapping spaces of governance 
that are imposed upon migrants, but sometimes, as we will see later, they provide the 
opportunity for migrants to self-organise against the encroachment they suffer.  
 
Places of Sorting: Hotspots  
 
Hotspots were introduced by the European Commission as part of its Agenda on 
Migration launched in May 2015. Hotspots were established as a purposive response to 
the increased arrival of migrants through the Mediterranean route, and as a strategic 
supplement to national authorities in identifying, registering and fingerprinting 
newcomers.118 Hotspots were piloted in Greece where there are currently five hotspots 
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(on the islands of Chios, Kos, Leros, Lesvos and Samos) and in Italy where there are also 
five hotspots (in Lampedusa, Messina, Pozzallo, Taranto and Trapani).119 The document 
that establishes these hotspots provides indications on how this approach was going to be 
operationalised:  
“Those claiming asylum will be immediately channelled into an asylum procedure where 
EASO support teams will help to process asylum cases as quickly as possible. For those not 
in need of protection, Frontex will help Member States by coordinating the return of irregular 
migrants. Europol and Eurojust will assist the host Member State with investigations to 
dismantle the smuggling and trafficking networks”.120  
 
According to this, the hotspot approach works on three interlinked aims: to register people 
and process asylum claims; to perform deportations for those who are not deemed as 
entitled of presenting asylum cases; to target traffickers and human smugglers and their 
networks.121 Initially, hotspots were thought as a solution to the ‘burden sharing’ of 
migrants’ arrivals at the Southern borders of the EU and to police the conduct of countries  
such as Greece and Italy have been accused of letting migrants move around Europe 
without taking their fingerprints.122 Established as spaces of transit and sorting, hotspots 
exist today as spaces of semi-detention. Following the implementation of the EU-Turkey 
deal on 20 March 2016, the hotspots in Greece rather than spaces of transit became de-
facto places of confinement where migrants wait for their applications to be examined 
and are eventually returned to Turkey.123 By attempting to retain control over mobilities, 
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the logistical infrastructure of the hotspots redistributes and channels movement around 
new moral and spatial loci.124 
The EU hotspots’ approach to migration containment, therefore, raises many 
questions regarding the management of mobilities through space and time. More 
importantly, as Garelli and Tazzioli have shown, the hotspots system impacts on migrants 
lives and geographies as their identities are rendered precarious and reshuffled 
temporally, while their mobility is spatially confined.125 Migrants are made (im)mobile 
in the sense that the hotspot traps them in islands and camps where their conditions are 
precarious so that their individual and collective political engagements can be further 
restricted. Thought of as a fast-track solution to member states processing centres, 
hotspots function as a pre-frontier of EUrope where “asylum officers render asylum 
decisions on the basis of nationality, rather than individual circumstances”.126 Hotspots 
do not represent then a structural solution to the management of mobile populations, but 
a further advancement in the mechanisms of exclusions for the many: 
 “When strategies of spatial containment and the criterion of nationality are not enough for 
disciplining mobility and narrowing the access to protection, states introduce temporal 
borders that vertically cut across the sites”.127  
 
 
This vertical cut further disrupts people on the move in their possibility of accessing legal 
networks of recognition. On top of this, it is essential to stress the fact that hotspots are 
ambiguous facilities for the initial reception and identification of migrants arriving by sea 
which extend both as open and closed sites of aid beyond immediate rescue.128  
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As widely explored, institutions of care rule over unruly populations by 
establishing their own hierarchy of needs.129 Pallister-Wilkins argues that the hotspot 
makes possible and necessary humanitarian interventions in practice: a specific 
humanitarian triage is at play at hotspots where mobility and life designate control and 
care.130 The intertwining of both rationales is identified in terms of the biopolitical 
engagements that hotspots produce both in terms of exclusion and inclusion of the 
population concerned. It cannot pass unnoticed that as a mobile spatial entity,131 the 
hotspot rationale has systematically reproduced and multiplied entrenched ways of 
governing the ‘undesirables’ of the world. As Walters puts it, “the humanitarian 
crystallizes in the midst of complex relations of inequality, far from neutralizing political 
conflict it should be seen as an emergent zone of politics in its own right”.132 Politically 
then, the hotspot model reinforces ways of thinking about humanitarian borders but also 
physical borders by reaffirming their presence where they are supposed to be. 
Biopolitically, these borders permeate migrants’ bodies, making them experience the 
consequences of such re-(b)orderings in terms of pre-emptive governance. Migrants are 
reduced to people who should (only) survive by living in the wait, and whose life needs 
to be delimited to what is acceptable for the state. Looking at the shifting geographies and 
politics of migration control through hotspots helps us to unveil tense relationships 
between ideal types of care, but also control. Created to speed up the process of 
identification of ‘irregular migrants’, hotspots re-territorialise borders and function to 
limit the politics of movement of migrants by fixing their time to place. 
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Places of Condensation: Islands Model of Detention  
 
Within the Euro-Mediterranean migration system, islands play a determinant role in 
contributing to the control and spatialization of migratory movements. It is not a 
coincidence that hotspots are located on islands functioning as part of a broader system 
of migration management. The proximity of islands to zones of interception allows nation 
states to mediate access to asylum133 before and regardless of migrants reaching mainland 
EUrope. Hotspots located on islands offer the possibility for coastal states to re-assert 
where their borders are supposed to be, that is within the margins of their sovereign 
jurisdictions. These margins are spatially and politically significant when looking at 
migrants’ (im)mobilisations in and through islands. In particular, political geographers 
have highlighted the importance of looking at islands to examine geographies of 
sovereignty and the rendered precariousness of migrants’ lives within them.134 Within the 
framework of securitised/‘humanised’ migration, islands represent an opportunity to 
discourage migrants from accessing legal recognition and further their journeys on main 
sovereign territory. Broadly speaking, islands also represent a fertile terrain in which 
governance operates “gradually”.135 As Alison Mountz puts it, “nation-states are using 
islands to capture liminal populations, neither home nor arrived, not able to legally 
become refugees or asylum-seekers because of their location at a distance from sovereign 
territory”.136 The ‘in-betweenness’ of islands limit migrants’ claim to rights and political 
life, and leaves them trapped by a geography of inconclusiveness.  
We can, for instance, think of the Greek islands and how they have come to 
symbolise this idea of entrapment. From places of transit, islands are increasingly being 
conceived as places of destination137 in which detention is not only institutionalised 
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through rigid state facilities but also normalised through the settlement of migrants in 
camps. Of these, the Moira refugee camp in Lesbos, the largest of the Greek’s islands, 
has acquired a certain scholarly and mediatic visibility also due to the precarious life 
conditions in which people are kept.138 The EU sponsored camp in Moira, contingent and 
constituted by the presence of the hotspot itself, calls for care and asks for control: the 
basic humanitarian needs are being met while the potential security risk for migrants to 
reach sovereign territory are minimised.139 Built on a former military base, the 
repurposing of Moira from a strategic military geopolitical asset to a facility of care and 
control exposes important patterns that evoke violent topographies of exclusion and 
exception and run throughout the histories of islands. 
Located at the intersection between distance and proximity, islands enforce 
practices that “deter, detain and deflect migrants”.140 They transfigure detention beyond 
centres where the margins are not completely separated from the politicization of islands 
features. Bernard Debarbieux talks of islands as “places of condensation” evoking “an 
analogy with the condensation of water vapor: a densification process (water aggregating 
in a small volume) that gives visibility (water drop) to that which had not been [visible] 
(water vapor)”.141 The French geographer emphasises the concrete and symbolic relation 
of islands with human developments and territorial production that are global.142 
Highlighting the passage from invisibility to visibility, the notion of condensation helps 
us to disrupt the more topographical idea of distance, bringing to the fore the spatial and 
political potential of islands. Undoubtedly, the island of Lampedusa fits this description. 
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As Bernardie-Tahir and Schmoll put it, “the island has turned into a resonance chamber 
for many issues, including the management of maritime migrants, deportation, detention, 
hospitality and solidarity, and the intertwined intervention of local, national and 
supranational institutions”.143 The fact that on the island are concentred Italy’s sea borders 
makes it possible to dilute migrants movements. 
Federica Mazzara attempts to unpack such complexities by looking at the island of 
Lampedusa through the interplay of visibility and invisibility. Drawing on Bauman’s 
categories of the “tourist” and the “vagabond”,144 Lampedusa is first thought through the 
lens of these two different categories of wanderers where autonomy and freedom are  
decurted for the later.145 Within these spaces that are rendered invisible or hypervisible, 
detention is concretely spatialised but also de-spatialised as ‘outdoors prisons’ that 
fabricate more permanent and temporary figures of migration. Islands are then 
heterotopias that contain undesirables’ bodies in which real utopian space is made 
impossible.146 What emerges from Mazzara’s very insightful book on counter-mapping 
the gaze on migration is an account of the island of Lampedusa as a complex multi-
layered space of disruptive governance.147 Lifting up these layers, the criminalisation and 
preventive illegalisation of migrants intertwine with the continued militarised-
humanitarian trend in the island. Foucault talks of “the great confinement” as a response 
to the mad and outsiders of central Europe at the end of the 16th century: their separation 
from visible margins was accomplished with the emergence of the asylum-house.148 
Similarly, islands are being repopulated by a new range of unwanted and repurposed as 
marginal places of disciplinary conduct.  
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It is not surprising then that humanitarian camps created for civilians draw on the 
military camp created for soldiers. From 2008 to 2011 the ex-NATO base Loran operated 
in Lampedusa as a temporary reception centre to tackle the ‘humanitarian emergency’ of 
North Africa. This former military base while operatively dismantled, was still considered 
as a military zone by Coast Guards and Carabinieri who kept making use of its 
facilities.149 Karina Horsti reports on the memorialisation of Loran, now an abandoned 
structure and once an architecture of surveillance and control: an open/closed space that 
still retains a strong feeling of confinement, complemented by “signs of humanitarian 
authority that governed the migrants by the logics of protection and alleviation of 
suffering”.150 In examining what remains of this space, Horsti provides a rich account of 
the merging of the humanitarian and securitised rationales of the border at Loran. This 
rationale endures today and transcends border zones, producing a new humanitarian 
border regime. William Walters has diagnosed the rise of humanitarian borders as a 
parallel move to the strategizing of state frontiers into instruments of migration control:  
“the humanitarian border emerges once it becomes established that border crossing has 
become, for thousands of migrants seeking, for a variety of reasons, to access the territories 
of the global North, a matter of life and death”.151  
 
 
The humanitarian border actualises new spaces by reinventing zones and emergencies as 
humanitarian.152 While this border manifests under specific circumstances and at the hand 
of different actors,153 it has to be considered as fluctuating so that its field of intervention 
is distributed along migrants’ routes and “zones of qualification”.154 These zones 
transcend but also reify the idea that detention is custody so that care is secured.  
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As Mazzara argues, “to protect migrants is first and foremost an act of protecting 
ourselves, by confining, securitising and sanitising the others through practices of 
hospitality/exclusion”.155 Hospitality and exclusion become entrenched in modes of 
(b)ordering that are mutually supportive. This leads us to think that referring to reception 
centres or to detention centres does not change the fact that these facilities host and divide. 
What is at stake in detention is not only the (im)mobilisation of migrants, but their very 
subjectification of indeterminate statuses. They are made to live in the wait, in between 
worlds, that mostly account for their basic needs of survival so that they can just continue 
living on state terms. While detention starts well beyond the physical borders of EUrope, 
islands within its jurisdiction condense mechanisms of detention with new modes of 
(b)ordering, making coexist insularity with isolation. Isolation here is spatially configured 
to reduce the political potential of migrants’ struggles.  
 
Places of Dispersal: Encampments of Camps 
 
In chapter two I explored the camp as a tool to govern people who are made to remain in 
excess. In particular, drawing on the work of Papadopoulos and others, I considered 
camps as porous speed boxes that serve to decelerate migration by controlling movement 
through time.156 Moving away from Agamben’s vision of the camp as “catalytic 
converter” of order based on lawful exceptions, the camp has so far been presented here 
also as a function of time that works to recalibrate space in terms of acceptable 
temporalities of movement. Keeping this in mind, mapping circuits of (im)mobility also 
requires us to engage with ideas of camps not only in their institutional forms but also as 
improvised and makeshift sites of political negotiation. I will now reflect on camp 
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typologies more broadly but also look at urban (protest) camps focusing on a particular 
camp in Rome, and at the forms of ‘solidarity’ and impasse that are generated within.  
In Managing the Undesirables: Refugee Camps and Humanitarian Government, 
Michel Agier scrutinizes the mechanisms of control and care over some populations, “the 
world’s residual ‘remnants,’ dark, diseased and invisible”.157 Exploring the disturbing 
ambiguity of humanitarianism, Agier notices that interventions under the humanitarian 
banner today go well beyond the spaces of the camps: there are many forms of 
encampments and these are made up of networks, leaderships and values.158 These are 
spaces of mobility, spaces of excessive liquidity,159 where people are not only spatially 
confined but also circulate under the care and control of formal and more informal 
regulatory technologies of survival, control and distancing.160 The de-spatialization of the 
camp, therefore, is an expression of the pervasiveness of  ways of managing the rejected 
of the world. Of these spaces, Agier identifies four main constellations of functions and 
modes of ordering the movement (and the politics) of individuals: self-organised refuges; 
sorting centres; spaces of confinement; unprotected reserves.161 The first type are self-
organised camps, shelters that are established in absence of hospitality; the second type 
are sorting centres that group and divide people on the move; the third type are more 
traditional refugee camps managed by international and state agencies; the fourth type 
are camps for internally displaced people.162 On the border and between borders, 
(im)mobility has become waiting, transiting, settling and unsettling: “the border is 
everywhere that an undesirable is identified and must be kept apart, ‘detained’ and then 
‘expelled’”.163  
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While causes and categories of justification for making people ‘undesirable’ 
might differ, the continuity among these spaces is in the form of government that enacts 
a power-over life. Power-over life operates as a network of knowledge and practices 
where the very humanity of the ‘undesirable’ is contested. In these spaces, the life of 
migrants is often reduced to its minimum so it can be controlled and sustained by forms 
of interventions that aim to maintain mere survival. In camps, migrants and their alliances 
struggle for life,164 or, as I suggest, for affirming ways of living life. The fact that migrants 
erect makeshift camps, ‘occupy’ space, and reconstitute their everyday lives according to 
their needs, represent the first disruptive element of thinking circuits of (im)mobility 
through the lens of a power of (human) life.165 So far this aspect has been only partly 
considered in this thesis but its implications for thinking politically will be better assessed 
in the next chapters and chapter five in particular, not as simply as a power-of but also as 
a power-to. When focusing on this typology of camps, therefore, the tension is not just 
between control and care per se, but also on the ways in which care is self-organised 
transversally, across grassroot solidarity nets and migrants’ demands, so that control can 
be resisted. 
‘Illegalised’ around the ‘margins’,166 dispersed in order to be made capturable and 
precarious, places and practices of migration are being stretched from the periphery to 
the centre of communal life. This is well depicted in the MigMap Project that provides an 
interactive visual cartography of European policies for governing migration in four 
maps.167 These maps identify the key players in the context of migration and borders 
management in EUrope (map1); the various discourses surrounding and shaping 
migration (map 2); the process of Europeanization of EUrope through polices (map 3). 
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Particularly interesting is Map 4 (fig.6) that identifies places of mobility, places of 
everyday life, public institutions and border installations. These do not exist in a vacuum 
but are influenced by nation states and supranational agencies. From a reading of these 
maps it is possible to fully grasp “how and where the production of knowledge is taking 
place in the area of migration – and who is participating and has access to it.”168  
 
 
Figure 7. MigMap Project, Map. 4 Places and Practices169 (screenshot: Antonella Patteri) 
 
 
Map 4 (fig.7) mobilises spaces of high political visibility as temporary (places of 
mobility) or more permanent settlements (border installations) in which spatial thresholds 
are continuously being crossed. Suspended at the margins of the centre, camps might exist 
unseen, outside sites of civic environment, but migrants’ mobility and engagements bring 
them at the centre of citizens’ gaze as their movements makes them intersect with 







Over the last decade, a network of camps has emerged on the way to EUrope.170 From 
processing centres, reception centres, state-run detention camps to improvised camps, 
urban camps and more self-settled encampments, isolation and (im)mobilisations are 
always constraining people in spaces of coercion. Control over human life is often 
maintained by dispersing people in encampments, reducing their capacity to organise 
politically, and often made evictable.171 The care for a shelter, and the control over the 
permanence of settlements, intersects with new spatial strategies. As all forms of 
contentious politics are spatial,172 camps’ locations respond to tactics of vicinity to 
infrastructures of mobility, border zones, and migrants’ routes. In some other cases, 
camps reproduce urban ghettos, “places of survival on the spot”, where people are 
immediately cast aside from the space/politics of the city.173 Returning to Foucault and 
its concept of heterotopia, Agier talks of off-places, places outside or at the edges of 
normal orderings where confinement possesses extraterritoriality.174 This 
extraterritoriality is experienced by migrants in terms of a double locality of exclusion: 
“They are excluded from the native places that they lost through displacement, and they 
are excluded from the space of ‘local population’ where the camp or other transit zones 
are located”.175 Extraterritoriality then is a cause of excesses that are political while being 
“confined outside”.176 Off-places make up real places keeping alive the extraterritorial 
tension between who cannot be included and who needs to be excluded. The fiction of 
extraterritoriality and the void of exception allow the heterotopia to build its artefact - 
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boat, island, or camp - in the middle of a void that is the border of a social or national 
order.177  
 
Urban (Protest) Camps: Political Encampments and Migrants in Transit 
 
As already considered, today encampments of camps are proliferating on the way to 
EUrope. In this mapping of ubiquitous (b)ordering practices, cities have come to represent 
the point at which law enforcement meets locally scaled borders.178 Many authors have 
discussed the continuous urbanization of cities where zones of disconnection are built and 
rebuilt in order to accommodate specific configurations of humanity.179 In order to fully 
understand how the making of borders interacts with the space of the city it is necessary 
to stress how borders have become internal extensions of more recognisable limits.180 
The callous reality of borders, in fact, is brought into existence into the everyday spaces 
of universities, schools, hospitals, social services, employment agencies and so on. The 
urban fabric somehow absorbs the border regime constructing new spatialities of 
(b)ordering, and cities are made to act as mediators of this new geography.181 The 
pervasiveness of borders within social life aims not only at enforcing reasons of 
containment by policing movement through identity checks or by reporting ‘irregular’ 
migrants to state authorities, but also functions to reiterate and normalise how, and to 
some extent also where, the recipients of these measures should live. The ‘how’ of 
migration regards the ways in which migrants can be made precarious, while the ‘where’ 
is always shadowed by the possibility of the camp. As already considered, there are 
different typologies of camps that are associated to different administrative categories of 
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regulated mobility.182 Within their own genealogy of making, urban protest camps 
represent a peculiar manifestation of a diversity of camps where demands are formulated 
in confrontation with the state.  
Feigenbaum and others define a protest camp as “a place-based social movement 
strategy that involves both acts of ongoing protest and acts of social reproduction needed 
to sustain daily life”.183 Drawing on this definition, the authors trace the origins of protest 
camps to then turn attention to their more contemporary forms, by also identifying four 
major emergent infrastructures of protest camps. These infrastructures include 
engagements with media activities, protest action, governance and recreation.184 What 
makes protest camps distinguishable from other forms of protest are these infrastructures, 
but also the practices that accompany protest activity which are intended to mobilise the 
constituent power of political autonomy and social care.185 The constitutional capacity of 
protest camps is given centre stage in the sense that camping works as protesting so that 
social movements refine their strategies of action within it. In the case of migratory 
movements, camps are often set up as a necessity to the forced dispersal and management 
of people on the move. Shifting attention from the institutional camps of the state to 
makeshift camps, informal camps are often linked to protest camps even though their 
ephemeral character forces us to rethink means and meanings of protesting. The notion 
of ‘protest’ camps is here re-conjugated to accommodate how protest can be articulated 
not just in terms of precise infrastructures of confrontation but through less settled and 
organised strategies of dissent. Often, such strategies are channelled by the intervention 
of members of grassroot organisations. In such circumstances, protest is not necessarily 
performed or even recognised as such, but it is experienced through acts of denunciation 
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that establish political relationships between the outside, the margins and the inside of 
camps.  
The visibility of migrants’ encampments is often associated to a situation of 
protest where, paraphrasing Judith Butler, the body appears and is recognised by others, 
making these spaces political.186 While it is important to recognise the political relevance 
of encampments, here the recognition of migrants as political subjects or not, remains 
subservient to the kind of identities that are assigned to them by the regime of recognition 
who validates them. As recognition is always pre-determined, bodies are often thought as 
biopolitical before appearing in the public arena: a body that exists as such. In order to 
discourage this, therefore, we need to think anew according to what protest might mean 
even when direct visibility is decurted. This will be better considered later in this chapter 
when looking at a migrants’ camp set up by the Baobab Experience in Rome. For now, it 
is important to consider the political character of cities in ensuring that migrants’ politics 
of presence are enacted through the negotiations between local/urban life and mobile 
borders. Isin remarks that the city offers a platform for rethinking political subjectivities 
so that presence can be claimed.187 As we will see in the case of Calais in the next chapter, 
visibility needs to be situated within migrants’ strategies of movement where they also 
need to hide in order to postpone their claims.  
Claiming presence then, involves a dynamic engagement with the politicization 
of mobilities. As Darling reminds us, “there is a need to be wary of positioning presence 
as straightforward claim to visibility”.188 In line with this, presence needs to be  disjoined 
from the aims of mere visibility and understood instead as a key concept for thinking 
about urban (protest) camps where the formal aspect of occupying (public/private) spaces 
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intersects with the informality of migrants’ existence. This is often the case for migrants 
who transit in sites.189 As the concept of transit is not contemplated within European laws, 
where migrants are either considered as legally claiming asylum or illegally staying 
within a given territory, their political presence is often denied in all its facets. These are 
migrants whose journey is rooted not only in the wider precarity and temporality of their 
movement, but also in the uncertainty that surrounds the reachability of their chosen 
country of destination: they find themselves stranded anytime their (im)mobility is 
promoted. However, migrants in transit exist not only because their mobility is obstructed 
but also because they do not give up their goals. In considering the context in which 
migrants in transit settled in a particular urban (protest) camp in Rome set up by a 
grassroot organisation, the Baobab Experience, I move away from ideas of a protest camp 
as a repertoire for social movements, a space of social reproduction, or a place-based site 
of ongoing protest.190 The infrastructures of solidarity set up in this camp, before its 
eviction in October 2018, could be defined as fragile. Nevertheless, this camp carries 
political potential by showing how protest works through the re-politicization of claims 
based on a politics of presence. The aid organisation that self-organised this specific camp 
with migrants in Rome understood that (b)ordered survival had to be contested by making 
this space political. 
 
When in Rome, Yes, We Camp! 
 
In the summer of 2018, the informal camp and the humanitarian presidio (settlement) of 
Piazzale Maslax near Tiburtina Station in Rome was still a reality. A few months later, 
in October 2018, people living in this camp were evicted and their tents and communal 
belongings were destroyed by the Italian authorities. Before this intervention, the 
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grassroot citizen-led organisation, the Baboab Experience, had erected about two hundred 
tents in an empty parking space owned by the Italian Railway National Services. This 
now empty parking space is situated in front of a massive edifice called Hotel Africa, one 
of the first buildings occupied in Rome by migrants since 2004, and it is today the only 
structure that exists to remind us that many migrants were transiting there. While the 
informal camp of Piazzale Maslax, that took the name from a former host of the camp - 
a nineteen years old Somali migrant who committed suicide in a reception centre in the 
south of Italy - existed for about a year, the history of informal settlements set up in Rome 
by the Baobab Experience goes back to 2015.  The centro sociale (social center) situated 
in via Cupa from 2004 to about 2014, grew spontaneously in the summer of 2016 where 
the Baobab centro sociale was made available for migrants looking for temporary 
accommodation. Since more migrants arrived in Rome especially between 2015 and 
2016, the volunteers decided to turn the settlement in via Cupa into an open-air camp. 
Tents, services, mattresses and so on started to appear on the streets catching the attention 
of media and politicians, raising issues of disorder for the local administration.191 This 
structure of aid could no longer hold due to evictions and interventions by the police, and 
volunteers had to think about more efficient ways to conduct their activities. These 
activities ranged from providing meals, medical checks, and assisting migrants before 
furthering their routes.  
The Baobab Experience started then to provide mobile support to migrants after 
the definitive eviction of the space in Via Cupa in October 2016.192 The volunteers of the 
organisations initially relocated their operations to an area behind Tiburtina’s station, 
central and visible from the city’s central hub. The informal settlement had to be moved 
again, with volunteers and migrants setting up a camp not that distant from the previous 
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location in Tiburtina, this time less visible, a parking space devoted for touristic buses but 
left unused. The informal camp Piazzale Maslax became a political encampment and a 
symbol of protest against local authorities, Italy’s reception system and European policies 
at large. Even though this place can be considered the last example of a series of 
encampments that have been set up by the Baobab Experience in Rome, the informal 
camp of Piazzale Maslax represented a continuum of experiences for the politically 
engaged possibilities that emerged from claiming migrants’ presence through different 
kinds of activism. 
Close to the entrance of the Piazzale Maslax’ camp, authorities put cemented 
blocks on the road so as to discourage members of organisations from reaching the camp 
and offering services to migrants (eventually, this barrier was removed). During the last 
weeks of July 2018, there were about two hundred fifty people staying in the camp. A 
little gardening space was located at the main entrance of the camp where some volunteers 
did gardening with some migrants. The parking space was surrounded by tents, with a 
communal area devoted to cooking and eating even though most of the meals were 
distributed by organisations. In this makeshift camp there were not proper infrastructures 
of support such as toilets and electricity was minimally provided. When I visited the camp 
on a warm summer day in July, some of the people staying in the camp were playing 
football and, since music was on, others were dancing in the background. Parked in the 
camp was the van of No Name Kitchen, a group of independent volunteers active in 
Serbia, Bosnia and Italy at the time while another van had been readapted for the 
distribution of clean water. At the centre of the camp there was a tent with a Star Wars 
character, Chewbacca, printed on it: this tent had most likely been a donation to members 
of the Baobab Experience but there, in the middle of the camp, we were symbolically 




The camp was populated by different nationalities with different statuses. The 
majority of people came from Eritrea, Francophone Africa, North Africa, Iraq, Sudan and 
Nigeria. People who lived there were mostly migrants in transit, people who were looking 
for an accommodation while made to live in limbo, transiting through Rome after 
escaping centres of identification in the South of Italy, or after being pushed south from 
the northern regions of Italy. Those categorised according to different degrees of 
illegalization were accompanied by those who had initially come to Italy with visas or 
humanitarian permits but were not able to renew them and were therefore made homeless 
and in need of an accommodation. A small number of people who had their status 
recognised via political or humanitarian claims and considered legal by the Italian state, 
had nonetheless to stay in this camp for transients because they had no other options. Part 
of the migrant population that lived in the camp had informal jobs outside it, but since 
they could not afford to live somewhere else, or their status did not allow them to rent a 
room, they had to stay there. The volunteers of the Baobab Experience made sure to keep 
in contact with migrants who had left the camp whenever possible. The organisation 
became essential not just in providing legal advice, medical assistance or ensuring that 
basic conditions of existence were met in the camp but also because they worked towards 
ensuring that the migrants’ presence was not forgotten at a political level. 
The politicization of this camp, in fact, was transversal and reflected a priority for 
the grassroot organisation that was that of denouncing the system of reception in Italy, 
the local administration in Rome, and the fallacies of European regulations at large. 
People living in the camp, in fact, epitomised, in various degrees, all the problems that 
surrounded the politics of qualification, abandonment and illegalization of migrants. The 
local administration in Rome had a key role in tolerating and/or criminalising this space, 
in the same way in which the national police was often sent in loco to carry out the 




only if people were purposively travelling there, this camp was kept away from everyday 
life visibility and mostly mediatised as such. Members of the Baobab played a decisive 
role in accounting for the presence of migrants by mobilising politically. Contrary to 
principles of neutrality that surround the provision of aid defined as humanitarian, the 
group of volunteers of the Boabab Experience were clear that their interventions had to 
be militant by critically opposing local/national/European policies. More importantly, the 
volunteers understood that without their activism the space of Piazzale Maslax would 
have denied migrants of their political presence. As Isin and Rygiel have explored, the 
logic of the camp can be better grasped if instead of considering them as spaces of 
abjection, where people are reduced to their bare life, we consider camps as abject spaces 
that are: 
 “spaces in which the intention is to treat people neither as subjects (of discipline) nor objects 
(of elimination) but as those without presence, without existence, as inexistent beings, not 
because they don’t exist, but because their existence is rendered invisible and inaudible 
through abject spaces”.193 
 
 
Of these spaces, the two authors identify frontiers, zones and camps as spaces where 
people are exempted from exercising politics. While frontiers and abject zones halt the 
migrants’ ability to enact rights and act as political subjects, camps also rely on a logic of 
internment where the aim is that of revoking the status of subjectivity.194  
Drawing on this, it can be argued that any camp enacts a logic of survival, that is 
ensuring the provisions for humans that are securitised, while undermining their 
politicization. In this case, subjects with rights become migrants in transit but not subjects 
of politics.195 Ultimately, the volunteers of Baobab Experience were aware that Piazzale 
Maxlax camp was not a political solution but an important starting point to give migrants 
a voice. Envoicing took different shapes within, on the edges, and outside the camp: 
 
193 Isin E. F., Rygiel K., ‘Abject Spaces: Frontiers, Zones, Camps’ in Dauphinee E, Masters C. (2007) Logics of 
Biopower and the War on Terror (Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave), 181-203, 184.  





migrants took part in political marches organised by Baobab or specific events that aimed 
to make local communities aware of the political limbo in which they were trapped but 
also organised political initiatives themselves –for example they invited a writer on pan-
Africanism to give a talk in the camp or established an information network about 
migrants’ rights. On a specific occasion, a reading of the Italian constitution with a 
specific focus on the right of asylum, article 10 comma 3,196 was organised in the context 
of a broader discussion of asylum policies and reception systems. Due to the political 
engagement of aid workers and migrants, this camp became a symbol of protest where 
the invisibility of migrants was counteracted by a politics of presence. 
These political engagements were at the core of the reasons of the eviction of the 
camp of Piazzale Maslax in October 2018. This eviction was presented by the newly 
established Lega-Five Stars Movement coalition of government in Italy, and especially 
the then Minister of Interior Matteo Salvini, as a necessary sanitisation of Rome so that 
order could be re-established. Migrants were relocated, some were just dispersed. The 
experience of Piazzale Maslax, however, was useful to denounce not only the precarious 
conditions in which migrants were made to live, but also because it insisted that one could 
shift the narrative of aid/securitisation and focus on migrants’ political presence only by 
mobilising politically. What was tolerated by the state/city authorities in the space of 
Piazzale Maslax was the existence of migrants as long as they disappeared from the public 
space; what was not tolerated was that people living there, and volunteers supporting 
them, made themselves visible and politically engaged. Migrants and volunteers, in fact, 
openly contested (b)ordering practices that aspired to reduce migrants to survival and 
volunteer’s support to the mere provision of essential aid. Yes, We Camp! inscribed on 
one of the camp’s walls, encapsulates all too well, a new way of understanding ‘camp’ 
 
196 Article 10(3) of the Italian Constitution prescribes that “The foreigner, who is prevented in his country from 
effectively exercising the democratic freedoms guaranteed by the Italian Constitution, has the right to asylum in the 




not only as a noun but as a verb which reclaims the agency of those who too often have 
it theorised away. 
 
 
Figure 8. Picture of the informal camp of Piazzale Maslax before its dismantlement in October 2018.197 
 
 
Icarus as migrant 
 
In Greek mythology, Icarus is known as the boy who dared to fly too close to the sun on 
wings of feathers and wax made by his father, Daedalus. According to the myth described 
in Ovid Metamorphoses, by means of these artificial wings, Icarus attempted to escape 
imprisonment from the labyrinth in which King Minos relegated him. He left Crete, and 
despite his father recommendations, flew too near the sun causing his wings to melt, 
falling into the sea where he drowned.198 As it is well known, myths play a social function 
as they are stories that address important and difficult questions about the edges, 
behaviour and morality of human beings more in general.199 The story of Icarus 
exemplifies the limits and risks through which we can also think of the history of our 
 
197 . This camp was situated next to a building called Hotel Africa, occupied by migrants since 2004, with different 
graffiti, one of which: “YES, WE CAMP”. Picture of the mural available at: 
https://baobabexperience.org/yeswecamp/#jp-carousel-2293 [accessed 20 October 2019]. 
198 Ovid, The Fall of Icarus (Penguin Classics, 2015). 
199 For an introduction of the role that myths play in our cultural, political and religious life in modern days, see Martin 




present times. In this light, Pieter Bruegel’s painting Landscape with the Fall of Icarus 
(fig.9) can assist us as we rethink the contemporary predicament of migrants. 
 
 




Bruegel’s painting describes different scenes within a landscape in motion. Without 
caring for Icarus who waves his feet desperately in the water (lower right-hand corner), a 
ploughman, a shepherd, and a fisherman continue carrying on, without any worries, their 
daily activities. The fall of Icarus is depicted by Bruegel as an almost unnoticed event in 
the background. The landscape in the painting is given more importance in respect to the 
position of humans, and the imminent death of Icarus within it. In the words of William 
Carlos Williams’ poem homonym to the painting: “insignificantly / off the coast / there 
was a splash quite unnoticed / this was / Icarus drowning”.201 This is also eloquently 
 
200 Bruegel P., ‘Landscape with the Fall of Icarus’, Royal Museum of Fine Arts in Belgium Painting available at: 
https://artsandculture.google.com/exhibit/landscape-with-the-fall-of-icarus-%C2%A0/MgIyXpmuNdcLJg [accessed 
20 October 2019].  
201 William Carlos Williams, ‘Landscape with the Fall of Icarus’, Collected Poems: 1939-1962, Volume II (New 
Directions Publishing Corp). The poem is available at: 




expressed by W. H. Auden’s poem ‘Musée des Beaux Arts’ dedicated to the painting, 
which begins with these words:  
“About suffering they were never wrong,  
the old Masters: how well they understood  
its human position: how it takes place  
while someone else is eating or opening a window or just  
walking dully along”.202  
 
 
The indifference towards the drowning of Icarus is somehow explicative of today’s 
governing of migration. Icarus’ flight resembles today’s migrants’ journeys not only for 
the death that he encounters at sea but also for attempting to resist a life that has been 
assigned to him. While Icarus is often taken as an over-reacher, as a figure that overly 
challenges the lethal effects of the sun despite his father’s warnings, migrants embark 
themselves in journeys that could be deadly despite being aware of what they might 
experience. Daedalus’ warnings to Icarus are somehow reminiscent of Donald Tusk 
warning to ‘economic’ migrants not to undertake a life-threatening journey to Europe. In 
a speech on March 2016 Tusk warned would-be-migrants not to embark in deadly 
journeys to Europe saying: “Do not come to Europe. Do not believe the smugglers. Do 
not risk your lives and your money. It is all for nothing”.203 The reminiscences of Icarus 
drowning with that of the deaths in the Mediterranean Sea seems to be an easy explanation 
of how this figure can be inserted within today’s spectacularised migratory dynamics. 
The story of Icarus is also a story of limits. The idea that Icarus acted beyond his mortal 
limits, contesting his own potentiality to behave like a God, is a prominent part of a story 
that calls into question the morality of those who behave with ‘hubris’.204 In the same 
 
202 Auden H. W., ‘Musée de Beaux Arts’. Poem available at: 
http://english.emory.edu/classes/paintings&poems/auden.html [accessed 24 January 2018].  
203 See ‘Do not come to Europe:’ Donald Tusk warns economic migrants’, The Guardian, 3 March 2016. Available at: 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/mar/03/donald-tusk-economic-migrants-do-not-come-to-europe [accessed 
24 January 2018].  
204 To the Greek, ‘hubris’ referred to the way humans openly challenged their own limitations behaving like Gods. This 
word has come to be understood as a way to excessive pride and self-confidence that calls for the punishment of those 




way, migrants who leave their circumstances of living in the search of a better life are 
often cast as putting themselves in the condition of being punished, suffer, and even die.  
The second analogy regards the power that security control asserts, and it is well 
evident in the role that the landscape plays in the painting. The landscape represented in 
the painting is totalising in respect to the humanity and death of Icarus. While we notice 
Icarus drowning only later on, it is the landscape that commands our attention. Similarly, 
our gaze is directed to the practices of rescue and securitisation in the Mediterranean 
rather to the conditions of migrants once they reach mainland and if their death is made 
visible, it is often presented as the result of their ‘fatal’ actions (both in terms of ‘lethal’ 




The Mediterranean Sea, in conclusion, represents today a very contested space 
where migrants are left to die, rescued or deterred from reaching territorial waters 
according to new rationales of assistance. At sea, assistance is not simply a duty to rescue 
but also a responsibility to police and pre-empt migrants from reaching the EU so that 
discourses about human rights merge with the need to securitise borders. These borders 
are increasingly being externalised to African countries so that responsibilities for 
rescuing lives are unevenly shared. Besides military actors, the sea is also populated by 
commercial vessels and non-state organisations. Criminalised for rescuing people in 
distress, NGOs are constantly accused to be a pull-factor to border crossings at large. 
From scenes of rescue to militarised jurisdictions, the Mediterranean, as a multi-layered 
infrastructure of control of unbundled sovereignty, is the space where “shipwrecked 
lives” are being crafted so that migrants’ humanity can be further graded on land. The 
simultaneous rise of care and control over migrants’ lives are manifest on the shores of 




Within a broader context of migration management, lives that are rescued are 
channelled across different circuits of (im)mobility. Hotspots, detention in islands and 
encampments of camps are functioning as interconnected strategies for the containment 
and care of migrants. By living in the wait, isolated, discouraged from furthering their 
journeys, gazed and disciplined otherwise, people on the move constitute a threat to the 
body of host populations that is the only legalised community that nation states recognise. 
Caught within a biopolitics of survival, migrants are expected to (only) survive whilst 
being denied a political potential, but they also renegotiate their condition across border 
points. As seen in this chapter, often the way in which these negotiations take place is 
through wider alliances that migrants make with aid workers. As explored in the case of 
BaoBab Experience in Rome, the political (im)mobility of migrants living in Piazzale 
Maslax was counteracted by migrants’ claims to political agency. The heightened 
politicisation of this camp, now evicted, contrasts with a less visible kind of politics that 
is in the making in areas like Calais. In the next chapter, I will consider experiences of 
encampments in Calais and forms of policed humanitarianism, by focusing on survival 
not just as a strategy of (b)ordering but also as an experience that gives raise to struggles 
for life. As we will see, in fact, survival is not only life governed with death but, most 
importantly, is a mode of ‘overcoming’ death that accounts for any struggle that aims to 













Policing Humanitarianism: Everyday (B)ordering in Calais 
 
 
Figure 10. ‘Liberty, Equality, Fraternity’; “Because you voted again for safety, discipline, convinced to move away 
the fear of changing. We will still come your doors and we will shout even louder” Fabrizio de André. 





Figure 11. When you put together two things that can resist. Orgosolo Mural  






In October 2016 the French authorities demolished the makeshift camp in Calais known 
as the ‘Jungle’. Following the eviction of the camp thousands of people have been 
relocated around France, while many others have remained in the area. Even though the 
number of migrants in Calais has sharply declined compared to when there was a proper 
settlement, many people still come to the North of France in the hope of reaching the UK 
and live in conditions which have significantly worsened. Despite the hardening of 
borders of the EU, those who have made it to Calais mostly end up sleeping rough in 
industrial areas, under bridges, parks and in scrappy woodlands. As they have to 
continuously hide from the police, who threaten them with violence, take away and trash 
their belongings, and constantly move them around in order to unsettle them, migrants’ 
demands and institutional (in)visibility is perpetually renegotiated on the ground. As 
migrants in transit who reach Calais cannot simply reverse their journey and do not want 
to stay in France either, they have nowhere else to go but to live in the wait. Such life in 
purgatory affects the terms of their staying as people suffer from living in the open space 
all the time, supported only by the work of grassroot aid organisations. Posited in a limbo 
between life and death, neither fully rescued nor fully abandoned, migrants move in 
between these complementary rationales of the state.  
In this chapter I consider how humanitarian interventions are being policed in 
Calais by addressing the role that police forces play in reducing migrants to acceptable 
forms of survival and enacting state practices of care and control, while aid organisation 
perform a vital intervention in support of migrants. I argue that biopolitical ways of 
governing migration in Calais ensure that people (only) survive as a measure of how their 
lives can continue only if they are delimited to it. I then shift my attention to 
infrastructures of solidarity, from the Calais Warehouse to operational buses in Calais, by 




criminalization of aid. As such, I will provide a reading of their activities in the field that 
accounts for the ways in which these experiences go beyond the mere preservation of 
lives. I conclude by looking at how these relational activities become acts of ‘affirmative 
survival’ by identifying what I call the politics of perseverance which are the expression 
of how strategies of (b)ordering are being redefined by migrants who engage with 
politically lived life. The multiple ways in which a politically lived life can articulate 
itself will be addressed in greater depth in the next chapter. In this chapter, I first 
problematise the relationship between theory, research methods, and fieldwork and, by 
delinking theory from specific research methods, I start this chapter by highlight the 
benefits of a post-qualitative inquiry grounded on thinking. 
 
Theory as Modus Vivendi, Fieldwork as Encounter  
 
Theory provides a framework of analysis for looking at phenomena, shaping our relations 
with social reality and channelling the objectives of such thoughts. As a way of making 
sense of things of the world, the broader significance of our experience is also, if not first 
and foremost, theorised as a form of knowledge that orders our own abstractions. Hence, 
theory organises thinking by selecting what accounts for concepts and directing us to the 
important questions that need to be asked. In this light, theory as a method seeks to control 
the production of knowledge by constructing fields of knowability that then make claims 
of truth according to the validity assigned to processes of data collection. One of the main 
problems in considering theory as a method is that what can be done is already grounded 
on ways of making sense of what can be imminently thought. According to conventional 
humanist methodologies, even when theory emerges from the ground this is still inserted 
within prescriptive ways of understanding findings. Findings are taken backwards to 
explain what theory can be. In other words, within research the function of theory is 




already observed when looking at borders as method, these are both institutions and a set 
of relationships that need to be interrogated beyond their methodological limitations. We 
encounter borders and borders encounter us. These encounters are not immune to our own 
status: we unequally stand in front of them, are allowed to cross them or even dismiss 
them.  
Theory as a modus vivendi means “reading, thinking, writing and living with 
theory”.1 While theory regulates discovery by inscribing relationships to narratives with 
a fixed meaning, what theory as a modus vivendi aims to do is to allow the encountering 
of the real to be analytically problematised as a possibility for intensifying thinking. 
Originated from Latin, modus vivendi literally means ‘way of life’, an arrangement that 
allows life to progress without conflict. Theory as an agreement for reading social reality 
coexists with what is - but also with what could be. Living with theory, therefore, is not 
simply an experience of the now but a possibility for later. The kind of theory that informs 
field-research includes a not-yet as thinking itself is inquiry that meets reality.2  
On this point, St. Pierre convincingly suggests that we need to think research as a 
post qualitative inquiry that “has no substance, no essence, no existence, no presence, no 
stability, no structure […] it presumes an ontology of immanence and it is always 
becoming”.3 As a tenant of poststructuralism and transcendental empiricism, St. Pierre 
argues that becoming cannot exist prior to its ‘coming’ that is when status quo is no longer 
maintained as such, but is confronted with what will happen. 
The context of discovery follows a context of justification where “the pre-
empirical, before-fieldwork component of a study (theory, thinking) and a separate 
‘empirical’ component of a study which involves going to the ‘field’ and ‘collecting 
 
1 St. Pierre E. A., ‘Writing Post Qualitative Inquiry’, 604. 
2 See St. Pierre, E. A., ‘Nomadic inquiry in the smooth spaces of the field: A preface’, International Journal of 
Qualitative Studies in Education (1997), 10(3), 365-83. 




empirical data’” are assumed as symbiotic.4 If we assume that theory contains objective 
reason before ‘letting life walk in’, we also assume that discovery is not a process of 
research but one of capture. Capturing social reality means making it pre-thinkable so 
that this is reduced to pre-emptive inquiries that control validity at the cost of creativity. 
If there are not pre-existing methods that accompany social inquiry it is because what 
compels us to think is not methodologically preferable to what we will encounter.5 A 
post-qualitative inquiry, therefore, does not tell us what to do in the field but allows us to 
think beyond attempting to apply pre-existing ways of thinking to things of the world.6 
We might still do so but only as a matter of possibility. We think according to a certain 
conceptual order, this is unavoidable, but it is also essential to try to displace it. 
Displacement is discovery and discovering while thinking is what allows conventional 
research ratios to be contested. This does not mean rejecting tout court existing structures 
of thought when conducting research in the field, or even methods of research, but to 
privilege beginnings by looking at ontological and epistemological unknowns that are 
already post in respect to the inquiry that we think we should conduct.7 While 
acknowledging that this position confronts  risks of (mis)representation,8 the fact that we 
are confronted with ‘objective’ and ‘scientific’ knowledge as pre-thinking, forces us to 
commit to a different idea of representability. This idea attends the material, empirical 
and ontological but it does so by focusing on knowledge that does not reproduce 
methodologies, but ideas.9  
 
4 Idem. 
5 See Smith W. D. (2012), ‘Concepts and creation’, in Braidotti R., Pisters P. (eds.), Revising normativity with Deleuze 
(London, England: Bloomsbury), 175-88. 
6 St. Pierre E. A., ‘Post-Qualitative Inquiry in an Ontology of Immanence’. 
7 Ibid., 10-11. 
8 Gerrard J., Rudolph S., Sriprakash A., ‘The Politics of Post-Qualitative Inquiry: History and Power’, Qualitative 
Inquiry (2016), 23(5), 384-94. In particular, post-qualitative research calls into question the positionality of the 
researcher, the lack of historical grounds and the inclination to decentre the ‘human’. 
9 St. Pierre A. E., ‘The posts continue: Becoming’, International Journal of Qualitative Studies in Education (2013), 




While in Calais, what I have seen, observed, felt, asked, thought and written is a 
succession of events that I have been able to witness, to take notes on, while also listening 
to aid workers there who either replied to my questions or described their daily experience 
in the Calais Warehouse where I volunteered for about two weeks. During this very 
intense time I participated also to food distribution to migrants. What follows, therefore, 
is an account of words, reasons and references that link ways of thinking about what is 
happening on the ground in Calais, and to some extent Dunkirk, with what is happening 
when discourses and narratives interact with the same reality that we are trying to reveal 
and re-discover. In this thesis I do not make claims of validity, generalisability or 
objectivity of my findings but put them in dialogue with a spectrum of ideas that enable 
me to rethink established parameters. What interests me is to think about how political 
modes of governance are enacted within the space of the border but are also counteracted 
by forms of activism that can make available alternative modalities of thinking. As Taylor 
writes, “Ultimately, the promise of post-qualitative research is political: it keeps 
methodology on the move in order to better attend the gaps, silences, excisions, and 
exclusions”.10 These gaps, silences, excisions and exclusions touch the “immanent, 









To Dover from Calais 
 
After midnight we drive through Sangatte  
on the outskirts, where teenagers rush to the tunnel 
 
In the big-cat gleam of our headlamps 
the boys pause for a heartbeat---disappear in a flash 
 
10 Taylor C, ‘Rethinking the empirical in higher education: post-qualitative inquiry as a less comfortable science’, 
International Journal of Research & Media in Method (2017), 40(3), 311-24, 321.  





If you’re not really a Syrian 
is it safer in the Congo, or Afghanistan? 
 
While we all fiddle with our smartphones 
sniffer dogs inhale the articulated lorry 
 
Two ferrymen tell me how they feel 
okay because they pull up the bridge and sail away 
 
It’s only a joke if it’s funny 
so I don’t laugh at ‘they weren’t exactly invited.’ 
 
Tell me, if Great Britain is so full 
why is this middle-of-the-night-crossing so empty? 
 
Karen McCarthy Woolf12 
 
So far, the discussion about the borders of the European Union has taken us from the 
Mediterranean Sea to islands, from encampments to a (protest) camp in Rome. While the 
borders of the EU are being stretched outside the outer limits of maritime control to 
islands of detention, in the Franco-English space of Calais borders are being taken inside 
the limits of European territorial jurisdictions. This move from out to in, from south to 
north, responds to the necessity to push migrants down and up so that borders can 
legitimately follow the asymmetry of migrants’ movement. Attention to the cross-
managed (b)ordering practices in Calais, therefore, serves to punctuate not only the 
mobility of borders but their very mobilisation for containing and repressing migrants but 
also tolerating them as merely surviving beings. It can be argued then that while the space 
of the Mediterranean Sea is hypertrophic, as its borders increase in size in relation to the 
offshoring and externalization of migratory controls, borders in Calais are atrophic, that 
is they are committed to decreasing in size anytime that responsibilities for ‘illegalised’ 
movement cannot be externalised outside EUrope.   
Why migration in Calais, and Northern France at large, matters? Calais is the 
principal ferry port in Northern France and the main trade centre with the UK. While 
 
12 Woolf K. M., ‘To Dover from Calais, and: Tatler’s People Who Really Matter’, Soundings: A journal of politics and 




migrants attempting to reach the UK via the Eurotunnel, the port, stowing away on 
vehicles or via boats have intensified, especially since 2013, the city and the area 
surrounding Calais have been for long characterised by the presence of migratory 
populations. For the majority of migrants who reach Calais, attempting to illegally enter 
the UK is the only solution to then legally claim asylum there. Unless specific 
arrangements are made, for example human corridors and other state-to-state and 
international agreements, it is not possible to claim asylum from abroad. Considering that 
a unique system of reception exists within the EU, it is necessary to be in the country in 
which the asylum application is intended to be filed in order to legally claim asylum. The 
Dublin regulation, in fact, determines that the first country of arrival is the one responsible 
for registering migrants who claim international protection. As an outcome of this policy, 
those who refuse or cannot claim asylum in such countries escape the control of the state, 
are abandoned by it or are allowed to stay only if their life can be reduced to the provision 
of bare necessities. This creates an (im)mobilising situation in which escape, 
abandonment but also mere survival become irreducible to the need to contain people in 
their demands for movement. It is then possible to understand why Calais has strategically 
become a bottleneck where migrants temporarily concentrate living in the wait while 
negotiating their position within the borders of the EU.  
Calais has been chosen as a research area of (b)ordering in EUrope in relation to 
two main aspects. Firstly, Calais represents a peculiar case: the French territorial and legal 
jurisdiction of space and the UK political influence on it makes a perfect example of how 
borders are managed according to EU and member state policies, but also cross-managed 
between states. This also provides a specific imaginary of the border that is no longer 
characterized by its fixity and as an impenetrable line of separation that can only be 
crossed if permission is first granted. Secondly, since the dismantlement of the main 




carrying out essential projects. Looking at uneven mobility also by considering how 
citizens self-organise against a state project of containment, helps us understand how 
different responses to the governance of migration can exist. As part of the politics of 
migration, therefore, grassroot aid organisations are developing mobile infrastructures for 
supporting migrant populations in the area. These practices go beyond immediate 
assistance or a minimalist idea of biopolitics that does as little as preserving people’s 
lives, as they often disrupt the acceptable care tolerated by the state. Help Refugees and 
other umbrella organisations working in the field and in the Warehouse in Calais, in fact, 
fall into the idea of ordinary people who associate and integrate the political demands of 
migrants by establishing a networked approach to giving aid. Continuously criminalized 
by politicians, laws and regulations, such organisations operate in a fragile environment 
in which discourses, practices and assumptions about acceptable aid to migrants and the 
need to actively support their struggles are in a constant dialogue. In particular, I argue 
that these organisations operate to contest the terms of migrants’ existence as mere 
survival. Migrants are a securitised problem to contain and as such in need of 
interventions that make their lives worth of minimal aid but, as I will discuss in this 
chapter, even the provision of aid is often discouraged by the state for fear that migrants 
would settle in this border area. Since they provide aid that goes beyond the minimal aid 
provided by the state, aid organisations are often held responsible for the presence of 
migrants in Calais. In such circumstances, the need for migrants to go away governs a 
series of policies and court rulings which only facilitate survival and reinforce the notion 
that their stay in Calais only has to be seen as temporary. Survival, therefore, is made 
possible through minimal interventions which aim at avoiding that migrants settle in 
Calais and mobilise thus evading the control of the state.  
As discussed in the previous chapters, (b)ordering migrants rests on the troubling 




in Calais happens in the background of complex dynamics that aim at (im)mobilising 
migrants politically while creating a hostile environment. Migrants are disempowered by 
forcing them to engage in daily struggles to secure food or shelter, struggles which are 
renewed every day by constant police interventions which make migrants’ existence 
dependant on the destruction of their communities and possibilities for mobilisation. In 
other words, what matters is to control how migrants live so that they can (only) survive 
or go away. 
 
Camps in Calais 
 
The history of Calais is first of all a history of a border in the making. Divided in two 
between the UK and France extraterritorially, this border is cross-managed also 
politically and financially. In 2003 the British and French governments signed The 
Touquet Treaty, de facto agreeing to conduct juxtaposed immigration controls.13 The idea 
of juxtaposed controls implies that those travelling between the two countries have to 
clear immigration in the country of departure rather than arrival. Following this, France 
carries out immigration controls in the UK, such as in the port of Dover and at London St 
Pancras International where the Eurostar departs, while the UK police carries out 
immigration entry checks in Paris Gare du Nord and Calais Fréthun. By moving the 
British border to France, and stretching the French border to the UK, passports are 
checked twice by both border officials. In the case of French checks in the UK, entry to 
the Schengen area takes place before reaching the actual country of destination. 
 At the present date, numerous fences have been built to protect the port, the 
Eurotunnel terminal, and train tracks on the other side of Calais. Such forms of control 
are combined with the UK large commitment to increase Channel border security. In 
 
13 ‘Implementation of Frontier Controls at the Sea Ports of both Countries on the Channel and North Sea’, Le Touquet, 
4 February 2003. Available at: http://www.fortunes-de-
mer.com/mer/images/documents%20pdf/legislation/Internationale/Surete/Traite%20Touquet%202003%20RU.pdf 




January 2018, UK Prime Minister Theresa May and French Prime Minister Emanuel 
Macron signed the Sundhurst Treaty further strengthening the joint operation of control 
of migration in Calais. On such occasion, the UK committed an extra £44.5 million to be 
spent for the management of their shared border and that of speeding up the process for 
asylum applications.14 In what is referred to as “part of a strategic relationship on 
migration”, the Sundhurst Treaty establishes a closer co-operation between the two 
countries in managing their shared border with the aim of reducing “the number of people 
attempting to cross it illegally and at risk of safety and life”.15 These words capture well 
the tension between two different rationales of containment that are that of protection of 
borders and that of protection of lives at borders. The agreement states that the two 
countries need “to work together to reduce migratory pressure at the shared border and 
on the French side of the Channel and North Sea”.16 In more detail, such cooperation 
regards the assessment of asylum claims that migrants make in France; the transfer of 
asylum seeker and unaccompanied minors; the deportation of third country nationals with 
no basis for staying in the EU. A fourth main point is also included in the scope of the 
treaty that is: 
 “to implement, in accordance to applicable law, a programme of mutually agreed specific 
measures to combat organised crime rings, fraud and illegal movement of goods and persons, 
and to discourage illegal immigration, through joint action in source and transit countries”.17  
 
In addition to this, both countries commit to deploy liaison officers to facilitate 
cooperation in coordinating border security. By reaffirming shared responsibility in key 
areas in Northern France, both countries’ commitment to maintain control in these border-
 
14 Travis A and Heather S., ‘UK to pay extra £44.5m for Calais in Anglo-French deal’, The Guardian, 18 January 2018. 
Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2018/jan/18/uk-to-pay-extra-445m-for-calais-security-in-anglo-
french-deal [accessed 20 January 2019]. 
15 ‘Treaty between the government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the government 
of the French Republic concerning the reinforcement of cooperation for the coordinated management of their shaped 
border’. Available at:  
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/674885/Treaty_Co
ncerning_the_Reinforcement_Of_Cooperation_For_The_Coordinated_Management_Of_Their_Shared_Border.pdf 






zones has led to a decrease in the number of migrants who can reach the UK, therefore 
forcing many to make a clandestine entry.  
Even though its long history of migration goes back well before the 2000s,18 the 
first migrant camp officially opened in Calais in 1999. Located close to the Eurotunnel, 
the Sangatte camp was set up with the help of French authorities in a warehouse 
previously used as a deposit to build the tunnel. Dismantled in 2002, due to the perceived 
pressure of migrants who were seen as settling in the area, the process of externalising 
the UK border into French territory can be situated as a response to more convergent 
migratory movements. Post-Sangatte makeshifts camps started to emerge more visibly 
and with it the continuous destruction and reconstitution of dispersed encampments. 
While the migrant situation in Northern France, and Calais in particular, has always been 
a matter of public attention, it became more of a well-known humanitarian/security 
problem as the migrant population increased in 2014. In particular, Agier and others 
report on a series of expulsions of migrants conducted on humanitarian grounds from 
several encampments on May 2014 without consulting parties involved or providing 
sustainable relocations: “on the pretext of a sanitary operation of treatment against 
scabies, the inhabitants of three encampments were evacuated and left destitute”.19  
This resulted in the creation of a makeshift camp and in April 2015, the so called 
‘Jungle Camp’, that counted more than 9,000 people at the time of its dismantlement in 
October 2016, came into being.20 No formal recognition of the camp took place, even 
though the state erected some structures of reception, and its management was mostly 
done by NGOs, citizens and migrants themselves.21 The vulnerable architecture of the 
 
18 For a systematic history of migration and the border(s) in Calais, see Agier M., Bouagga Y., Trépanier M, Fernbach 
D. (2019) (translated by David Fernbach). The Jungle. Calais’s Camps and Migrants (Polity Press: Cambridge).  
19 Ibid., 32. 
20 Buchanan Elsa, ‘Migrant crisis: A record 7,300 people now live in Calais' Jungle migrant camp’, IBTimes, 21 July 
2016. Available at: https://www.ibtimes.co.uk/migrant-crisis-record-7300-people-now-live-calais-jungle-migrant-
camp-1571819 [accessed 4 December 2018].  
21 Such as the Centre Jules Ferry, the daytime reception centre opened by the state and the Centre d’Accueil provisoire 




camp consisted in a series of ‘village-like’ services, buffer zones of communication and 
places of worship. All of this gave to the camp a settled semblance causing concern for 
its potential for attracting more people. More than three years after its dismantlement, 
there are still more than 2,000 migrants scattered between Calais and Dunkirk.22 While 
this number of people is not overwhelming, what is overwhelming is their inability to 
cross the border to the UK.23 Left without an organic community or proper infrastructures 
of support, their living conditions have today worsened.  
The ‘making’ of migration in Calais encompasses organised camps, dispersed 
movement, evictions, relocations, violence, hope and the institutional framing of the 
space, providing a powerful metaphor for representing the ‘wildness’ of migration. In 
order to justify evictions and reclaim order, migrants are routinely animalised and 
criminalised. This is evident when considering the proposal of seizing migrants age dental 
checks or the zoopolitical construction of their identity through the uses of a specific 
language to describe a range of aspects attached to their mobility such as ‘swarms,’ 
‘caged,’ ‘preys’ that need to be ‘hunted’ and so on. Overall, these are just few examples 
that describe how the outcome of security policies need to be understood in relation to a 
security continuum that stems from territoriality to borders that are first of all constructed 
as criminogenic. At the same time, the humanitarian character of reception of migrants in 
Calais is emphasised by a series of legal actions that prescribe the administration of aid 
by the state. Networks of grassroot solidarities aside, such (b)orderings persist today in 
Calais and have been possible by forms of policed humanitarianism whereby order is kept 
by tolerating the provision of aid as far as it can be controlled by the police, municipal 
authorities and the visible hand of states, in this specific case France and the UK, but also 
by the European Union at large.  
 
22 Numbers are also disputed here, with some aid organisations affirming that there are at least 3,000 ‘migrants’ in 
transit living in the area.   




Policing Humanitarianism: Police Violence and the Survival of Bodies 
 
Police, the military and humanitarian organisations, from more established international 
agencies to self-organised responses of civil society, are in the frontline for the daily 
management of migration. The managerial orientation of governing ‘illegalised’ 
movement has transformed containment into a matter of violence or provision of basic 
aid. Agier highlights that enacting border controls in the name of keeping the 
‘undesirables’ of the world at a distance means to recognise that there exists a functional 
solidarity “between [the] humanitarian world (the hand that cares) and the police and 
military ordering (the hand that strikes)”.24  
There is a connection between the way in which the border as a space of 
humanitarian government manage migrants’ lives and the policing/militarisation of 
controls at borders. According to Redfield, the political concern for life encompasses 
destruction when humanitarian interventions aim at assisting populations by maintaining 
their physical existence when such actions do not lead to more than ensuring that the bare 
minimum is provided.25 Life in crisis, according to Redfield, is maintained by a medical 
humanitarianism: the value of life that Medecins sans frontières attaches to lives is one 
that preserves people’s existence by restoring physical health. This leads to circumstances 
where relieving suffering is limited to preserving the physical integrity of a person 
without providing the person with the dignity expected by humanitarian interventions. 
On the other hand, (b)ordering strategies make biopolitical survival possible only if 
political life is discouraged through policed interventions. These interventions serve to 
redistribute life so that some can just exist as such while others are considered more 
important humans with access to better, more fulfilling lives. In contemporary migration 
regimes, as Mbembe reminds us, what counts is “the redistribution of life on different 
 





scales of insurability and non-insurability [and] borders are not obstacles to free 
movement. They are boundaries between species and varieties of humans”.26 (B)ordering, 
therefore, also results from the unequal effects of borders that keep people in motion, 
territorially segregated, confined but also ensure their survival as such.  
In The End of Policing Alex S. Vitale looks at law enforcement and the 
militarisation of space in order to understand how the realm of public safety has been 
reduced to abusive policing. Particularly, he considers the role of police in society 
recognising a shift in the state of policing today. As it is often assumed, the police use 
force legitimately for the benefits of the whole society. What is less clear, however, is 
how such legitimacy “fabricates social order”.27 As part of this fabrication, managing 
disorder and protecting classes is first and foremost a political activity that aims to meet 
demands that are not necessarily founded on broad ideals of justice. As Vitale puts it, 
“The reality is that the police exist primarily as a system for managing and even producing 
inequalities by suppressing social movements and tightly managing the behaviour of poor 
and non-white people: those on the losing end of political arrangements”.28 While forms 
of policing and resistance have changed over time, the basic idea that the police needs to 
maintain order by managing the “poor, foreigners and non-white” is an established idea 
of how dispersed inequalities can be exploited by a system that is economically and 
politically unequal as well.29  
The dramatic expansion of police activity, especially in relation to their scope and 
militarised techniques of repression, has raised issues regarding the relation between its 
role as apparatus of the state and the life of its citizens. Beyond rights of citizenship, the 
main referents of violent policing are those who are kept outside the polis like migrants. 
 
26 Membe A., ‘Bodies as Bprders’, 11. 
27 Neocleous M. (2000) The Fabrication of Social Order: A Critical Theory of Police Power (Pluto Press) qtd in Vitale 
A. (2017-2018) The End of Policing (London-New York: Verso Books), 34. 





As these are framed as remnants in excess that need to be managed differently, that is 
outside the law for the ‘illegalised’ status that inhabit, intensive policing becomes a 
marker of wider notions of order. It is not just about protecting citizens per se, by 
constructing a biopolitical division between deserving and undeserving bodies, but it is 
also about providing clear indications about the very necessity to treat migrants 
differently. In other words, the aim is also that of making ‘truth’ converge with unequal 
regimes of governance. In this respect, the potential for social mobilisations for those who 
directly challenge the order of the state, such as migrants that cross borders without 
permission or mobilise, is considered as repressible for the intent of deploying acceptable 
levels of violence.30 In this context, humanitarian interventions are policed according to 
which forms of survival are acceptable and which other forms need to be further lowered. 
The idea of policing humanitarianism, therefore, aims to highlight more controversial 
practices that aim to make people (only) survive. Police interventions in Calais aim to 
delimit the perimeter of action for migrants to what can be accepted from them. They 
should survive, live with death, but they should not claim more than that. Aid 
organisations, as we will see, sometimes provide more than that and this unavoidably 
entails a refocus of policing that criminalises humanitarian interventions more broadly. 
In other words, practices which disregard human rights, criminalise migrants but also aid 
workers.  
 
‘The French State is the Police’:  Between Tolerance and Repression 
 
In France there are two national police forces, the Police Nationale and the Gendarmerie 
Nationale, policing services are also conducted by the so called Compagnies 
Républicaines de Sécurité, abbreviated CRS. The CRS is the riot police that is stationed 
in Calais and Dunkirk permanently, even though its main role is that of crowd control 
 




during protests. The CRS agents assert their presence in Calais in various ways, from 
keeping people always on the move causing a perpetual feeling of insecurity, therefore 
discouraging them from staying in the area, beating them up and carrying out daily 
evictions. During my stay in Calais, volunteers from different aid organisations reported 
daily intimidations that the police carried out against migrants by subjecting them to 
coercive and psychological threats but also against aid workers themselves by disrupting 
their activities. The kind of violence and harassment that volunteers experienced was a 
fraction of what migrants experienced and I will get back to it later in this chapter: here 
suffice to say that it is nonetheless important to acknowledge the way in which solidarity 
is being targeted. 
At the time of my staying in Calais during the last weeks of August 2018, evictions 
were happening every day in different locations, except on weekends. This violence was 
perpetuated by officers who routinely confiscated people’s vital belongings and burnt 
their tents. Over the summer of 2018, migrants were continuously being exposed to 
violence of any sort: volunteers often ‘witnessed’ it indirectly as they could not be on the 
field 24 hours a day. Aid workers told me of migrants lamenting of having suffered 
physical injuries (i.e. broken cheek bones), of being beaten in the morning and tear gassed 
in the evening, of being arbitrarily deprived of their phones: they added that such violence 
had become almost a routinised behaviour. This is part of police strategies of disruption 
that aim to exhaust lives so that a reduced form of survival is the only way to keep people 
docile, disengaged and orderly reduce their agency. For many of those who transit in 
Calais, the French state is the police so that their experience of France is referenced 
through a system that cannot be fully trusted.  
The humanitarian base operationalised by the Prefecture of Calais offers services 




food as outlined by French humanitarian law.31 Such services have been provided after a 
series of court’s rulings. La Vie Active, supported by the State, has been offering water 
and sanitation to migrants in Calais since the summer of 2017, following a court ruling 
upheld by the Conseil d’État.32 In March 2017, Calais Mayor Natacha Bouchart 
introduced a ban blocking food distribution to migrants. The decree was intended to 
discourage gatherings so that public disturbances could be avoided.33 In May 2017, this 
decision was reversed by a tribunal that found the decree to be infringing legal standards 
of treatment for migrants.34 In March 2018, La Vie Active, contracted by the government, 
started distributing also meals daily at two locations identified by local authorities 
patrolled by the police.35 While organisations in the area welcomed the decision of the 
state to take responsibility for people in transit, the service proved to be insufficient to 
cover people displaced in different zones of Calais. When statist humanitarianism fails, 
humanitarian activism intervenes so that these two processes are often complementary, 
but I would argue, the State only tolerates those interventions that it deems acceptable. 
Most importantly, and this is the real aporia of human rights and the rule of law in their 
convergence within the governance of migration, organisations have denounced how 
state-provided aid or state-sanctioned aid is never immune from the contradictions that 
state-centric humanitarianism and securitisation bring to the fore. In some cases, while 
 
31 See Code de l'entrée et du séjour des étrangers et du droit d'asile. Available at: 
https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichCodeArticle.do?idArticle=LEGIARTI000006335286&cidTexte=LEGITEXT00
0006070158&dateTexte=20111110&oldAction=rechCodeArticle [accessed 5 February 2019]. 
32 ‘Calais Update – French Government to begin Food Distribution for Refugees’, 5 March 2018. Available at:  
https://medium.com/thedigitalwarehouse/calais-update-french-government-to-begin-food-distribution-for-refugees-
f73fd4742c08 [accessed 5 February 2019]. 
33 Amelia Gentleman, ‘Calais Mayor bans distribution of food to migrants’, The Guardian, 2 March 2017. Available 
at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/mar/02/calais-mayor-bans-distribution-of-food-to-migrants [accessed 5 
February 2019]. 
34 Jack Steadman, ‘A tribunal in Lille has suspended the inhumane ban on distributing food in Calais, deeming it 
illegal’, Help Refugees, 22 March 2017. Available at: https://helprefugees.org/news/tribunal-lille-suspended-
inhumane-ban-distributing-food-refugees-deeming-illegal/ [accessed 5 February 2019]. 
35 Charlotte Boitlaux, ‘French Government starts distributing 700 meals a day in Calais’, InfoMigrants, 8 March 2018. 
Available at: https://www.infomigrants.net/en/post/7942/french-government-starts-distributing-700-meals-a-day-in-




the government distributes meals, the police dismantle camps.36 Security forces, 
therefore, militarise not only spaces of distribution in which order is said to be at stake, 
but also those of everyday life. Fears that migrants would create new permanent camps 
have pushed the local government to dismiss its own obligations towards them. It is then 
not surprising to find that migrants do not trust these services and that boycotting aid 
provided by the French government is often a means of resistance. As an aid worker put 
it: “It is true that those who feed you are also those who beat you”. 
These mechanisms of tolerance and repression ensure that, on the one hand, 
migrants are tolerated and essential support is provided; on the other hand, to make sure 
that migrants do not stay in the area where support is given, support needs to be policed 
and continuously disrupted. Ultimately, migrants are constantly uprooted in order to 
disallow potential reconfigurations of space and organised struggle. The aim is to qualify 
the life of migrants as mere survival. Surviving migrants, in fact, make the biopolitical 
project of the state clear in the sense that their life is reduced to a lower threshold of 
tolerable existence. 
  
 (In)Visibility and Migrants’ Struggles 
The visibility and the invisibility of the migrant is both targeted according to the need to 
detect, dismiss, and/or care about them or control their movements and the risk they can 
present. Migrants’ mobility is a matter of framing that can be instrumentalised by the state 
to project visibility and invisibility in relation to risk. Most of our perceptions about risk 
and reality are shaped by the production of knowledge about what can be called 
securitised invisibility. Those who are affected by such politics of knowledge are included 
or excluded through decisions that are made upon them regarding their possibility to be 
 
36 Charlotte Boitlaux, ‘In Calais, the ‘government’ dismantles camps while meals are being distributed’, InfoMigrants, 
30 March 2018. Available at: https://www.infomigrants.net/en/post/8365/in-calais-the-government-dismantles-camps-




seen. As Beck argues, relations of definition are now relations of domination as the real 
power lies in the possibility of determining and assessing what is a risk and what is not. 
In so doing, the unseen is made knowable through the securitisation of invisibility.37 
Invisibility as a strategy of governance regulates the relation between threats and their 
knowability so that legitimacy is defined by what has to be seen or unseen. Beside 
recognising the ‘natural’ invisibility of risk, it is manufactured invisibility that takes 
decision-making to the realm of its unseen consequences.38 While Beck describes such 
politics in relation to climate change, it can be argued that such logic runs through the 
management of migrants. The institutional power of risk definition, in fact, takes the 
figure of the migrant and fragments it in relation to a hierarchy of uses. Visibility is 
designed as the possibility of investing in the controllability of risks that are first of all 
defined as knowable, while invisibility comes as the de-legitimisation of what should not 
be acknowledged by political power. Visibility (recognition) and invisibility 
(abandonment), therefore, become an exercise of power that works through the denial of 
what is hidden. In this process of objectification of threats through the intertwining of 
visibility and invisibility, the very humanity of migrants is made to disappear, lost within 
the gaze of what needs to be represented as invisible.  
This move is well exemplified by Rene Magritte’s painting entitled The Human 
Condition (fig.12) where “the viewer is prevented from seeing the actual subject matter 
being painted, because it is blocked by the artist’s painting of the subject matter: we are 
only allowed to see what we are allowed to see”.39  
 
 
37 Beck U. (2016) The metamorphosis of the World (Cambridge: Polity Press). 
38 Ibid. 






Figure 12. René Magritte, The Human Condition, 193340 
 
 
Such is the case with risk, as perception moves to the forefront of reality through ‘politics 
of mediation’. For instance, when considering the processes of threat construction in 
chapter one, I considered the idea of perception to be of fundamental importance. Such 
politics, in fact, drive on the organised irresponsibility of politicians and institutional 
creators in making only some subjects/aspects matter. In so doing, politicians and 
institutions fail (as they do not know how to cope with risk) but also do not fail (as their 
politics of invisibility is making risk invisible to the public).41 
Migrants are not only affected by this kind of politics of (in)visibility, but also 
drive them on in ways that are strategic to their re-invention. Migrants’ struggle for 
affirming their lives through visibility needs in fact to be understood in terms of their 
engagement with the necessity to make their cause count and that of making, sometimes, 
their presence hidden. While on the one hand the visibility of migrants is securitised for 
 
40 Magritte R., ‘The Human Condition’, National Gallery of Art, Belgium: https://www.nga.gov/collection/art-object-
page.70170.html [accessed 20 October 2019]. 




the needs of state security, national identity and populism, on the other hand their 
presence is denied through the invisibility given to their political engagements. In the 
same way migrants make themselves unevenly visible in response to the stipulations of 
the Dublin regulation. Such a system has proven to be particularly problematic also due 
to the volume and concentrations of arrivals reducing EUrope to the discretional politics 
of nation-states.42 Moreover, it has become necessary for many migrants who aspire to 
reach certain European countries to escape the control of the state in which they first 
arrive or transit through in order to then legally claim asylum in the country of their 
choice. This has given rise to a series of mechanisms of resistance that aim to keep people 
on the move invisible as they attempt to cross into visibility, that is qualified presence 
within a territory. Here resistance is often silenced due to the need to avoid being caught 
before reaching their chosen country of destination, in the case of Calais, mostly the UK.  
Moving away from the institutional (in)visibility thrown upon migrants by the state 
to the uses that migrants themselves make of their hidden presence, it is important to 
remark that the terms of confrontation between migrants and the state are often 
characterised by strategies of escape. Escaping from the state, for migrants, is a very 
important strategy of resistance. While regimes of power control dictate what should be 
‘seen’ and what should go ‘unseen’, therefore strategizing human suffering and security 
accordingly, people on the move can experience invisibility as an opportunity to further 
advance their political demands. The fact that migrants interact with the state but also 
have to strategize their visibility when relating to it, leads them to make calculations about 
their visibility in order not to damage their case when they will attempt to reach the UK. 
Considering that people transit to Calais mainly for the aim of reaching the UK, making 
their movement recognisable to the French state is often experienced as problematic so 
this means that even though the French state is an indispensable interlocutor for people 
 




in transit, decisions are also being taken by migrants in terms of situating their 
engagement with it.  
 From migrants burning their fingerprints so that their biometrics cannot be 
collected and stored giving them digital invisibility, to those who hide around the woods 
in Dunkirk in an attempt to then cross the channel, invisibility is a means to an end, that 
is that of crossing borders and eventually claiming asylum in the country of choice. This 
raises some issues because making themselves invisible in France they do not have a way 
of effecting change of their own conditions whilst residing there. In some ways, therefore, 
aid workers in Calais are the ones who mediate the institutional, but also situational and 
embodied, invisibility of migrants by filtering their everyday demands for better 
conditions in an effort to make them count as political actors. As an aid worker puts it: 
 “people will try to remain invisible while being in Calais. They are operating out of the 
economy, below the kind of way of living, affecting their capacity of being able to request 
rights. The possibility for people to assert their politics and political views in relation to their 
‘illegalised’ conditions are, therefore, not always possible in terms of open protest as this 




In some cases, visibility is only postponed as people on the move record their experiences 
in order then to make them visible to support their cases later on.  An aid worker recounts 
this: 
 “people write diaries, film audios so that not all is lost, not only from the perspective of 





The wider implications of escape and invisibility, therefore, are not simply intended 
to be non-confrontational, but are also part of a process where biographies are in the 
making. While protests happen in Calais and in Dunkirk, as the two main sites of 
distributions both of aid and of migrants’ dispersal in the North of France,43 more 
attention needs to be given to the different ways in which migrants affirm their presence 
 
43 For instance, during my staying in Calais we were informed that a group of women organised a protest in Dunkirk 




by engaging with their conditions of life. When Macron visited Calais in 2018 and a 
march was being planned in protest against the French government and in solidarity with 
migrants, a group of them wanted not only to march but they wanted to put banners up. 
Aid workers from the School Bus Project44 provided materials but they did not engage in 
the creation of the banners. While this refers to what is visible, that is protesting and 
banners, the hidden element of this equation regards the kind of conscious engagement 
that people have with their conditions. While visibility always makes an implicit 
reference to invisibility,45 it is also the expansion of optics into politics that make such 
terrain more controversial for people who demand recognition. Both visibility and 
invisibility, in fact, often make migrants-as-humans-who-struggle to redefine their 
survival disappear, reducing their presence to the uses that institutional framings need to 
make of it. As such, it is important to also recognise that the ways in which migrants’ 
struggles also depend on the ways in which we frame these struggles. As we have seen in 
the case of Rome, the idea that migrants should merely survive is rejected and rationales 
for governing lives can be always disrupted from within. 
 
Infrastructures of Solidarity: From the Calais Warehouse to the ‘Will’ of the Bus 
In August 2015, at the peak of the so-called ‘migration crisis’ in EUrope, the hashtag 
#HelpCalais started to emerge on social networks. Launched by a group of friends who 
wanted to raise £1,000 and bring donations to Calais, the project reached £56,000 in a 
week. In response to the growing demands for supporting migrants in the area, Help 
Refugees started its grassroot operations soon becoming the largest aid organisation in 
Northern France. From a social media campaign to a global movement, since 2015 more 
than 25,000 people have volunteered with the charity. Help Refugees has established in 
 
44 I will consider later in this chapter in more detail the activities of the School Bus Project. 





Calais a networked and fieldwork approach by supporting migratory populations on the 
move there. While the UK charity delivers projects in other areas of the world, Calais is 
a pivotal case of a self-organising citizens networked response to the ways in which 
borders and migrants are managed within and between specific nation states, but also the 
EU.  
In 2015, Help Refugees partnered with L’Auberge des Migrants, an aid 
organisation created in 2007 by former artists and teachers, and in September 2015 it 
opened a Warehouse to store, sort and then distribute items in the field. Along with these 
two main organisations, another six organisations operate in the Warehouse providing 
support to people on the ground: Refugee Community Kitchen (RCK), Utopia 56, 
Refugee’s Women Centre, Refugee Info Bus, the School Bus Project and the Refugee 
Youth Service. While Help Refugees and L’Auberge des Migrants, and partially Utopia 
56 too, distribute non-food items such as blankets, sleeping bags, hygiene kits, clothing 
and so on, other organisations provide specific services such as internet, food, education 
and leisure time. As we will see, these organisations and their activities support migrants 
in substantial ways, disrupting the more general idea of what is the aid that should be 
provided to them. Before paying a closer attention to the activities coordinated in the 
field, it is offstage, within the parameters of a cooperative experiment, that volunteers 
come together in response to policies that are oppressive and repressive in practice.  
 
The Calais Warehouse 
 
As I have observed during my stay in Calais, a typical day for volunteers in the Warehouse 
starts around 9 am. The morning brief, run by experienced volunteers, usually takes place 
a bit before that when updates about what happened the day before, the general condition 
of the migrants in question, a general assessment of their situated needs and the most 




by an experienced coordinator who introduces them to how the space within the 
Warehouse is organised and how activities are structured according to different roles and 
responsibilities. During the morning brief we were told not to take pictures of the front of 
the Warehouse. Organizers are alert to the fact that the power of sharing what is 
happening here runs on social media and the necessity of dissemination to support their 
activities but they are also mindful that making the outside of the building too 
recognisable means making the whole operation vulnerable due to intimidatory acts that 
have taken place in the past. The organisations have even asked Google not to make it 
appear on its maps for this reason. What happens inside the Warehouse, instead, is 
sharable through social media as long as it does not give away the coordinates of its 
location (fig.12). 
 
Figure 13. #MoreThanAMigrant. Board with messages from volunteers (photograph: Antonella Patteri) 
 
Inside the Warehouse, on the right, there is a board where the eight organisations are 
presented as connected together by the specificity of the services they offer (figs. 13, 14). 
Their activities are carefully mapped and presented as interrelated. These mapping makes 
it absolutely clear that the network and its aid distribution works through a meticulous 





Figure 14. Board with the eight organisations collaborating in the Warehouse  




Figure 15. A description of the different projects carried out in the Warehouse  
(photograph: Antonella Patteri) 
 
 
On the left, there is the kitchen run by Refugee Community Kitchen (figs.16, 17, 18) an 
organisation created in 2015 by four friends who came together to offer assistance and 
distribute food to people displaced in the area. Meals are prepared here by volunteers who 
overlook the entire process from preparation to the actual distribution on the ground. The 
organizers are proud of the resilience with which they have kept the operation running: 




safety reasons, but the volunteers successfully prevented the closure and, when I was 
there, it was still operating at full capacity.  
 
 
Figure 16. Refugee Community Kitchen (photograph: Antonella Patteri) 
 
 




As we were walking through the warehouse, my interlocutor, explained to me that 
donations are accepted and sorted according to the idea that ‘anything is better than 
nothing’. However, adamant that clothes also serve to dignify migrants, the volunteers 




of degradation (fig.18). Donations are therefore carefully assessed according to the 
specific state of the item and redirected to meet critical needs on the ground. Significantly, 
black skinny jeans were considered the most popular item as they are practical in the 
sense that those who wear can easily become less ‘visible’ to the police and their 
movements are not impeded in case they need to run away in an emergency situation.  
 
Figure 19. Model to assess suitable items for distribution  
(photograph: Antonella Patteri) 
 
 
The items that need to be repaired, darned, and repurposed are taken to the cleverly named 
SEWHO (figs.20, 21, 22, 23, 24) (a pun on the central London location Soho), a space 
within the building in which items are made reusable. It is here that I have seen how even 
a broken tent can become a comfortable and much-needed and comfortable blanket.  
 






Figure 21. SEWHO station (photograph: Antonella Patteri) 
 
















Next to SEWHO there is one of the most important areas in the Warehouse, that is Tent 
World (fig.25) the site where all the tents are kept together and in good order. Obviously, 
tents are extremely valuable items in this context and they are considered priority items 
to be distributed in the field together with boots, sleeping bags, blankets, and waterproof 
jackets. Apart from being of practical value, tents also have a huge symbolic value are 
they are seen by the migrants as shelters while sleeping bags are considered to be less 
settling, less of an accommodation. At the same time, however, they are also dangerous 
target as the police identifies them with migrants ‘not on the move’ and therefore targets 
them during raids. For this reason, when evictions occur, tents are usually confiscated or 
destroyed by the police with the intention of making it more difficult for people to settle 
and to create distress among communities. Consequently, constant police interventions 
mean that there is always an urgent need for tents since, on average, a single tent can be 
considered the equivalent of accommodation for migrants for a period of only five days. 
Notably, since during my stay, evictions were taking place twice, even three times a day, 
it was evident that a hostile environment which kept migrants in a constant state of 
transience was perpetually being reasserted by continuously uprooting them; this was 
achieved also by taking away the migrants’ few possessions every time.  
 
 






Figure 26. Items general check (photograph: Antonella Patteri) 
 
 
Warehouse 1 was flanked by Warehouse 2, where were stored the items considered not 
worthy of distribution (fig.26). Far from being disposed of, these items were set to be 
recycled and re-donated, often to a network of craftsmen who could repurpose them 
effectively. Sleeping bags were sorted in huge containers within this space and, like tents, 
they were continuously distributed and re-collected from the field if they needed to be 
checked or repaired and then amended and redistributed for further use by the volunteers 








In line with the optimisation of distributing items, just outside the Warehouses a laundry 
had been set up where items could be thoroughly cleaned for reuse according to pre-
established shifts (figs.28, 29, 30). 
 
 
Figure 28. Laundry outside the Warehouse (photograph: Antonella Patteri) 
 
 







Figure 30. Washing machines where items for re-redistribution are washed  




In front of the laundry, was parked the Refugee Info Bus along with other vans and next 
to them were various information stalls and the Refugee Youth Service point (fig.30). This 
space outside also served as a commune in which volunteers came together, shared their 
experiences and enjoyed work-related breaks. People from different backgrounds, 
professions and expertise gathered here to talk about migration, ‘what is happening out 
there,’ coming together to reflect on the experience of what it meant to be involved in the 
organisation of a response to univocal and damaging ways of constructing ‘illegalised’ 






Figure 31. Meeting points outside the Warehouse (photograph: Antonella Patteri) 
 
The Warehouse in Calais is a huge place which, in order to be run successfully has to rely 
on the cooperation of many different charities, the most important ones and the founders 
were Help Refugees and L’Auberge des Migrants. Over the last two weeks of August 
2018, when I was there, more than 70 short-term and long-term volunteers worked to 
sustain this operation. Some long-term volunteers also shared an accommodation outside 
the Warehouse. Since it was summer many students too had time to come to Calais and 
volunteer there, along with people who took time off from work, such as primary and 
secondary school teachers since the schools were also closed for the summer break. This 
influx of volunteers makes the summer a time where it is easier for the aid organizations 
to meet the needs of the migrants since they can rely on an army of volunteers; from 
October on, however, I was told that there might be only 15 people carrying out all the 
sorting and distribution of donations, further stretching help on the ground.  
Overall, the Warehouse is a massive experiment in communal working and, for 
some, communal living: the right of each of the many organisations to do things 




to coordinate, coexist and share goals. A team of coordinators makes sure that things run 
smoothly across the Warehouse: they form part of the welcome team; operate as 
Warehouse managers; provide general updates and coordinate daily meetings. Human 
rights and police training are offered to new volunteers so that they are able not only to 
accurately map conditions in the field but also to assess and denounce violations and 
respond to unlawful intimidations or demands. As we can see, the Warehouse did not 
only cater for primal needs but also offered support that goes beyond immediate 
assistance with food, shelter, or health. The provision of aid, moreover, was not limited 
to add legal representation to basic needs but, even within the parameters of the need to 
prioritise operational needs dictated by the dire conditions of the migrants, the provision 
of aid also extended into education and cultural activities. As far as the volunteers were 
concerned, ideological dreams could live up to their broader construction, to them what 
seemed most urgent was to get the work done and, by default, build a safer and less 
deprived environment for migrants. Even though the space was structured and managed 
under the imperative of making distribution work organically within and beyond the 
Warehouse, volunteers organised to transform their space into a hub connected with a 
broader network. The Warehouse as space is fixed in its location but what happened there 
can be considered part of a process and continuum that uprooted more traditional ideas 
of place and extended it in such a way that it both mirrored the mobility of migrants 
displaced in the area and provided a more solid response to their needs. 
The space of the Warehouse function as a meeting point and place of connectivity 
for migrants otherwise dispersed in the area and belonging to different communities. This 
remained true after the dismantlement of the Jungle camp in Calais, when communities 
were further dispersed and new communities congregated around the area. When I was 
there, I could observe that migrant communities had organized themselves according to 




nationality: in the area called Old Lidl, for example, there were people who originated 
from Afghanistan while in the Little Forest there were Eritreans and Ethiopians. Other 
areas, however, included mixed nationalities. All these communities of people on the 
move were connected by the space of the Warehouse which was a site that created a 
conversation across geopolitical borders that are generally presented to us as uncrossable 
but also rejected the idea that (b)ordered living can only be predicated on exclusion, and 
that (b)ordering can only be an univocal and overdetermining mechanism. Humanitarian 
aid of the kind provided by the Baobab Experience and the Warehouse is instrumental to 
denounce and counter oppressive and repressive ways of (b)ordering. What networked 
and grassroot aid can do, by refusing to become implicated in the politics of containment 
provided by the state, is to rethink borders as a place of connectivity and organized 
response. The geopolitical border that divides the UK and France in Calais, and the border 
that ‘illegal’ migrants were made to ‘carry inside’ in the urban space of the Roman 
Piazzale Maslax community are reimagined and repurposed as sites from which the forces 
behind the very (b)ordering migrants are subjected to, can be resisted. Mezzadra and 
Neilson have considered how the multiplication of different types of boundaries have 
diversified the semantic field of borders: 
 “Symbolic, linguistic, and urban boundaries are no longer articulated in fixed ways by 
geopolitical borders. Rather, they overlap, connect and disconnect in often unpredictable 
ways, contributing to shaping new forms of domination and exploitation”.46  
 
 
Listening to the stories that volunteers from aid organisations in Calais and Rome told 
me about their experience, however, shows that new forms of dominations and 
exploitations are only one side of the story and that the violent enforcement of borders 
can also become an occasion to create connections and articulate resistance in multiple 
ways. Borders have always two sides, disconnecting and connecting, excluding and 
including. In the case of Calais, the most obvious way in which the UK and the French 
 




border connects for the domination and exploitation of migrations is through the violence 
of the police against people on the move and, at large, through the creation of perpetual 
hostile environments for migrants. The way in which the border disconnects is through 
the line at physical borders that concretely maps the territorial jurisdiction of each 
country. In the case of the Warehouse, the physical border that maps the territorial 
jurisdiction of France and the UK and the organisations working on the ground, is the 
very reason and occasion for connections that rethink this very border from the 
perspective of everyday forms of re-connection that volunteers, projects, and direct 
deliveries, perform and sustain.  
“Shout out about what is going here” is what a member of the welcoming team told 
me on the first day in the Warehouse. The Warehouse is not only an off-stage site of 
distribution of items or services. The enduring energy of the place forces us to think that 
networked responses to state managed migration are essential for re-connecting ideas of 
what life means for those who struggle for it. Even though such re-connections are linked 
to the connections and disconnections that political power systematically establishes, 
what needs to be ‘shouted’ is never already silenced. In Calais, the (b)ordering of voices 
is confronted with the concrete work of those who ‘shout out’ against the violence of 
borders: this violence is mapped, denounced by volunteers who work in the field and by 
the migrants themselves who document and reflect on their suspended journeys.  
 
The “Will” is on the Bus 
 
Migrants’ journeys are important not only in relation to border crossings per se, but also 
for how people strategize their mobility. The projectuality of migrants’ journey is not 
only politically relevant for the challenges it poses mainly to states in terms of their 
sovereign jurisdiction, but also because of the networked means of resistance they rely 




vehicles then need also to be taken into account in the study of migration politics. While 
not all migrants’ journeys might be politically salient,47 overall, they undoubtedly play a 
fundamental role as they allow movement to continue. This idea of including means of 
transportation within the political realm is well explained by Walters who refers to the 
idea of viapolitics.48 Here via (from the Latin ‘via’, which means ‘road’ but also, 
crucially, ‘way’) draws attention to transportation and communication as vital 
components of mobility and ways of moving but also thinking – at the same time it 
highlights the journey rather than the destination, the fact of being on the move and 
transient. In particular, as Walter puts it, “Vehicles, routes and journeys matter not just 
because they shape migration worlds; they matter because the ship as well as the city, and 
the road as well as the agora have provided a locus for problematisations of the human 
and for the possibility of politics”.49 In line with this, Walter advances three theses on 
viapolitics:  
“1) research on migration should be more attentive to the way vehicles feature in migration 
controversies: the way that ships, trains, buses and other vehicles mediate the public 
understanding of migration and border-crossing is rarely neutral; 2) vehicles also matter as 
they are mobile zones of governance and contestation in their own right; 3) under certain 




In considering these three aspects, Walters looks at how humans interact with 
vehicles in strategic circumstances, somehow redefining the more spectacularised 
perspective that frames migrants as being simply forced to travel by boats, trains and so 
on. Vehicles produce paradoxes as they possess a positive and a deadly function: we can 
think of the boat in the Mediterranean; the train from Ventimiglia to France in which 
migrants attempt to further their journey to Northern Europe; the deportation flights in 
 
47 Walters W., ‘Migration, vehicles and politics: Three theses on viapolitics’, European Journal of Social Theory 
(2015), 18(4), 469-88, 470. 
48 Idem. 
49 Ibid., 472.  




which planes are deployed to expel migrants; the bus that is used by officials to remove 
migrants and temporary dispersing them in detention centres within national territories.  
At the same time buses, vans, trains, boats and planes are used by migrants (openly or in 
a clandestine way) to reach friends, relatives and zones of contact while waiting to further 
their instances.51 The ambiguities of what means of transportation can do to encourage or 
discourage migration further emphasises their often neglected role in the processes of 
migration. The possibility of being a site of contestation, a zone of governance and a set 
of political action makes the vehicle itself a hybrid entity in which questions of how 
migrants have access to it, how they relate to it, how they use it and how they confront 
its limits need also to be given centre stage.52 As Walters remarks, such inquiry is 
necessary as it is “one that treats the interconnections of humans and vehicles as 
irreducible feature of migratory struggles”53 which, he reminds us, do not only happen in 
fixed settings and structures but are also catalysed by vehicles, routes and 
infrastructures.54  
The experience of how vehicles connect with migration struggles through 
networked aid is reconsidered by looking at how a series of organisation in Calais use the 
bus to provide services and interact with migrants dispersed in the area. Migrants’ 
movements are tracked by volunteers who bring the bus to them and with it the 
mobilisation of solidarities and mobile relations that aid workers establish with migrants 
dispersed in the area and the migrants establish amongst themselves. Such relations, in 
fact, also need to be explored in terms of iterative experiences where migrants are not 
simply the recipients of aid but are also integrated within the learning practices facilitated 










field and establish vital connections with people in the area and  develop projects where 
aid is not experienced as something that can only be provided to migrants, but as 
something that can be co-created by providing migrants with the possibility of engaging 
with a different idea of life. This idea expands life and does not reduce it to matters of 
mere survival. In what follows, I will consider in more detail the experiences of the 
Refugee Info Bus, the Refugee Youth Service and the School Bus Project in the Calais 
area.  
 
Refugee Info Bus 
 
The Refugee Info Bus project was founded in 2016, at the time where the Calais ‘Jungle’ 
camp was still a reality in Northern France. At the very beginning of the project, an old 
horsebox was converted into a mobile office and Wi-Fi hotspot. This volunteer initiative 
provided mobile network and beamed Wi-Fi to about 400 refugees per day. In addition 
to this, volunteers of the project delivered workshops keeping people on the move 
informed about the UK and French asylum systems. When the ‘Jungle’ camp was evicted, 
the organisation distributed more than 4,000 multilinguals info-packs containing legal 
and emergency information for those migrants forced to leave Calais. Many individuals 
continued living in the Calais area scattered about. Due to this dispersal, volunteers 
realised that they needed to have a constant internet service that was reliable and useful 
in order to reach everyone, disseminate vital information, and develop formative projects. 
The BUS today continues to operate in these areas where it is parked up near migrants’ 
settlements and internet is provided for a certain amount of time (fig.31), and phones can 
be charged. It is in these new site points which extends from forests to parking spaces, 
that the experience of Refugee Info Bus continues to play an important role.55  
 





Figure 32. Refugee Info Bus (photograph: Antonella Patteri) 
 
 
If digitalization can be instrumental to (b)ordering migrants as we have seen in 
chapter two, digital connections are also extremely important for people on the move. 
They are a significant aspect of migrants’ movement, giving rise to what Papadopoulos 
and others call “mobile commons”.56 The fact that this service functions as a mobile 
lifeline is explicative of the idea that connections are fundamental not only in terms of 
keeping contact with people in countries of origin, but also with those who live in zones 
of transit, particularly because in Calais there is no longer a centralised camp. At the 
moment it is far worse than 2016 as dispersal has made it extremely hard to build a 
community and the absence and impossibility to form a community is a key aspect and 
the result of the precarization of migrants’ lives: as migrants are perpetually made to 
experience insecurity, it is hoped that they will eventually go away.57 When I was there 
Refugee Info Bus was covering three sites in Calais and to Dunkirk where lots of people 
 
56 See Papadopoulos D., Tsianos V. S., ‘After Citizenship’, 190. The idea of ‘mobile commons’ will be better discussed 
in chapter 5 of this thesis. 








also lived in precarious conditions. The bus parked for about three, four hours in each site 
and internet was provided in Dunkirk four times a week, in Calais six days a week. In 
addition to this, the bus parked in the Warehouse for one day a week so that all volunteers 
had the opportunity to get to know better what the situation on the ground actually was 
(fig.33). Once the bus entered the areas in which migrants were gathered, the volunteers 
put out a big generator and up to a hundred people could charge their phones. This was a 
very particular moment and an aid worker recalled this experience with these words: 
 “When everybody sees the bus people just come over and then two minutes later you hear 
all the beeps, the phones beeping all at the same time, and people will start calling, saying 
Hello, you will hear lots of people calling home. The BUS also functions as a community 











Refugee Youth Service 
 
Refugee Info Bus was not the only project that I saw was being developed by the 
volunteers in Calais. Founded by three friends in November 2015, the Baloos Youth 
Centre was created to provide a recreational, educational and communitarian space within 
the ‘Jungle’ camp with the idea that minors could relax and participate in activities. The 




as child protection, education and attention to child resettlement programs were all 
promoted. The Mobile Youth Centre that was operating when I was there in Calais, was 
a vehicle that served different zones in Calais and Dunkirk providing a safe space for 
minors, information about asylum procedures, and facilitating legal routes. There are two 
kinds of youth services, one that provides some sort of structured leisure and educational 
activities, everyday services, everyday table games, football games, and a barber shop in 
which the boys could do their hair and even study; the other that focuses on helping young 
people to get accommodation, finding legal ways to help them to reach the UK, some 
even through the Dubs amendment. This became increasingly difficult as the Dubs 
amendment added to the Migration Act 2016 to provide a safe passage and relocate 
unaccompanied children refugees in EUrope to the UK, was abandoned at the beginning 
of 2017 and only a minimal portion of the almost 3,000 minors initially planned to be 
guaranteed safe passage, have been able reach the UK.58 
There is always uncertainty about the size of the current migrant population in 
Calais and my stay there was no exception. The reason for this is that it is not possible to 
map people’s movements with certainty: people are not registered when they first reach 
the area and are in constant flow. Nevertheless, according to reports from volunteers, it 
transpired that most of the dispersed population in Calais, and Dunkirk, was composed 
of young adults. Of these, there were also many unaccompanied minors who were waiting 
or aspired to be resettled in the UK. Many minors, therefore, were stuck in Calais, 
outnumbering the quotas allowing the possibility of reaching the country under family 
reunification laws. The organisation also encouraged minors to stay in France as an 
option, but unfortunately this was not an option for many of them. As a volunteer 
explained:  
 
58 Bulman M., ‘Government’s treatment of child refugees under Dubs scheme broke law, Court of Appeal rule’, The 
Independent, 3 October 2018. Available at:  https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/dubs-child-refugees-




“there are many reasons for this such as the fact that many minors have family connections 
in the UK, or do not speak French as most of the kids speak English as a second language so 
that they could start working in England, go to school there”.  
 
 
On top of the considerations made by the volunteers one should also take into account the 
level of violence that minors are exposed to since when they arrive in Calais and which 
can constitutes a powerful deterrent for many to consider France as a ‘safe’ place. The 
kids first experience of France is Calais and the whole of France is Calais to them, so 
when presented with the idea that they might be able to have a very nice life in France 
they tend to thoroughly dismiss it. 
 Unfortunately, in fact, kids’ experience of France amounts to being beaten by the 
police, being chased by them and having their items requisitioned. Considering the scale 
of the abuse from the police, from what they consider to be the French State, many 
minors’ encounters with authority come in the form of violence. This has been well-
documented in a report produced by Human Rights Watch Living Like Hell: Police Abuse 
Against Child and Adult Migrants in Calais.59 Through dramatic accounts provided in 
part by minors, the report effectively displays the scale of the police abuse in Calais 
where: 
“police use pepper spray most frequently at night, on asylum seekers and migrants who are 
asleep or whom they have just woken up […] Food and water that have been sprayed cannot 
be consumed and sleeping bags and clothing must be washed before they can be reused”.60  
 
 
As many minors recall in this report, such experiences come to inform their everyday life 
in Calais where intimidations and police abuses are the preferred mode of constraining 
people who stay in the area while attempting to go somewhere else. Between the duties 
of a hosting system, in this case France, and the concomitant responsibilities of keeping 
order, such situation creates a paradoxical, but unavoidable conditions of insecurity in 
 
59 Human Rights Watch, ‘Living Like Hell: Police Abuses against Child and Adult Migrants in Calais’, 26 July 2017. 
Available at: https://www.hrw.org/report/2017/07/26/living-hell/police-abuses-against-child-and-adult-migrants-





which the Janus-faced practices of the police are both reaffirmed and revealed. As a 
volunteer puts it: 
“As migrants see it, why would they talk with someone who will get them into an 
accommodation, while they also get paid to clear their belongings. They are part of the same 
system, so it is frustrating and difficult to think otherwise. The young adults who live in 
Calais are striving for survival in all kind of ways while there are two governments that are 
failing them at the same time: the English side and the French side”.  
 
School Bus Project 
 
The School Bus Project was set up in 2015 by educators and community members when 
the Calais Jungle camp was at its peak. The project started by conceptually thinking about 
the possibility of providing mobile education for those migrants, especially minors, who 
by embarking on long and uncertain journeys, encountered also the risk of missing out 
on the possibility to get an education. In the ‘Jungle’, a double decker bus was converted 
into a classroom and it was functional till October 2016, when the camp was officially 
dismantled. In October 2017, the Project was reorganised as part of the network of 
organisations in the warehouse (fig.34) and re-adapted to the new circumstances on the 
ground, providing educational opportunities in different zones in both Calais and 
Dunkirk.  
 




The bus was taken back to Calais, refurbished and subdivided upstairs. Classrooms can 
sit about twenty people. In the bus there is also a subsection where learning is done and 
a fun section where people can relax, and it is quiet. People can have conversations there. 
Downstairs the concept is much more open: people can listen to music, play games and 
share time together. The situation significantly changed post-Jungle, especially with the 
latest agreement signed between the UK and France, and as a result of which the number 
of migrants scattered in the area were of an inferior number compared to 2015/16. 
Nevertheless, people still came back or stayed there in an attempt to cross further 
border(s). As an aid worker directly involved in the projects highlights:  
“While some are trying to find their way into the UK, many want to study, to continue the 
life they have created, a certain number wants to join family, and a number of people want 
to re-join more distant family; there are people who have husbands, wives and children there. 
Most of the migrants are now in Dunkirk where the population is composed mainly of Iraqis, 
Kurdish, families and young children. Ultimately, the bus project is about stimulating a safe 





In other words, the aim of mobile education was that of making a positive intervention 
within the disruptive circumstances in which migrants found themselves by having had 
to leave their country of origin and the institutional learning in which they were inserted. 
The School Bus Project, as did/do other projects at large, responded to the need for 
recovering what Anderson calls “stolen time,” that is the waste of time predicated upon 
migrants’ spatial (im)mobility.61 Waiting time, emptied time, time withheld. This “stolen 
time” serves to decelerate migratory movements by means of extraction.62 
When the weather gets warmer in Calais, as it was when I was there, it was 
possible to set up outdoor classroom spaces, otherwise activities took place in the bus. 
Direct delivery, training, and advocacy are the three strands of the project. Usually, the 
team was led by teachers with educational background who were responsible for the 
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planning, development and delivery of the classes that were mainly organised 
thematically, for example on themes such as growth, identity, friendship, storytelling and 
science. This kind of organisation was necessary because of the way in which teaching 
takes place, but also in terms of the differentiation that is needed for the learners that 
attended the classes. In terms of migrants’ engagement with learning, this took often the 
shape of an iterative process in which people made calls for certain subjects to be taught. 
Teaching languages such as English was not one of the primary goals, especially in order 
to avoid perpetuating the myth of the UK as a place of ‘salvation’. Migrants were 
informed about the classes by routinised visits to the areas in which the school bus parked: 
Come and Learn with Us was been put on different languages. In addition to this, migrants 
themselves were invited to make demands about the content of their learning experiences. 
One example of this, as a volunteer told me, was that a number of young boys wanted to 
learn more about sex education so orientation classes were delivered in response to their 
demands. Through mobile connections, youth services and iterative learning, these 
projects challenge the voiding of aspirations’ of people on the move. At the same time, 
however, aid workers were also continuously targeted for making this border area a space 
of contestation of biopolitical life. 
 
Targeting Solidarity, Making Borders  
 
Under article L622-1 of French’s immigration law, “any person who directly or indirectly 
facilitates or attempts to facilitate the entry, movement or irregular stay of a foreigner in 
France will be punished by imprisonment of five years and a fine of 30,000 euros”.63 
There are exceptions to this provision for individuals or associations that provide free 
legal assistance and aim “at preserving [migrants] dignity or physical integrity”.64 While 
 





this law is supposed to be a deterrent to those profiteering from refugees and migrants, 
people and organisations that do not fall into this category are also increasingly targeted 
as such. Instances of solidarity that are within the law are often criminalised. This is 
becoming the modus operandi for how citizens organise when making sure that the needs 
of migrants are being looked after. In response to the increasing participation and activism 
of citizens and organisations in assisting ‘illegalised’ migrants, states are now shifting 
attention from targeting traffickers to those who provide them humanitarian support, 
accommodation or are deemed to facilitate their crossing of borders. 
 According to the EU Council Directive 2002/90/EC member states should sanction 
a series of behaviours that constitute smuggling and assistance, often conflating these and 
effectively reducing migrants’ access to fundamental rights. Civil society organisations, 
citizens and local authorities are all compelled to respect the idea of what constitutes 
irregular migration, raising concerns for those who are left without papers and as such 
further excluded by the state.65 The persecution of those who commit so-called crimes of 
solidarity is also perpetrated through arbitrary police measures. L’Auberge des Migrants, 
Utopia 56, Refugee Info Bus and Help Refugees published a report that records police 
harassment of volunteers in Calais from the 1st November 2017 to the 1st of July 2018. 
During this time, 646 incidents were identified and reported, with police officers and 
volunteers’ interactions registered as surveillance; ID checks and traffic controls; body 
searches, searches of vehicles and personal belongings; obstruction of volunteer activities 
through fines, banning distribution, immobilisation of vehicles; verbal abuse and physical 
violence.66 The constant pressure faced by volunteers was exacerbated  by the presence 
of CRS anti-riot officers. After the Jungle camp in Calais was dismantled, police constant 
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pressures were intended to discourage migrants from staying in the area and policemen 
too felt they were on the frontline of an impossible battle: 
 “We are asked to look busy, to evict people, to arrest them […] we could put 1,000 CRS 
here – but as long as England is over the border from Calais there will still be migrants here. 
Even without blankets and water. Politicians are trying to deter them from coming. But that’s 
not going to happen”.67  
 
During my visit to a camp in Dunkirk a CRS van was parked at the main entrance 
of one of the sites. This was usually the norm and it was part not only of a surveillance 
strategy that targeted volunteers by observing and asking about their activities as soon as 
they approached the sites, but it was also a way to assert control and order over migrants’ 
staying in the area, entering and exiting their sites. Officers routinely carried out identity 
checks on volunteers, body searches and pat-downs. As the use of car and vans are 
essential for reaching the sites and supporting the work of volunteers in the area, 
unjustified fines for parked or transiting vehicles constituted another intimidating 
practice, leading also to the banning of distribution of items and food. These measures, 
rooted between legality and illegality, come to inform a strategy of containment that 
redefines survival as something that can be guaranteed only within the parameter 
sanctioned by the state and the police. Food distribution or health support were generally 
tolerated but police interventions aimed at disrupting them ensured that volunteers and 
migrants could not take even basic aid for granted in an effort to discourage them to even 
consider asking for more and redefine ‘dignity’ as more than a plate of food, clean clothes 
or even legal representation. 
It seemed clear, therefore, that humanitarian workers were exposed to different 
kinds of policing, some of which were indirect. The ambiguity of the securitised project 
of the state and that which holds humanitarian values at its centre of action was constantly 
redefining what containment meant. The fact that intimidation towards aid workers was 
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intended to criminalise acts of solidarity put into question French (but also British) legal 
and extra-legal boundaries. The porosity of these extra-legal boundaries gives us a sense 
of how migration is seen to be facilitated by rationales of control and aid. As Tazzioli 
convincingly remarks:  
“the criminalisation of individuals and groups who are facilitating the crossing of migrants, 
without making a profit from doing so, opens up the critical question of who exactly is a 
smuggler today: the boundaries between supporting migrants for one’s own financial benefit 
or for ‘humanitarian’ reason are constantly blurred”.68  
 
 
The criminalisation of activities in support of migrants shows how slippery is the 
seemingly shared codified idea of what life consists of, both in terms of its expansion and 
containment and in terms of what dignity amounts or is limited to. One of the volunteers 
I met in Calais referred to how their activities were reframed by the police as actions 
actively facilitating ‘illegal’ migration. Notably, many aid workers in Calais, particularly 
those who came from other parts of France, had not fully anticipated that the police would 
display such a negative attitude towards them, highlighting how processes of (b)ordering 
can function along lines which are different from those that regulate everyday life: 
“the police here are just so different, they do not feel like humans themselves and they do not 
treat [migrants] as humans either. There is, however, a level of resistance against the police, 
and denunciation is one of them”. 
 
 
These strategies of resistance involved coordinating with other organisations, tracking 
violations, reporting police abuse, minimising the disruption of activities in support of 
migrants in transit in the area but, most importantly, rejecting that the threshold of what 
is acceptable and unacceptable within the idea of solidarity is being drawn by the state. 
Dominant state narratives ambiguously construct the figure of the migrant as being 
 
68 Tazzioli M., ‘Crimes of Solidarity’, Radical Philosophy, 2 February 2018. Available at: 




‘disposable’,69 ‘deportable’,70  and a ‘security threat’71 while also being cast in the passive 
role of those in need of ‘humanitarian assistance’.72 These boundaries were resisted by 
the volunteers of grassroots aid organisations I met in Calais who remodelled them 
according to the challenges they faced in their daily interactions with the police.  
 
Introducing the Politics of Perseverance: ‘We are not giving up’ 
 
The increasing violence in the informal settlements like those in Calais affects migrants 
directly and, as we have seen, to a certain extent also aid workers. In different terms, both 
are exposed to the politics of exhaustion legitimised by the polices of the EU, nation-
states and local governments.73 Most importantly, these strategies are made to exist on 
the ground by the police that polices humanitarian interventions but also calculatedly 
tolerates them, therefore (b)ordering bodies who are deemed to (only) survive. As 
Welander and Ansems De Vries put it, “the politics of exhaustion refers both to the ways 
in which exhaustion is employed as a tool of governance and control, and to the ways in 
which it is experienced as a daily reality by refugees”.74 The continuous evictions, 
confiscation of migrants’ belonging, burning of their tents or sleeping bags, and the 
policing and harassing of aid workers, ultimately lead to perpetual experiences of 
 
69 On the politics of disposability, see Bauman Z., Wasted Lives. Specifically, Bauman reflects on how migrants without 
documents are considered human waste as outcome of modernity. In a global context, those who are of little economic 
value are conceptualised as waste and made redundant and in excess by nation-states. In this sense, humans are de-
humanised and considered as in surplus as result of strategies of globalisation and power calculations. 
70 On the legal production of ‘illegal’ migrants and the logic of ‘deportability’, see De Genova N., ‘Migrant ‘Illegality’ 
and Deportability in Everyday Life’.  
71 On migration and security, see Guiradon V., Joppke C. (2001) Controlling a New Migration World (London and 
New York: Routledge), in particular Chapter 5, Bigo D., ‘Migration and Security’.  
72 See Ktistakis Y., ‘Protecting Migrants under the European Convention of Human Rights and the European Social 
Charter’, (2013), Council of Europe Publishing. Available at: 
https://www.coe.int/t/democracy/migration/Source/migration/ProtectingMigrantsECHR_ESCWeb.pdf [accessed 15 
January 2019]. 
73 On the politics of exhaustion, see Welander M., ‘The Politics of Exhaustion and the British Sea Spectacle’, Border 
Criminolgies, 28 January 2019. Available at: https://www.law.ox.ac.uk/research-subject-groups/centre-
criminology/centreborder-criminologies/blog/2019/01/politics [accessed 20 October 2019]; Welander M., Ansems De 
Vries L., ‘Refugees, displacement, and the European ‘politics of exhaustion’’, Open Democracy, 30 September 2016. 
Available at: https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/mediterranean-journeys-in-hope/refugees-displacement-and-europ/ 
[accessed 20 October 2019]. 
74 Welander M, Ansems De Vries L., ‘Calais demolition: ‘mission accomplished’, the politics of exhaustion and 
continued struggle for mobility’, Open Democracy, 25 November 2016. Available at: 





violence and trauma. These experiences are continuous and do not only involve the 
destruction of migrants’ environments, but also aim to displace them, keep them on the 
move by reducing their political engagements mainly to strategies of survival. However, 
whilst vulnerability is continually reproduced and sustained by complex measures of 
dispersal, violence and misinformation,75 people’s struggles for life continue too. 
From the Calais Warehouse to the mobile support of the Bus in the field, it is 
possible to map relations of migration within a context of solidarity, action, inaction and 
disruptions. Accounting for resistance in zones like Calais, where not even basic needs 
are being met, is not easy but it is both urgent and necessary. In such circumstances, in 
fact, migrants’ forms of resistance often take the shape of what I refer to as ‘affirmative 
survival’. ‘Affirmative survival’ accounts for the ways through which migrants assert 
their politics of perseverance by living on and struggling for life. In Calais, migrants’ 
exposure to direct violence is mediated by both the work of volunteers but also by 
migrants themselves who assert their presence by continuously re-articulating their 
demands. These are expressed not only in terms of direct confrontation with the state but 
to begin with by challenging it through the refusal to comply with its underpinned logic 
of sedentary bias.76 The state frames migration as a transgressive condition that is 
formalized through asylum policies, territorial delimitations and social construction of 
identities. This logic that upholds sedentariness in one’s country of birth as the preferred 
or only option, is contested on the ground by people who keep moving between borders 
and despite them. At the same time, while the State wants those on the move to keep on 
moving until they reach the country of their destination and ask to be accepted there, 
migrants try to organise to make their lives on the move more livable and secure 
themselves outside the basic parameters of safety in which they are allowed to function. 
 
75 Welander M, Ansems De Vries L., ‘Calais demolition’. 
76 See Foucault, M. (1991b) Remarks on Marx: conversations with Duccio Trombadori (translated by R.J. Goldstein & 





In terms of migrants’ active engagement with being in charge of their own safety, an 
experienced aid worker who spent a long time in the field told me that: 
“migrants take turns in sleeping, they provide food to each other, while some people are 
sleeping, others will wash the dishes. They look out for each other, in terms of what they are 
doing. For instance, when trying to jump on lorries, someone has to stay behind and close 
the door, someone has to help another person, they organise even though is not necessarily 
conscious, but they organise in ways that keep them secure. In practical terms, this translates 
in migrants finding ways of engaging with the police by carrying very few belongings with 




This was very evident in Calais where there was no main camp or settlement and the 
police were moving people all the time so that migrants could not carry more than a small 
backpack with few belongings or no belongings at all. Flipping once again the notion that 
digitalization and connectivity infrastructures are only deployed to control migrants, one 
needs to bear in mind that having a phone and changing SIM cards in order to elude 
control is also very important. Phones, in fact, help keeping migrants organized on the 
ground and enables them to respond more readily to threats. These threats, as an aid 
worker I spoke to in Calais recalled, are engineered in such a way that what is targeted is 
the very notion of community that access to mobile phones can create and reinforce in an 
alternative way: 
“It is this idea of keeping people awake, so that people who are awake will not sleep at night. 
This is mentally draining, and the police knows this so that is why it keeps people moving. 
This is really an inversional kind of politics that attempts to break communities because there 
is a misunderstanding of what a community is, and this is something that cannot be easily 
broken […] forms of resistance cannot be broken only by strategies of dispersal”. 
 
 
As Butler argues, we are all located within power relations that are simultaneously 
productive and oppressive and resistance does not permit escape from these.77 However, 
it is possible to think of escape in terms of a different way to complement resistance, that 
is resilience. The theme of resilience and escape came up during my stay in Calais, 
resonating as a leitmotif for providing a more complex understanding of the dynamics 
 




that migrants themselves put in place. While such dynamics would otherwise go 
unnoticed unless visibly expressed in terms of open contestation, it is often this kind of 
resilience that informs forms of resistance. What I am referring to here is not simply the 
idea that resistance is occluded and happens even when we do not see it, what Scott 
identifies in his ethnographic study of peasants in South Asia as “everyday forms of 
resistance”,78 but more specifically what happens when such processes take place within 
migratory transits that lack the social structures that we tend to associate with enduring 
communities. It is in this spirit that volunteers in Calais refer to migrant communities as 
enduring communities, forging concepts that cannot only take into consideration state-
centric perspectives, but also situational conditions derived from the experience of 
communities which operate outside the ideological structures of the nation.  
People look after each other and this is a communitarian value. The value that 
migrants attach to more-than-self-preservation through everyday strategies of resilience 
and perseverance is politically relevant and cannot be underestimated. The importance of 
grasping such dynamics lies in the fact that the system that embeds migrants with their 
limiting experiences is not simply re-adapted per se, but purposefully resisted and 
confronted with subversive projects that migrants (and aid workers) put in place by 
crossing borders, occupying space, and purposively trying to settle in their country of 
choice. The reasons behind migrants’ movement are often in conflict with a rhetoric of 
passivity and opportunism that constructs people on the move as taking advantage of their 
conditions and it is also against this rhetoric that they have to fight. We do not know for 
certain why people move – there are many layers, factors and variables involved and 
claims cannot be preemptively assessed through a binary construction of legal and illegal 
mobility. Migration’s drivers, in fact, are too often simplified and aggregated for the 
 





purpose of creating deserving and underserving migrants. Mindful of the pre-emptive 
labels attached to them, migrants’ politics of perseverance manifests itself into their 
decision to make noise and persevere in the face of them. As an experienced volunteer in 
Calais told me: 
“from the field in Calais you here migrants saying, “we are not going […] we are no leaving 
this place until the UK has fulfilled a number of commitments”. 
 
 
As refugees’ rights are human rights, people on the move are aware of state 
responsibilities towards their unwanted presence in a foreign territory, as much as they 
know that claiming rights from those who deny them is problematic. Migrants try to find 
ways to make their staying bearable in the hope that new possibilities of crossing will 
come about at the same time in which they are forced to live the life of people whose 
transit is not permitted, if not outright criminalized, according to national and European 
laws more broadly.  
Aid workers also practice, as we have seen, this politics of perseverance when they 
continue their work in the face of criminalization and harassment. They also join with the 
migrants in their fight against the pre-emptive labels and cover ups. At the end of August 
2018, the news that the police intended to dismantle a camp near-by in Dunkirk reached 
the volunteers in the Warehouse. They were sure that the eviction would not result in the 
disappearance of migrants: as one of them told me:  
“Police will come and conduct a clearance, taking migrants tents and moving them out, and 
before the police has even left, people are already putting more tents up. The police do not 
care, they just leave. People will always come back where they were before, sticking together, 
keeping positive.” 
 
The volunteers immediately organized a visit to the threatened settlement before its 
dismantlement where I could see that many people were scattered among woods. The aid 
organisations working on the ground deployed a drone to record how many people were 
at risk of dispersal and keep a record which could be used to denounce the evictions 




engagements, that state oppression can be counteracted, in this case through the use of a 




The present in Calais is characterised by complex dynamics of (b)ordering that 
profoundly impact migrants’ lives. Migrant populations in Calais are continuously 
exposed to the policing of the French state which asserts its power of containment. The 
Prefecture of Calais has made available a few services for migrants such as water points, 
toilets and the distribution of meals but this humanitarian base offered by the French State 
alongside the violence of the police on the ground towards migrants – and to some extent 
aid workers too – is increasingly defining humanitarian interventions in terms of 
acceptable aid. The terms of migrants’ engagements with their struggles are being re-
addressed by organisation of citizens established in Calais. These organisations, born out 
from the formal settlement of the ‘Jungle’, actively struggle to deal with the 
circumstances of insecurity in which they are inserted as their activities are both 
calculatedly tolerated but also actively criminalised. Aid workers, and their purposive 
projects, disrupt and expose the survivalist project of the state and play an essential role 
not only by providing vital support to migrants, but, most importantly, by persevering in 
enriching their life through projects which engage migrants as beings entitled to a more 
bearable life and political life. Migrants too engage with or without the support of aid 
organizations in a politics of perseverance which counteract their criminalization or 
victimisation. In the next chapter I will further engage with a different approach to 
survival and migration whereby ‘affirmative’ survival is considered as a process of 
‘overcoming’ one’s condition based on the politics of perseverance. While biopolitics 
makes life an administrative task of politics, therefore reducing migrants’ lives to 
 
79 See Pezzani L., Heller C., “A disobedient gaze: strategic interventions in the knowledge(s) of maritime borders”, 




continue to exist disengaged from it, I will rethink struggles for survival as struggles for 
life as politics. These struggles redefine migrants’ relations with borders and (b)ordering 




























Life as Politics: Survival, Migration, Art 
 
Figure 35. ‘We are all Illegal Migrants’. Mural drawing on Giuseppe Pellizza da Volpedo's painting The Fourth 











The strategy for (b)ordering migrants’ lives is considered here as a rationale for border 
and migration management that promotes mere survival. In the thesis, I argue that modes 
of (b)ordering constrain migrants’ live to live with death by producing forms of survival 
that simply aim to preserve life at its minimal terms. The life of migrants is not only 
reduced to the bare minimum in biological terms, but it also (b)ordered as ‘deserving’ 
only minimal interventions so people can be (only) kept alive. Granted that migration 
cannot be separated from the systems of regulations it is inserted into but one should not 
forget that migration is also relational and therefore that we cannot fully erase neither 
migrants’ struggles to persevere and assert their demands nor their presence as a political 
force of its own making. With this in mind, in this chapter I will rethink (b)ordering 
processes as the only possible reality for thinking the life and the politics of migrants by 
focusing on the ways in which they are disturbed, interrupted, and challenged. In the 
previous chapter, I introduced the idea of the politics of perseverance, linking it to the 
complex ways in which migrants attempt to reconstruct their social reality by 
continuously reasserting their demands, presence and political engagements, also in 
alliance with aid workers. In this chapter, I look at the relations that migrants establish 
with survival and borders and will then consider artistic engagements that repurpose 
framings of migration. 
The politics of perseverance sustain the constitutive acts of what Papadopoulos, 
Stephenson and Tsianos call “imperceptible politics”.1 These acts are redrawing politics 
by giving visibility to ‘nonmovements’ of dissent. Moving away from ideas that these 
acts are merely responses to state control, more attention will be paid to the ways in which 
they affirm and re-affirm life. The life of those whose life is deemed expendable is also 
characterised by an otherwise politics in motion. As such, in order to account for the 
 




search for alternative paths by people whose life is shaped by (b)ordering (but as we will 
see, not exclusively by (b)ordering), we need to look at a series of negotiations that 
migrants initiate with life and borders. While the negative borders of EUrope control 
movement through biopolitical re-ordering, ‘affirmative’ political action is not simply a 
more positive answer to containment but represents the missing re-politicisation of 
instances that migrants themselves set in motion in their pursuit of life as politics by 
exceeding forms of life imposed upon them. Migrants’ engagements do not exist in a 
vacuum and are not simply the expression of an alleged intrinsic ‘criminality’ of the 
migrants themselves but need to be put in dialogue with those new ‘affirmative’ ways 
they put in place while searching to enhance their circumstances of life.  
Drawing on this and moving away from the idea of life that biopolitics specifies, 
the making of life as politics will be explored situating it within migrants’ struggles to 
survive as political subjects, and with a political claim for allowing reiterations to be 
recognised as measure of how the predicament of resistance can be articulated. The 
discussion will then shift to how migrants bring their ‘lived’ experience to borders. What 
I refer to as ‘affirmative’ survival is intended to open up a conversation about self-
organised practices of security, resistances, strategies of escape and dissent that evade 
traditional framings of agency. Those who can be considered surviving migrants for the 
state are now rethought as people who are ‘overcoming’ their (b)ordering condition and 
not just living with it. This aspect will be further considered analytically by a reading of 
the Autonomy of Migration and by considering the ‘lived’ experience of borders. In the 
last section of this chapter, I will consider artistic engagements and migration by looking 
at how the effects of surviving borders are being brought within society through public 
installation artworks and murals. The theatricality of borders, as nation states’ walls, will 




art. I argue that art has the potential for allowing the restitution of life to migrants, 
interrupting their (b)ordering as people without agency.  
 
Life as Politics 
 
Survival has been considered in this thesis as what derives from the point of intersection 
between mechanisms for the control and care over the life of migrants within their 
mobility. Such mechanisms have been explored by looking at interventions that distribute 
life with death conditions. Nevertheless, migrants exist in excess not just as a result of 
policies, practices and discourses that force them to exist as such, but also as a result of 
alliances and the politics of perseverance that they enact. These exceed the need to contain 
them by entertaining the possibility of a richer life. In these circumstances, surviving can 
become ‘making’ a life that is no simply limited to enacting survival strategies, but also 
about attaching new meaning to the idea of life itself. In the ‘making’ of life, ‘affirmative’ 
survival is not just about ensuring the continuum of what is kept alive through biopolitics, 
but the recognition that life needs to be lived beyond the ‘natural’ or biopolitical value 
assigned to the lives of particular people and their bordered movements. To further 
rethink biopolitical (b)orderings, therefore, it seems necessary to look at the multiple 
arrangements that migrants establish with life, enacting life as politics. 
Before making the move from biopolitics to life as politics we need to engage with 
the concept of politics of life highlighted in Fassin’s work.2 As Fassin argues, the 
analytical utility of thinking life in biopolitical terms does a disservice to the idea of 
politics that can be promoted. The main argument that Fassin puts forward, with respect 
 
2 In the thesis I engage with the idea of life that biopolitical governance specifies arguing that it grounds life in a notion 
of (b)ordering that delimits politics to administrative tasks. As such, in how life can be lived politically for some 
becomes a matter of survival. However, life has been problematised as being a totalising medium for understanding 
ordering as a domain of a biopolitical state. While in the thesis I discuss Fassin’s idea of politics of life to then focus 
on life as politics as power-to, it is worth to stress that the links between politics and governance are multiple. The 
coming into being of subjectivities, in fact, touches modes of governance and knowledge production that necessitate 




to Foucault’s theory, is that biopolitics is not the same as politics of life and clarifies his 
claims by making four substantial points: 
 “1) Politics is not only about the rules of the game of governing, but also about its stakes. 2) 
More than the power over life, contemporary societies are characterised by the legitimacy 
they attach to life. 3) Rather than a normalizing process, the intervention in lives is the 
production of inequalities. 4) The politics of life, then, is not only a question of 
governmentality and technologies, but also of meaning and values”.3  
 
In other words, Fassin asserts that biopolitics gives meaning to life not through politics 
but by understanding governance as governmentality: the government of populations is 
not the government of life. Life in biopolitics is denied in its substance, reduced to how 
technologies operate on human lives without concern for what politics does to these 
lives.4 These reservations have been discussed by many authors who have considered 
how politics has virtually disappeared from biopolitics,5 becoming even more a politics 
of difference that justifies itself through the language of biology.6 As Fassin has noted 
using Dean as a springboard, Foucault “treats life from the perspective of conduct, 
biopower in terms of disciplines exerted on individuals, and biopolitics in terms of 
technologies normalising populations”.7 According to this, Foucault contemplates life as 
a method and not as a principle.  
Life as a principle, according to Fassin, eludes consistent methods of intervention 
once the idea of life itself is dislocated from pure living matter. While cells and species 
validate our scientific existence, “life as such”, as Fassin calls it, refers to “life as the 
course of events which occurs from birth to death, which can be shortened by political or 
structural violence, which can be prolonged by health and social policies, which gives 
 
3 Fassin D., ‘Another Politics of Life is Possible’, 44. 
4 Fassin D., Life: A Critical User’s Manual, 85. 
5 Fehér F., Hellen A. (1994) Biopolitics (Aldershot: Ashgate) qtd in Fassin D., Life, 89. 
6 Fassin D., Life, 89. 
7 Fassin D., ‘Another Politics of Life is Possible’, 44. In particular, Foucault defines government as the “conduct of 
conduct” that includes modes of governing subjectivities as “technology of the self”. In this sense, conduct is also a 
mode of power based on a relationship between ways of governing and ways through which human beings (are made 
to) act on themselves. See Mennicken A., Miller P., ‘Michel Foucault and the administering of lives’, in Adler P. S., 
du Gay P., Morgan G., Reed M. (eds.) The Oxford Handbook of Sociology, Social Theory, and Organization Studies: 




place to cultural interpretations and moral decisions”.8 “Life as such” does not leave the 
biological living out of consideration but re-dimensions it according to a reinvigorated 
morality that aspires to bring meaning and value back to the things of life.9 Giving ethical 
trajectories to biopolitics means to acknowledge that complexities of life cannot be 
reduced to the governability of the matter of living per se, by recognising instead how 
this matter gives sense to life itself. As Fassin remarks, to make live is “to reject into 
death”, either practically as a consequence of the neglect of policy-makers towards certain 
groups of populations, or intellectually, as a result of not measuring the effects of these 
policies”.10 Theoretical distinctions about what constitutes life need then to contest more 
assertively the normalising path of life and death that is at the core of how biopolitical 
(b)ordering works. The politics of life, Fassin continues, regard also “the concrete ways 
in which individuals and groups are treated, under which principles and in the name of 
which morals, implying which inequalities and misrecognitions”.11 The fundamental idea 
that politics of life are at the necessary service of producing inequalities helps us to frame 
practices of politics besides focusing on their state-centric de-vitalisation.  
To sum this up, for Fassin: 
 “biopolitics is about the framing of the government of human beings, while the politics of 
life pertains to its substance. One is interested in the techniques and rationales of population 
management, whereas the others focus on the differentiation in the treatment of lives and its 
meaning in terms of unequal worth”.12  
 
All these shifts, with respect to Foucault’s original thought, are extremely important 
as these take biopolitics away from its totalising limits, proposing a refocusing toward 
 
8 Ibid., 48. 
9 According to Fassin, biopolitics is not a politics of life as life is elusive and only taken as a measure of a targeted 
population. A community of human beings, a population, is the real referent of biopolitics. He insists by stressing even 
Foucault leaves matters of life and death out of a proper analysis of political life, seeing population as a method of 
control as its real referent. Ibid., 46. 
10 Fassin D., ‘Another Politics of Life is Possible’, 54. 
11 Ibid., 57. 




issues of “life as such”.13 Nevertheless, inspired by Arendt’s idea that what characterises 
modernity is exactly the declining of the political and the raising of ‘natural’ life,14 this 
thesis commits to the idea that a biopolitical focus on forms of life is a crucial starting 
point for capturing interventions in society upon human lives in ways that are also de-
politicising. Missing this aspect, in fact, would mean admitting that the framing of the 
government of human beings and techniques and rationales of management are self-
explanatory. The fact that biopolitics reduce life to technologies of governing and these 
render some people worthy of only minimal interventions is not necessarily an analytical 
problem but an opportunity that allows us to openly contest the how (power-over) and 
turn attention to the what (power-to) of living.15 Once life is understood nor as a mean, 
as it is in biopolitical terms, it is possible to see life as politics that emerges from the 
ordinary, from what is necessarily political. In so doing, it is possible to cross a border 
between life as an object of governance and life as an object of lived life. To rethink 
biopolitical governance, that is concerned with capturing life by putting it in order and 
disallowing some people from engaging with it, what is needed is the re-politicization of 
politics in order to make life anew. The fact that biopolitical interventions take away 
politics functioning as a method for capturing ‘life’ and ordering it, in fact, provides us 
with an opportunity for resituating politics itself. Migrants lives can be reduced to mere 
survival, but this condition needs to be understood as always temporary and as always 
resisted: survival is not just about ensuring the continuum of what is kept alive through 
(b)ordering, but the recognition that those who are subjected to it, in this case migrants, 
struggle for a more fulfilling life and change the idea of politics within it. On this reading, 
politics becomes the search for new possibilities for living politically.  
 
13 Ibid., 46. 
14 See Arendt H. (1958) The Human Condition (Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, 1998). 
15 This idea of power-to draws on the work of John Holloway and it will be better addressed later in the chapter.  




In Life as Politics: How Ordinary People Change the Middle East, Asef Bayat 
looks at the ways in which every day social dynamics are altering society in the Middle 
East by focusing on what he calls practices of nonmovements.16 The concept of 
‘nonmovements’ explains well the idea that the agency of the dispossessed, whose 
constraints characterise the expression of their contentious politics, needs to be situated 
within their “quiet encroachment of the ordinary”.17 While Bayat writes in particular 
about the urban poor, the politics of the streets and the governance of urban life 
throughout cities in the Middle East, he also observes that:  
“This kind of spread-out and encroachment reflects in some way the nonmovements of the 
international illegal migrants. There exist now a massive border check, barriers, fences, walls, 
and police patrol. And yet they keep flooding— through the air, sea, road, hidden in back of 
trucks, trains, or simply on foot. They spread, expand, and grow in the cities of the global 
North; they settle, find jobs, acquire homes, form families, and struggle to get legal 
protection. They build communities, church or mosque groups, cultural collectives, and 
visibly flood the public spaces. As they feel safe and secure, they assert their physical, social 
and cultural presence in the host societies”.18  
 
 
The “encroachment” of ordinary people/migrants on ordinary life or (b)ordered 
conditions is real even if it is not organised in the traditional form of social movements, 
and, most importantly, it cannot be framed in terms of mere coping mechanisms. As such, 
Bayat argues that even the framing of  these encroachments as “survival strategies” fails 
to account for how these incremental acts do not only aim to further people’s claims but 
give life to powerful “nonmovements”.19 The poor or migrants might be framed as simply 
struggling to survive but, ultimately, this view is partial and biased as it does not reveal 
that the poor and, in my reading, the migrants are not just reducible to victims without 
agency.20 While a political rationale of survival attempts to reduce the politics of the 
dispossessed to coping strategies of existence, Bayat insists that it is the state as engine 
of forms of life that the poor or the migrants are actually rethinking and confronting. The 
 
16 Bayat A. (2009) Life as Politics: How Ordinary People Change the Middle East (Stanford: Stanford University 
Press).  
17 Ibid., 4. 
18 Ibid., 15. 
19 Ibid., 16. 




failure of biopolitical governance to bring the political within the governance of 
migration, as it views the political as synonymous with ways of managing lives, demands 
a renewed attention. Political (im)mobilisation that reduces life to mere survival can be 
reinvented once affirmative survival is seen to include a way of living politically. Life as 
politics, therefore, has no other imperative than making life the content of a politics that 
emerges through the politics of perseverance. Taking this further, we can say that life as 
politics starts with “the quiet encroachment [of] the silent, protracted and pervasive 
advancement of ordinary people” 21 or, indeed, migrants, who struggle to maintain a 
purpose in spite of their negative (b)orderings. This politics is not simply understood as 
a property of individual interaction but as a means to advance political life with a focus 
on the possible.    
 
“I am, therefore I Am”: The Politics of Perseverance 
In Changing the World Without Taking Power, John Holloway investigates the meaning 
of revolution today. Based on the premise that the antagonist nature of power is 
overlooked in contemporary life, he attempts to re-substantiate power-to that exists as a 
rebellion against power-over.22 As Holloway emphasises, “this is not a matter of power 
against power. The struggle to liberate power-to from power-over is the struggle for the 
reassertion of social flows of doing against its fragmentation and denial”.23 This struggle 
to liberate power-to functions as an anti-power and not as a counter-power. While 
counter-power works against ruling power, and actively reproduces power, anti-power 
aspires to recover the self-negation of doing. As Holloway eloquently explains, in fact, 
power-to exists only in the form of its negation: individual performances recognise the 
expression of the struggle for human emancipation that power negates.24 There are 
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22 Holloway J. (2002) Changing the World Without Taking Power (Pluto Press).  
23 Ibid., 16.  




categories of humanity that only exist through their disavowal. For this reason, Holloway 
argues, social science is unable to account for them due to the complexity of the forms of 
their denial.25 The emancipation of our potential, then, according to Holloway, regards 
struggling for asserting our existence and being recognised for this: 
 “there is a whole world of struggle that sometimes goes no further than saying ‘no’ […] but 
that often, in the course of saying no, develops forms of self-determination and articulates 
alternative conceptions of how the world should be”.26  
 
What Holloway calls “subversive invisible no”, struggles without a voice and a face, 
represent what is denied in the everyday. The ubiquity of these “no” are not immediate 
resistance in the sense that what Holloway calls “Scream” and “Doing” mostly open up 
possibilities for the visibility of denied sociality. To understand the power of anti-power 
means to attempt to re-articulate the politics of organisation and militancy in terms of a 
disembodied struggle for recognising what has been ‘rejected’. A positive reassertion of 
that which does not formally exist starts with ordinary ubiquitous oppositions. As a 
“cumulative breaking of linearity”, the fragmentation of our projects and our sociality can 
no longer be seen as inactivity.27 
Drawing on Holloway and his analysis of power-to as anti-power, therefore, it is 
possible to differently signify the continuous oppositions to our negation: while counter 
power-over is instrumental to reproductive power, power-to has a generative social 
purpose. By encompassing spectacles of power, “visible only insofar as they are 
considered to impinge upon power politics”,28 power can be actualised through its 
negation. In order to overt political possibilities of “doing”, Holloway sustains that we do 
not need to look exclusively at how power is taken and re-appropriated but how it flows 
where it is negated.29 “Screams” that are not immediately perceptible to political 
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hierarchies echo among socialities. If politics is also about the search for new possibilities 
of being, the politics of perseverance that migrants enact by continuously reconstituting 
and resisting their biopolitical (b)ordering play a part in rethinking not only what is not 
visible, but what has been othered - when not ‘rejected’ and dismissed. Attempting to 
understand how agency finds a space for itself through denial, does not mean to dismiss 
the coercive effects of control and caring over populations. The core argument is that 
assuming that survival speaks for itself is not enough: the subject of survival is 
(im)mobilised but also mobilises in-between. Borrowing from the German poet and 
dramatist Bertolt Brecht who argued that the fact that we do not see those who are in the 
dark30 does not mean that their absence should be taken for granted. Their politics of 
perseverance remind us not just of their existence, but also that the terms of their 
(b)ordering can be challenged. 
In this light, the politics of perseverance can be better understood once we posit 
reiterations at the centre of migrants’ struggles for asserting the making of life as politics 
out of unequal, violent and unjust biopolitical processes of (b)orderings. Politics today 
needs reiteration for the simple reason that its immobilising power is unwilling to 
acknowledge life as politics which emerges outside that of a method of containment. A 
life that reiterates itself is a life that strives to persevere in being by becoming something 
more and something else than what it is supposed to be, or in other (Des Pres’s words), a 
life engaged in ‘overcoming’. In this sense, without retaining its original meaning, 
borrowing from Descartes famous proposition “Cogito ergo sum” translated into English 
as “I think, therefore I am”, I would argue that the power of reiterations can be explained 
by a different semantic correlation: “I am, therefore I Am”. What seems to be a tautology 
is presented here as an antanaclasis. Antanaclasis is a rhetorical figure of speech where a 
 





key word is repeated but with a different meaning.31  In this sense, ‘I am,’ when reiterated 
the second time as ‘I Am’ acquires a new, deeper, and incremental meaning accounted 
for by its capitalization. Reiterating a more-than-survivalist-existence means to demand 
political recognition not just because some people are made to exist as such, but also in 
the name of our continuous re-articulations of life as politics. What we are is no longer 
what we could be once we attempt to cross thresholds of biopolitical (b)ordering such as 
those that see survival as a measure of life with death. Reiterating our incremental 
differences from what ‘I am’ to what ‘I Am’ means reaffirming that there are political 
needs that we can only account for if we wake up from our normalising political amnesia 
and embrace the notion of life as politics which emerges from the deficit of life as method.  
 
 
Borders and Migration: ‘Affirmative Survival’ in the Age of Organised Mobility 
 
People trying to cross frontiers in the search for better conditions of living invest their 
existence in looking for alternatives to the path of insecurities that has been given to them. 
This search entails the construction of different figures of migration. For instance, in our 
securitised life, as Hayter notes, “migration for economic betterment, rather than being 
considered, as it should be and as it was when Europeans did it, a sign of enterprise and 
courage, is now regarded as criminal and somehow shameful”.32 Their initial economic 
insecurity is seen as a result of a mediocre performance and, since individual performance 
is now the cornerstone of some sort of capability approach to security, also when in transit 
migrants are judged according to their individual capability to achieve security.33 As 
Bauman remarks, the risk of relying on a society that recognises first and foremost its 
 
31 Examples of antanaclasis are found in Shakespeare's writings where he uses this structure to convey double meanings 
by repeating the same word, with a different meaning, in a sentence. For instance, in Othello he writes: "put out the 
light, then put out the light" which has a double signification: in the first part Othello will put out the candle, in the 
second part he will end Desdemona's life”. See Post J. (ed.) (2013) The Oxford Handbook of Shakespeare Poetry 
(Oxford University Press).  
32 Hayter T., (2000) Open Borders: The Case Against Immigration Controls (London: Pluto Press 20014), 64. 
33 I am echoing here Amartya Sen’s idea of empowerment through human capabilities and freedom as being related to 





members through their capacity to perform has detrimental consequences as it further 
commodifies vulnerable subjects to the needs of the market.34 This is problematic in the 
sense that security becomes something one needs to prove to deserve and not something 
attached to shared responsibilities of states. Individual security needs to be achieved while 
collective insecurity is attached to migrants’ bodies and identities by securitised means 
of circulation. At the same time, the recognition of migrants as victims of circumstances 
is soon turned into migrants’ incapability to deal with their circumstances. 
Responsibilities are often shifted from the level of the state to that of individuals 
becoming the measure of their incapability to better survive. The dangers of such 
discourses are clear as they end up drawing a line between those who can provide for 
themselves and those who should be providing for themselves, making security the 
distinctive outcome of personal capabilities. These discourses that highlight individual 
performances for the sake of apportioning blame and reduce state responsibility are 
nonetheless imbricated in narratives which deny the migrants’ a collective political voice. 
A politics of perseverance which highlights migrants’ agency does not rest on notions of 
individual performance but on organised mobility which serves the purpose of re-
inventing alternatives to the state-centric limits of security. The ways in which migrants 
self-organise and establish alliances with citizens and aid organisations tell us something 
about how (b)orders are crossed, re-adjusted and experienced. More importantly, it forces 
us to politically confront biopolitical normative life and actively reinsert migration within 
a different framework of complex everyday negotiations. Some of these negotiations rely 
on the self-organisation of migrants in mobility. 
From this perspective, the move from self-reliance to self-organisation is made 
transitorily visible once we posit social connections, networks of support, and the 
projectuality of movement that migrants exhibit, at the core of new strategies of 
 




manoeuvre. Migrants’ decision-making and assessment of the dangers on their journey to 
EUrope, is now part of a wider system of networking that involves the search for safe 
routes, the collection of information about asylum procedures in different countries, the 
constant communication in social media networks and the re-articulation of 
circumstances in which they find themselves. The sharing of a network of instances 
becomes an opportunity for migrants to renegotiate their position across borders and 
routes. Physical borders are being displaced by migrants who create politics itself by 
encountering and collaborating with people who originate from different places. Once 
specific frames of reference are lost (such as the right of citizenship and the legal 
protection of a particular nation-state) new cultural categories are deployed that rely on 
the search for commons. By communicating across cultural barriers, self-organising 
reconstructions of meanings and identities, migrants themselves rearticulate their 
positions through journeys and multiple engagements with powers of (b)ordering. It is 
here that contingent practices of security are carried out that go beyond metaphors of lines 
and walls, and that, by default, disallow the border from limiting access to a dispersed 
site of interrogation of generative potential. Thinking migration as organised mobility, 
instead of a performing security of individual fate, helps us understand the strategic ways 
through which migrants engage in political acts by also escaping confrontations with the 
state. Organised mobility is not just mobility outside the law. More broadly, it is a project 
of “imperceptible politics” that reorganises insecurity of movement and reiterates needs, 
wants and emergent politics.35 Looking at social learning and self-organisation in ways 
that are conjectural, processual, and less deterministic means focusing on a different idea 
of agency so that even autonomy within survival can account for the many forms in which 
(b)ordering can be resisted. 
 
 




Autonomy of Migration: Excesses of Sociability in Motion 
 
The approach of the Autonomy of Migration (AoM) represents an important turn in 
Migration Studies. Autonomy of Migration refers to a series of ideas about migratory 
movements that shift attention from the practices of control of the State to the ways 
migrants experience mobility. Such experiences are no longer seen as mere responses to 
controlled mobility, but as a creative force to insert within and beyond structures of 
containment. As Papadopoulos and others remark, “migration is autonomous – meaning 
that – against a long history of social control over mobility, migration is and continues to 
be a constituent force in the formation of sovereignty”.36 Most importantly, the AoM’s 
approach rethinks the role that migrants play within border control dynamics, stressing 
the fact that their ‘illegalised’ condition does not represent a deterrent to their political 
engagements and movement. Migrants are not simply forced to respond to their situated 
vulnerability but are active constructors of their own reality. From this perspective, the 
agency of migrants is vital. The ‘excluded’ mostly act outside visibility and recognition, 
giving life to their politics of perseverance: “the AoM is a movement that is created and 
reproduced because of need and compels those who take part to create relationships based 
on deep interdependence. It is replicated over and over again and, in this repetition, 
creates a movement that expresses the freedom of movement”.37 This is consistent with 
the idea advanced earlier in this chapter of the importance of political reiterations for the 
legitimisation of the contemporary politics of the excluded. 
The mobility of people is prior to the possibility of political power to control it.38 
Such ontological primacy reshapes the debate about migration and refashions it by giving 
importance to the political re-constitution of limits that are always crossed. Based on a 
materialist-Marxist reading of history that sees the struggles for re-asserting uneven 
 






positions of power as structural to the composition of our reality, Boutang’s idea of 
autonomy is indebted to the efforts that ‘living labour’ make in their everyday struggles 
to regain power over themselves and their activities. From a discourse of autonomy, 
Boutang moves to a discourse of degrees of autonomy, in order to highlight the various 
forms of everyday resistance that are silenced because of the need of not allowing other 
stories to surface.39 Drawing on the tradition of operaism, struggles and invisible 
subversion are at the core of what Boutang considers in excess to the integrationist 
method of representative democracies. Within representation, refusal, escape, and dissent 
can only signify disagreement according to the citizens’ own role expectations. These 
normalised representations stabilise action within a framework of legibility, but do not 
allow us to see the power of the unqualified.  
From the perspective of the AoM, therefore, there is another reading of migration, 
excesses and migrants’ agency more broadly, a reading that we can only grasp once we 
abandon the idea that there is no space for mobility beyond the production and 
reproduction of capital. On the assumption that control is not a totalising mechanism of 
coercion, but the regulator of the “speed of absorption” of economic migrants for the 
neoliberal end of optimising the economy of mobile populations,40 we can see that such 
orderly institutionalisation of movement is not only the space and time of contemporary 
politics. For the purpose of understanding migrants’ mobility outside its state-centric 
capitalisation, we need to look into their differential inclusion within a system of 
citizenship control. This is suggested by Papadopoulos and others. As the authors notice, 
the tripartite relation of labour-mobility-security works under the distributive umbrella of 
citizenship, that is the only way through which there can be a relation between rights and 
 
39 See Moulier Boutang, Y. (1998) De l’esclavage au salariat. Economie historique du salariat bride (Paris: Presses 
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representation.41 Citizenship is a form of governing migration in the sense that it defines 
who is a subject of rights and who is entitled to have rights.42  
In line with this, it can be argued that the “right to have rights” invoked by Arendt 
is not simply dismissed by the function of citizenship or lack of thereof, but it represents 
a further assertion of what legitimises political action or a political life.43 The double-R 
axiom of rights and recognition is the starting point for understanding a modern polity, 
but, as every other starting point, its privileged position of analysis is one that is never 
exhaustive but one that needs to be reconciled with what can be called the function of 
non-citizenship.44 Because we operate in an integrationist system of politically 
convergent homogenisation, Papadopoulos and others question what happens to all of 
those who are mobile but cannot be incorporated within these logics of inclusion. In order 
to validate and recognise their constitutive role, the authors suggest that we need to give 
migrants’ mobility a centre stage: 
 “Migration is not primarily a movement that is defined and acts by making claims to 
institutional power. It rather means that the very movement itself becomes a political 
movement and a social movement”.45  
 
 
The social and subjective aspects of mobility ante control are recognised by the 
AoM. From this viewpoint, movement before control is not seen as movement without 
control. As Papadopoulos and Tsianos stress, migration is not romanticised as operating 
detached from control,46 the point is rather that mobility is not just reactive to it as “it 
creates new realities that allow migrants to exercise their own mobility against and 
 
41 Ibid., 181. 
42 Idem. 
43 Rancière J. (translated by Julie Rose) (1995) Dis-agreement. Politics and Philosophy (Minnesota/London – 
University of Minnesota Press, 1999). 
44 Papadopoulos D., Tsianos V. S., ‘After Citizenship’. 
45 Ibid., 184. 
46 From this perspective, the consequence of a politics of detention and deportation in the management of migration 
are not dismissed by the AoM. The AoM investigates the way through which mobility and movement are asserted not 
simply as a reaction to the assertion of control but as a ‘spirit’ of creating a different kind of politics outside what is 
usually framed as being the result of control. On the theme of deportation, detention and movement, see De Genova 





beyond existing control”.47 Such realities are experienced differently as they are inserted 
within a different logic than that of citizenship. While in the view of European societies 
migration is encouraged only if it can be institutionalised within a tripartition of inclusion 
(labour-mobility-security), Papadopoulos and others note that, by supporting rights and 
representation through citizenship, we end up restricting movement more as their 
complementary relationship of subtraction is reinforced. At the same time, because there 
cannot be rights and representation without citizenship, we need to make a different effort 
in order to see the politics of migrants that emerge outside this “integrationist polity”.48 
To achieve this, it is necessary to abandon the subject-form idea of political presence and 
look at the political and social practices that migrants put in place within their story of 
movement. More importantly, the authors remark, the creation of these “imperceptible 
politics” are made vital through ‘escape’. According to them, “movement has now 
become escape”, that is the subversive dis-identification from regimes of power control 
to the construction and dissent of everyday strategies of refusal.49 “Escape is about dissent 
and construction, it is not protest”,50 as it does not address institutional politics, while it 
creates its own intervals of meaning. Seen in this way, escape has a life of its own as it is 
incommensurable to what prevalent forms of politics entails. The predicament of 
resistance is then revisited here as a measure of unseen subversive acts that are already 
political beyond, and besides, being co-opted within a theoretical whole. The approach 
that Papadopoulos and others advance is extremely important for this thesis as it 
represents the key for understanding the kind of politics that emerge from considering a 
(b)ordered forms of survival as a condition to overcome.  
We can then identify another idea of excesses that complements the ones that serve 
for (b)ordering migrants. On the one hand, excesses are the biopolitical reduction that 
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mechanisms of control create for the securing of worthy life. According to this, excesses 
are the result of what biopolitical processes of (b)ordering deem as unproductive for the 
constant normalisation of governable life. This caesura determines who needs to be 
securitised and ‘humanised’ as ‘proper’ in a dynamic relationship where life is diminished 
and recovered at the same time. This idea of excesses as a biopolitical function has been 
discussed throughout the thesis. On the other hand, excesses are the result of an excess of 
sociability in motion, necessity and potentiality that people on the move exhibit not as a 
mere consequence of their biopolitical containment, but as an alternative way to 
experience their condition of exteriority to their given politics. The reason for this can be 
found in the fact that the crafting of excesses and the vital necessity to exceed are linked 
by movements that calls into question two different rationalities of security.  
While biopolitical mobility reduces life and focuses on the capacity to control it, 
the search for security alternatives for migrants expands possibilities of life. From 
reduction to expansion, excesses are both the pre-condition of biopolitics and that of 
subversive mobility. Nevertheless, it is only when we place excesses within a framework 
of mobility that we can better grasp the peculiarity of rethinking movement for the 
demands that migrants articulate. Such demands are what bridges the gap between the 
political and the apolitical. The fact that such demands are unfiltered, unheard, non-
confrontational or only partially taken into consideration by institutional politics does not 
mean that they are not there. A more complex view of migration demands us not only to 
look at the unseen as more than a product of the seen, but also to link “imperceptible 
politics” with security in ways that are convergent with migrants’ unfiltered demands and 
their ‘rejected’ politics of movement. In this view, modes of confronting survival are 




Even though the AoM’s approach has been mainly criticised for seeing movement 
before capital and control - while recognising their interdependence, -51 for ending up 
proposing a binary framing of control vs mobility,52 and for creating a big narrative on 
migration,53 these analyses allows us to clearly resituate excesses as form of resistance to 
the (b)ordering of migrants, and biopolitical life more in general. This demands us to look 
at the ways through which political confrontations are not simply avoided through escape 
and imperceptible resistances, but also to consider how the politics of perseverance 
expand political conditionalities. Movement is not the same in every situation as it is often 
part of (im)mobility of circulations. These inverse excesses cannot be simply inserted 
within a broader narrative of movement but need to be understood for their complex 
disorderly endeavours to generate a different kind of order from a constellation of 
relationships. The politics of perseverance is what gives transitory movement a voice. As 
already pointed out, this is not suggesting, as in this case, that migrants are simply reactive 
to control, but that survival as control and care is also rearticulated from within the 
emergence of migrants’ political endeavours. 
The consequences of seeing the search for security as a driver of movement means 
looking at the AoM from a more complex perspective. This perspective is here revisited 
in terms of what this search can do to political crossings. AoM recognises mobility ante 
control but it also links it with migrants’ excesses in sociability. The creation of 
alternative dynamisms to the juridical-ideologically fixed reality of univocal order 
represents a securitised responsibility to the problem of the production of a biopolitical 
body. The problem of security that biopolitics presents to the subjects of mobility, 
therefore, is the production of excesses as reduction. The problem of security that a more 
 
51 For a more exhaustive perspective of their different interdependence, see Mezzadra S., ‘The Gaze of Autonomy. 
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complex approach to the AoM exposes to the need of governance is excesses as 
expansive. As migrants’ quests for safety are also in excess to their excesses, in respect 
to their position within proper politics, it is against their degreed existence that the 
incommensurability of their humanity and their securitisation is being questioned. We are 
looking at a politics where the emergence of resistances to reduced modes of living that 
re-orient the injustice of circumstances of insecurity towards the lived experience of 
borders, is given centre stage. 
 
Moving from the Edges: Borders are Above All Lived 
 
In No Borders: The Politics of Immigration, Control and Resistance, Natasha King looks 
at how people on the move refuse borders. In particular, she focuses on the challenges 
that migration poses to the securitisation practices of the state revealing the ways through 
which people actively confront it. As King puts it, “in the act of moving without 
permission, or in actively contesting controls that limit their lives, people refuse the 
border and oppose the state at the moment”.54 The struggle for freedom of movement is 
the refusal of the border and the profoundly inscribed nature of division that it perpetuates 
within and among states. This struggle reflects moments of refusal that oppose the state 
both intentionally and unintentionally. Within this, borders’ production of ‘human 
illegality’, is not a deterrent for the mobility of people who practice their freedom of 
movement despite controls. Movement across territorial borders is the measure of what 
King calls a “no border politics”, that is the recognition of political acts of rejecting 
borders by crossing them.55 This refusal of borders, that is an opposition to the state, poses 
a dilemma as it is within the state that rights are demanded or guaranteed. Migrants need 
to appeal to the state to see their freedoms guaranteed, but they also challenge it by 
 





refusing the territorial limits set by its jurisdiction. This impasse is constitutive of a 
broader politics of refusal that is incidental to the contestation of a status quo by 
resistance.  
Within Social Movement Studies, resistance is predominantly theorised as a 
collective practice that engages with the power of the State. Resistance is contestation in 
the sense that it is mainly based on quests for re-appropriation from within a system of 
power dominated by the State.56 What happens outside this framing of contestation, King 
remarks, remains mostly unexplored as resistance remains thought as a force of dissent 
but not as a creative and destructive practice of negative freedom.57 Without discounting 
resistance as disputative exercise for questioning relationships of domination, the 
invisible acts of autonomy within migratory movements are now the actualisation of 
individual desires that bring into line migrants’ safety with their self-organising dynamics 
of creative security. Life within control is the everyday making of activities that represent 
the moments of the political. King suggests that autonomy is now the imminent 
constitution of present instances that rearticulate experience within the refusal of borders. 
The contents of “no borders politics” is oriented towards autonomy, but it also recognises 
the role that demands for rights play for those who are non-citizens. King stresses that the 
political dilemma of needing the state while attempting to remain independent from its 
control is somehow negotiated through a “no border politics” as the concatenation of 
moments of autonomy. What is not traditionally viewed as a practice of politics is now 
considered as such for the reason that keeping moving is already by itself a political 
statement.  
The difficulty of understanding border-crossings as a political assertion of a 
negative freedom lies in the fact that it forces us to look at the unintended effects of 
 
56 On the idea of social movements as re-appropriation of social relations relationships, see Melucci A. (ed. by Keane 
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unintentional acts pursued “by people who have no intention of behaving politically – 
and this makes it hard to think of it as political, if what we think of as political is 
intentional activity”.58 As the creation of alternatives ways of being to the dictates of the 
state, “no border politics” create reality through the transgression of limits set by borders. 
These alternative moments of autonomy exemplify how the edges of politics move within 
the ways politics is lived, as a re-bordered reality of transgressed significations. Seeing 
people on the move through their ability to produce different forms of existence based on 
“imperceptible politics” of necessity mediated by a “no border politics”, forces us to 
reflect upon the ways in which we can rethink (b)ordering as lived experience. 
Papadopoulos and others identify a second world that exists in the making where migrants 
organise their lives creatively, negotiating the negative effect of borders. As the authors 
state, a World 2 of migration and “mobile commons” is always in the making. This is 
“the world of transmigrants whether they are on the road, in a new country, or in a new 
neighbourhood, whether they are settled, clandestine, have refugee status, or are 
documented workers”.59 Drawing on Winner’s idea that organisation is the practice of 
producing alternative ontologies and ways of life,60 the organisational ontology of mobile 
commons relies on the ability to “cultivate, generate and regenerate the contents, practices 
and affects that facilitate the movements of mobile people”.61 More precisely, 
Papadopoulos and others isolate five precise contents that are at the core of these 
expansive commonalities: the invisible knowledge of mobility that keeps people on the 
move informed; an infrastructure of connectivity that supports their digital connections; 
a series of informal economies where services are offered and where production and 
 
58 Idem. 
59 Papadopoulos D., Tsianos V. S., ‘After Citizenship’. 
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reproduction could be exploitative; different forms of transnational communities of 
justice to rely on; a multiplicity of relations of mutual care and cooperation.62  
In these “fields of the everyday”, as the authors call them, the mobile commons 
become the form of political reality that migrants express as essential manifestation of 
what their search for security entails. The recognition of migrants’ political agency is 
taken on another level as the debate is fully re-oriented from resistance to their dispersed 
moments of creative necessity.63 Such moments are recognisable through different lens 
of temporary movement. As seen, the transitorily emergent structures of solidarity in 
Rome and Calais are key for understanding how life as politics is pursued against that of 
a method.64 Borders are a method through which we can think (b)ordering – from the 
privileged position of writing about them - but for the many who have to cross borders to 
then being (b)ordered otherwise, life is the potential of their politics. Such life aims to 
bring back meaning to what has been voided of political sense. The only way to see these 
excesses of sociability beyond their shaped existence is that of moving from the edges of 
politics to the core of their reinvention within a politics of necessity: ‘borders are above 
all lived’ through the refusal, crossing and desire for security of a different kind of 
contestation. As part of this contestation, the restitution of this politics to life, or better 
the restitution of life to this politics, is something that art aims to reorder. 
 
Borders and Art: Confronting Migration through Public Visual Art 
 
Borders as ‘lived’ boundaries, as we have seen, are constantly being negotiated by the 
many actors who cross them as conditions of life and death are assigned to these multiple 
edges. These negotiations continue on each side of borders where migrants persevere 
through strategies of resistance, visibility/invisibility, presence/absence, denunciation, 
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protesting and escape and, most importantly, reiterating their politics of necessity in 
alliance with networked solidarities. The “imperceptible politics” of migrants, however, 
are not only politicised in their possibility to be represented otherwise but are also part of 
a spectacle that makes possible the theatricality of borders on the ground. The ‘reality’ of 
migration in EUrope is increasingly characterised today by its spectacular representation 
that answers the need of populist politics, the construction of the migratory problem as a 
security issue and the protection of sovereignty and national identity. Facilitated by a 
massifying and statist language that promotes flows over individuals, migrants are often 
shown on overcrowded boats, in excess to the capacity of European nation states to host 
them, therefore reinforcing a myth of invasion and uncontrolled mobility within limited 
jurisdictions. The space of the Mediterranean Sea epitomises this well and it is in border 
zones in general (whether on land or sea) that the visibility of migration becomes a 
symbol and a deterrent for strategies that states put in place to showcase their authority, 
deter arrivals and exercise their politics of rescue. As De Genova has exhaustively argued, 
what happens at borders is often the result of spectacles of security staged for the 
exclusion or inclusion of migrant labour.65 Geopolitical borders, therefore, display 
features that are not only functional to delimiting territories but also aim at making 
manifest securitarian and humanitarian responses to migration at large.  
These responses are often influenced by representations of borders, migration and 
migrants that emerge from their depiction as images. Images are pictures and ideas that 
give form to what is being represented, qualifying their content as meaning. As Guy 
Debord has famously argued, images have supplanted genuine human interaction as a 
succession of spectacles is functioning as a frame of reference for understanding reality.66 
The relation between images and spectacles is one of irreducible co-dependence once 
 
65 De Genova N., “Spectacles of Migrant ‘Illegality’: the scene of exclusion, the obscene of inclusion”, Ethnic and 
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reality is simplified so that it can be made to exist as a medium for displaying visual 
performances. While in the language of the state these visual performances are always 
contradictory, working to allow the double focus of security and humanitarianism to be 
maintained, the language of art challenges different aspects of thinking about these 
boundaries. Politicians and certain groups often mobilise the spectacle to perpetuate 
ambiguous notions of legitimacy – where a saver protects the nation against the 
‘unwanted’, but also vulnerable individuals are rescued by it – and artists and activists 
defy these performances by presenting works of art that aim to decentre narratives about 
borders, migrants and (b)orderings more broadly. 
 Migrants are often univocally considered to be a security threat both to the 
qualified citizens and the order of the state of reception; otherwise, they are perceived as 
victims of their own circumstances in need of help, or even helpless. To counter this, a 
series of works of visual art – particularly art installations and murals – are making 
borders and (b)ordering visible within society by putting into question notions of inside 
and outside, life and death. Such representations raise social consciousness about 
alternative framings of migration but, most importantly, they have also the capacity to 
expose our own implications with seemingly distant (b)ordering practices and policies. 
As Jill Bennett has argued, by bridging the gap between diverging experiences, art acts 
as a medium in which the possibility of connecting is no longer a matter of immediate 
witnessing.67 As such, art mirrors politics enabling people to recognise not just the 
humanity of an ‘other’, which art re-addresses, but also exposes how the normalisation 
of contemporary migration policies precludes ways of rethinking the limits of 
(b)ordering.  
 
67 Bennett J. (2005) Empathic Vision: Affect, Trauma and Contemporary Art (Stanford University Press). On this 




Public visual art marks its presence in spaces that are inclusive, as they grow 
within ideas of commons and civic life,68 spaces that are in continuous change, appearing 
and disappearing, evolving into something different, transformative, and almost 
suspended in time. While we need to keep in mind as a starting point that access to public 
spaces is often unequal and ideas of neutrality need to be challenged as deceptive,69 public 
visual art represents a model of distributive art in which the outside is not only the space 
of museums or particular exhibitions.70 A broad definition of public visual art takes public 
space and visibility at the centre of visual representations of the social world that are not 
valued according to traditional artistic criteria per se, but in terms of their disruptive, 
creative and relational potential. The potential of public visual art resides in its ability to 
stimulate political imagination, opening up not just the space of the visible but also that 
of the unthinkable.71 Re-thinking entrenched boundaries, therefore, demands us to 
consider the uses of art as embodied interventions that aim to re-ground praxis of life. A 
wide range of street art interventions, murals, art installations, graffiti and so on, make up 
a new symbolic order where contestation takes the face of activism and resistance though 
artistic engagements. Art can oppose powerful and dominant representations of our social 
world in its political context but can also express alternatives to ways of thinking about 
politics. In their circular relation, “politics builds on art just as much as art is guided by 
political values and discourses”.72 Art is embedded in social and political life in ways that 
make us wonder what we believe boundaries are. These boundaries are those of nation-
states, of cities, of our neighbourhoods, of everyday life, of people, of our mind. The 
materiality of what is visually represented through art becomes a situated history 
mediated by images that grow in the manifestation of present boundaries.73  
 
68 Stavrides S. (2016) Common Space: The City as Commons (in Common) (Zed Books). 
69 Berry J. (2018) Art and (Bare) Life (Berlin: Sternberg Press), 284. 
70 Miles M. (1997) Art, space and the city: Public art and urban futures (London: Routledge). 
71 See Rancière J. Dissensus. On Politics and Aesthetics. 
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Aspects of thinking about public visual art are addressed by the emergence of 
creative contestations that are centred on activism. According to Groys, art activism is 
‘the ability of art to function as an arena and medium for political protest and social 
activism”.74 Central to this definition is the idea that art can change conditions of the real, 
and not just represent or re-represent political and social settings.75 While we should be 
careful when attaching a potential for systemic change to art activism, what seems rather 
interesting is the role that art plays in rethinking matters of the real beyond its dominant 
framings. Criticism towards the ‘aestheticization’ of political action has been raised, 
rooted in many discourses that emphasise how politics and spectacles are bounded to 
neutralise the reasons and effect of political actions.76 At the same time, it is argued that 
art can also function as a critique to its own totalising aestheticization once it is considered 
to be theoretically relevant to politics. Admitting that only total aestheticization exists, in 
fact, would mean to accept “that we see the current status quo as already dead, already 
abolished”.77 Far from this, art revitalizes possibilities for life as politics exactly because 
status quos need always to be challenged. From visual art to how we relate to it, the 
affective dimension of art understood as experience78 is said to expand life, posing 
problems that are never defined once and for all. Before considering the theatricality of 
walls and the political significance of mural art, it is important to reflect on how art and 
migration/borders, life/death, meet through art installations that engage with the more 
recent migratory movements in EUrope. 
Public installation art is a form of street art that involves the configuration of 
objects that are democratised in their capacity to be seen and, like murals, present a great 
potential for contingent visibility. These artistic forms of representation function as 
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counter-spectacles that connect us with the already hyper-visible struggles of state-
centric fabrication: they are counter-spectacularised examples of border-life. More 
importantly, art installations are designed not only to favour connections with the issues 
represented, but also to change the perception of space in which they are established. 
Their contingency as open-air art museums that inhabit temporarily, or more 
permanently, our neighbourhoods, cities and situated politics, serve to rethink violence 
and migrants’ struggles at physical borders in terms of a space continuum. “Borders are 
everywhere”79 so that alternative ways of resisting them are also made visible 
everywhere. This de-spatialization of borders, therefore, configures objects in spaces that 
are considered to be significative to the medium of art installations. 
 For instance, we can think of artist Ai Weiwei who brought migrants’ struggles 
to resist within two cities situated far away from the south of the Mediterranean Sea. By 
covering Berlin’s Konzerthaus in Life Jackets recovered from Lesbos,80 and placing 
twenty-two lifeboats on the façade of Palazzo Strozzi in Florence,81 Ai Weiwei de-
spatializes the politics of managing migration and their deadly declination within 
symbolic spaces of urban and everyday life. The striving of migrants to survive is here 
epitomised by these two objects, life jackets and lifeboats. What Ai Weiwei seems to 
denounce is then not simply the right of safe passage that migrants should have recognised 
but the very idea that this non-right has become a struggle for survival. While these 
installations can be seen as a tribute to the lives of refugees lost at sea,82 it is possible to 
recognise the intersection of life with death once we take a closer look at how these 
objects of survival function as mediums to life. It seems very difficult, in fact, not to note 
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how showcasing life jackets and lifeboats not only raises attention towards the drowned 
but also towards the rescued, the ones that are made to remain in excess. Recovered from 
the shores of EUrope, these objects used to emblematize death, also raise essential 
questions about the lack of security of people on the move and the way in which such 
lack is considered ‘normal’ in their struggle to survive in order to reach EUrope and the 
structural violence inherent in (b)ordering.  
Life Jackets, a lifeboat and items of clothing are the objects used by war artist Arabella 
Dorman who choose St. James’s Church in Piccadilly, London, as a set for her two-art 
installation works on the migrants’ journey and plight. In Flight (2015) (fig.37) the artist 
displays, hanging under the volt of the church, a rubber dinghy, almost capsized. This 
particular boat was recovered from the Greek Island of Lesbos where was used by sixty-
two people that arrived there from Turkey on a vessel with a capacity of about fifteen 
people. Next to the dinghy are three life jackets falling into the void, towards us.83 These 
orange life jackets are two adult-size and one child-size evoking the idea of a family, or 
in the context of a Church of England parish at Christmas, of the ‘Holy Family’ itself. 
The small life jacket seems to be falling further into the abyss while what appears to be 
his/her parents’ are just behind, about to follow. As Dorman puts it: 
“Installed over the Christmas period, the three lifejackets evoke the flight of the Holy Family 
to Egypt and ask the viewer to engage with the subject on both a metaphysical and physical 
level. The setting of the boat invites the viewer to embark upon their own spiritual journey, 
while a suspended interplay of light, form and shadows above the nave reflects the uncertain, 
rootless and volatile experience of life as a refugee”.84 
 
 
83  Dorman A., Flight. Available at: https://www.sjp.org.uk/flightvideocd.html [accessed 2 January 2020]. 





Figure 37. Flight by Arabella Dorman, St James’s Church, Piccadilly.85 
 
As Squire has argued, redeploying discarded objects and turning them into objects 
of art “forges connections or associations between different subjects-objects-
environments in ways that transform ‘people’ and ‘places’ through which they pass, as 
well as the various connections they forge”.86 An object of trash becomes an object of 
value.87 In this process of re-evaluation, these objects call into direct question the reasons 
for exposing migrants to struggles for survival when crossing borders. 
This is also explicit in Dorman’s following work linked to Flight, Suspended 
(2017) (fig.38), showcased in the same Church, where the artist seeks to address the 
materiality of suspended lives, that are those of many migrants stranded in cities and 
detention centres around EUrope. These lives exist suspended between the double-axiom 
of a past and a future that seems to be equally compromised. This art installation 
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comprises hundreds of items of clothes that have been discarded by the many migrants 
who arrived at the island of Lesbos.88 These clothes are suspended from the vault of the 
Church, where lights brighten and darken up the space, making visibility fluid, and 
demanding the viewer to contemplate the fragmented experiences of migrants though 
their multi-coloured clothes hanged in multiple sizes.  
 
 
Figure 38. Suspended by Arabella Dorman, St James’s Church, Piccadilly.89 
 
Dorman’s Flight and Suspended, and Ai Weiwei’s life jackets and lifeboat art 
installations, use real objects, recovered from real life experiences of migrants that 
symbolise what remains of their stories, of themselves, so that they can be imagined as 
acts of ‘being-with’ beyond individual survival.90 These belongings are not just preserved, 
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they are re-purposed so that people can be transformed through things.91 The theatricality 
of these installations also bring to the fore problems of representation when real life 
objects are staged as means of other possible significations. In particular, art helps us to 
reveal what can be considered to be the paradoxical uses of these objects not just because 
they are displaced in installation works as means of art, but also because alternative 
significations are extrapolated through spectacle.  
Christoph Büchel’s controversial art project Barca Nostra (Our Boat) has raised 
the question of art as a spectacularised form of disaster or criticism regarding the uses of 
‘tragedy’ for the manifestation of empathy.92. Here the wreck of a boat on which about 
eight-hundred people died in the Mediterranean on the night of 18 April 2015 went on 
display on the occasion of the Venice Biennale art festival in May 2019.  The boat, which 
was in fact a coffin for hundreds of people whose bodies were later recovered by the 
Italian navy93, was lifted from the Mediterranean Sea after a decision of the former Italian 
Prime Minister Matteo Renzi who vowed to give the victims a proper burial.94 This effort 
echoed the initiative promoted two years before by the former Italian Prime Minister 
Enrico Letta who in the aftermath of a shipwreck near Lampedusa in October 2013 
declared: “The hundreds who lost their lives off Lampedusa yesterday are Italian citizens 
of today”.95 If Matteo Renzi put the emphasis on giving dignity to migrants who died by 
recovering their bodies and giving them appropriate burial, Enrico Letta’s proposal to 
grant them posthumous Italian citizenship further reinforces the idea of how the value of 
certain lives can be re-articulated as deserving humans only after their death is 
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ascertained. With this in mind, and instead of reducing this art installation to a univocal 
meaning, Barca Nostra calls into direct question the public spectacle in which the 
governance of migration is taking place by performing a counter-spectacle. Becoming 
entrenched to art, counter-spectacles allow for a different kind of political denunciation, 
one that unleashes other possible significations about those events instead of keeping 
them trapped exclusively within state-centric narratives. At the same time, the very title, 
Barca Nostra (our boat) de-territorializes the border and practises of (b)ordering by 
implicating viewers into the technologies of power. 
The boat of Barca Nostra, life jackets, lifeboats, and items of clothing retrieved 
from the shores of EUrope, might be exploited by spectacles but their significance cannot 
be reduced to their framing as spectacles. As migrants are often made to remain 
institutionally (in)visible and in excess within the borders of European nation-states, art 
as counter-spectacles intervenes to make violent policies and practices of (b)ordering 
known through the radicality of these objects.96 These are objects of life and death, 
struggle and survival. The materiality of these objects intersects with more abstract 
conceptions of what is human life and what are the contents of security: ‘their’ humanity, 
‘our’ Humanity; ‘their’ safety, ‘our’ Security. Art creates a continuum that interrupts 
univocal significations of matters of life and death, empathy and responsibility, by turning 
vision into imagination. Migrants’ belongings and objects of crossing do not serve to hide 
the figure of the migrant, but they are the counter-spectacularised elements that allow 
people on the move to be seen, imagined, understood, recognized.  
In the process of rethinking biopolitical borders, art calls out not just human 
suffering and/or politically denounces the structural violence of borders but helps us 
intensify thought about borders, their management and policing, and the implication of 
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society at large in these processes. Art, bringing to the fore objects of crossing that are 
necessary for those whose mobility is bordered, for those who have to live with death, 
invites us to reflect upon the fact that survival is a politicised issue. These objects remain, 
further calling into question survival as a mean to life. This contestation often extend 
through walls where artistic depictions painted on them openly challenge the violence of 
borders and which are located within the boundaries of our everyday lives. Before looking 
at how art meets walls through murals, we need to consider the biopolitical function and 
sovereign fiction of walls and question their theatricality as borders. This disjunction of 
walls from material borders to walls as murals helps us confront ways of thinking about 
borders that are both symbolic and ‘objective’.  
 
 
Theatrical Boundaries: Borders as Walls 
 
Anti-immigrant infrastructures are on the rise in EUrope. According to a report published 
by the Centre Delas and the Transnational Institute, since the 1990s about 1000 km of 
walls have been constructed to protect European borders.97 The ways in which the 
European Union and its member states have militarised borders, by also securitising and 
differently humanising people in their migratory passages, concur to turn space and 
human mobility into a matter of (b)ordering. The political commitment to walling in 
EUrope answers the need to fortify territory in order to deal with two parallel crises: 
security and migration.98 From the fences of Ceuta and Melilla in the Moroccan-Spanish 
border built at the end of the 1990s, to our contemporary times, walls have become a 
consolidated reality in the fabric of border-making. In 2017, it was possible to count 
fifteen walls built by European states to deal with migratory flows.99 These physical walls 
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came to complement more established virtual or digital(ised) walls.100 As symbolic and 
material manifestations of political boundaries, walls are historically contingent 
infrastructures.101 If today we live in a world of walls, in fact, this is because different 
motivations have been provided throughout history for their necessity. Jones identifies 
three main reasons that underpin wall construction: 
 “establishing sovereignty over ungoverned or unruly lands; protecting the wealth of the state 
and population; and protecting cultural practices within the state from the possible influence 
of other value systems possessed by immigrants”.102 
 
 
The desire to establish walls is then grounded in their capacity to mark differences 
that need to be first of all materialized.103 The abstract idea of sovereignty finds its raison 
d'être in the convenience of borders that can be fixed. Walls aim to fix space in time and, 
in the broader sense, the border wall works as a concept, meaning “a political divider that 
comprises complex technologies, control methods, legislative provisions and securing the 
border discourse”.104 Walls then are not just understood as physical barriers, but they are 
also gateways, punctuated by checkpoints that are modulated by states to control 
movement.105 In the construction of walled in and out identities, borders are transmuting 
into regimes of (b)ordering that provide indirect evidence that movement cannot be 
stopped, but that the identity of those ‘inside’ the walls needs to be preserved regardless 
of this. Walls as security barriers function as sociotechnical devices where the referent of 
control is not just the territory as in the geopolitics of security, but the productive mobility 
of people.106  
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Mobility as circulation reconceptualises security barriers so that flows can be 
managed. Ballif and Rosière talk of “teichopolitics” as the politics of building barriers on 
borders for numerous security purposes.107 Teichopolitics, as biopolitics of walls, is 
primarily concerned with controlling migration so that privilege can be protected, and 
undesirable movements can be prevented.108  While there are different typologies of 
border barriers, and these cannot be reduced to walls or fences, they are the most common 
and visible infrastructures of containment.109 Containment is about “selectively 
differentiating”110 between good and bad flows so that barriers can direct how and when 
borders should materially stay open or closed. As Pallister-Wilkins has eloquently argued, 
“barriers are not simply concerned with prescribing, securing and administering the intra 
muros […] but with governing movement across them”.111 Far from structuring space 
alone, Pallister-Wilkins continues, security barriers constitute an “environment of life” 
by working with expanding circulation.112 Walls and fences as security barriers are 
analytic devices that serve the purpose of interrupting movement and capturing data.113 
They also function to extend the potential of borders as it is in the case of considering 
walls as theatrical devices which project ‘security.’  
As Amoore and Hall have argued, borders share key qualities with theatre. Borders 
display their theatricality by performing rituals of control, regulation and differentiation 
where the staging of spectacle ensures their securability.114 But the border is not simply 
“like the theatre”, functioning to give pretence to characters, places and stories.115 At the 
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border, a particular kind of space comes into being, producing a political stage that 
appears to be theatrical. It is here that appearance is produced as a way of making both 
borders and border crossers involved in sequences of identification.116 Rituals that are 
performed at borders, as in theatre, form these sequences that serve to make a series of 
categories recognisable.117 Because of these rituals, that originate for the materialization 
of the encounter between borders and people, crossings are also symbolic. Within these 
border performances, the existence of walls is predicated upon the necessity to make these 
rituals governable. Walls are theatrical as they pretend to border, making acceptable their 
existence tout court. As Wendy Brown has highlighted in Walled States, Waning 
Sovereignty, the progressive erosion of nation state sovereignty has been followed by 
global wall building where the protection of territory is staged for purpose of 
containment.118 In a “post-Westphalian order”, where nation-states’ sovereignty is being 
eroded by global political relations, Brown argues that “the new nation-state walls are 
iconographic of this predicament of state power”.119 Despite their dominant material 
presence and dimension, the new walls of globalization often function theatrically, 
projecting power that states cannot exercise so that their performance often comes to 
contradict the production of sovereignty.120  
Walls purport to stage the image of a sovereign state that is disappearing, so that 
their theatricalized and spectacularized presence realigns “sovereign impotence”.121 
Thus, new walls project ideas of containment and security, making coincide sovereignty, 
as a border concept, with borders as sovereign reality. As Brown explains, this is what 
makes walls relevant in today’s world as even though they “bear the irony of being mute, 
material and prosaic, [they are also] potentially generative of theological awe largely 
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unrelated to their quotidian functions or failures”.122 It is the desire for walls that wishes 
for power so that the fiction of state sovereignty can be maintained. Shifting attention 
from the politics of walls as devices for governing circulation to their theatricalization, 
Brown reminds us that walls cannot simply be regarded as tools of policing but also as 
the extension of neoliberal capitalism.123 By providing a sense of order that is first of all 
staged, security as movement, and economy as circulation, intertwine to facilitate the 
liminality between new ways of (b)ordering and re-(b)ordering.  
Drawing on Peter Andreas’ work on the USA – Mexico border, Brown stresses the 
fact that the political relevance of walling today consists in their capacity to perform the 
image of the border so that this can be thought to exist as integral to state sovereignty.124 
Border walls act as a “theological reminder” that only certain people and nations can be 
‘protected’, but not others. Walls articulate security as protection.125 “Fantasies of 
impermeability”, as Brown calls them, materialise through new walls understood as 
visual signifiers that exceed human power and state sovereignty.126 The porosity of walls 
is regulated through an imaginary that produces at the same time ideas of safety and 
unsafety, so that walls open and close by modulating sovereign protection. What walls 
mediate is the illusion that political power can protect because of the materiality of 
barriers - and can keep people and territories safe. The sum of these ideas enriches 
imagination, but at the same time restricts it by guiding our thinking about walls as sites 
of “pure interdiction”.127 Far from this, and moving away from borders as walls to walls 
as counter-spectacles of (b)ordering, border walls need to be confronted with strategies 
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of resistance that can artistically tear it down.128 As such, we are no longer at borders, 
strictly speaking, but we are thinking about walls with borders as (b)ordering in order to 
gain a different understanding of the many relations that they can mark.  
Thinking theoretically with borders through walls means addressing the question 
of how walls can exceed their intended effects.129 This demands us not only to question 
what walls do or how they work, but also to reflect on what a different rethinking of walls 
can do to interrupt wider constructions about borders. Far from being the expression of a 
rational security policy, the walls of (protest) murals that populate our everyday life 
intersect with political border-lines that are the measure of processes of (b)ordering life 
with death that are assigned to some. Certainly, these walls are different from the ones 
that we find at the edges of nation states. Keeping in mind the theatricality of their 
imaginary at borders, walls are not just the expression of anxieties of less sovereign states, 
they are also the visual construction of politically and spatially contested trajectories of 
merged and ubiquitous (b)ordering projects. The limits of borders (as walls) are exposed 
by forms of artistic re-(b)orderings where disjunction from sovereign imperatives of 
walling becomes a form of collective reflection about the unequal, violent and arbitrary 
effects of borders. 
 
Walls as counter-spectacles of (b)ordering: the activism of murals 
 
As already seen, walls as territorialised and sociotechnical devices proliferate worldwide. 
In EUrope, the “Schengen Wall”130 continues to extend, institutionalising power spatially 
and symbolically. The complex social life of walls, however, is not simply reducible to 
the political and moral organisation of the European Union through the fortification of its 
edges. If we are to understand how migrants’ struggles –in their different articulations- 
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can come into being on walls, we need to look at them by recognising their engagements 
with political debates and political resistance.131 This means shifting attention from 
borders as walls to walls as counter-spectacles of (b)ordering. The possibility to visually 
gaze anew, as Amoore and Hall observe, does not grow out only from the possibility of 
being proximal to an object/subject of reflection.132 What we should appreciate is the 
possibility of artistically intervening in debates so as to arrest the smooth-running 
sequences of borders, wherever their effects might be felt.133 As such, the more 
comfortable reality of borders in our daily life is confronted with walls as sites of artistic 
intervention. The violence of their ritualised existence is transfigured once our 
perspective on walls takes us away from thinking about how they protect and segregate 
at borders,134 to how they can impact upon the imminent dimension of life through 
dispersed murals.  
Ingrained in the rhythm of the urban space, from cities to towns, from symbolic 
places to everyday public life, murals do not display power per se but merge (b)ordering 
with walls so that the effects of ‘objective’ borders can be visualised on their surfaces. In 
the previous chapters I considered the institutional, and not, uses of visibility to regulate 
and strategize migrants’ movement. Murals are not understood here as something that can 
only be seen or be visible as such, but as a visual opportunity to readapt “lines of sight” 
about migration and borders more broadly. As Amoore has eloquently shown, specific 
modes of visualization are always at work in contemporary border security so that 
“unknown features” can be pre-identified.135 Attention here becomes a tool for governing 
and pre-constituting both migrants and borders. At the same time, Amoore argues for the 
possibility that art possesses to mobilise a different kind of attentiveness to the one 
 
131 Callahan W., ‘The politics of walls’, 9. 
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already present within the space of (b)ordering aimed at surveillance and control. It is 
always possible to alter visuals of the border and refocus attentiveness to trigger “a 
revised reflection on how we live and how we wish to live”.136  
Borders as walls as rituals, therefore, become objects of artistic interventions that 
far from providing solutions about political questions, deploy artistic vision with the aim 
of interrogating, through interruptions, the ways in which we inhabit the world.137 These 
interruptions make securability uncertain so that certainty about state-centric 
representations of borders and migrants can be challenged.138 Paradoxically, it is 
uncertainty that becomes valuable for giving meaning to the possibility of understanding 
how art can interrupt the univocal function of walls. Walls that divide reproduce the 
border as a political artefact; walls that unite interrupt the border through political 
artefacts.139 From walls as markers of boundaries to their affective capacity to articulate 
interruptions that are artistic in vision, murals exist by addressing public imaginaries of 
(b)ordering. Walls as devices for governing circulations, as already considered, are 
material but also theatrical as they perform the border. On the assumption that the border 
is becoming the migrant body itself,140 the politics of walling reorganise how (b)ordering 
practices are meant to work in ways that affect migrants’ bodies and lives.141 Rethought 
along these lines, murals change the appearance of a surface that can be visualised without 
asking for permission, touching aspects of migrants’ life so that a form of surface 
justice142 can be located in our political landscapes. By situating artistic interruptions 
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within the interstices of (b)ordering, murals implicate us in the process of rethinking 
discourses and practices about borders. 
Even though the visual art of Muralism is not widely spread within the European 
space, as it is in other parts of the world starting from Mexico where it originated at the 
beginning of the twentieth century, it represent a great opportunity for rethinking our 
embeddedness with migration, rewriting ideas of belonging and justice. Artists such as 
Bansky, MTO, Massimo Mion and BLU, among others, have engaged directly with the 
ongoing management of migration and borders in EUrope by creating murals that deal 
with displacement, struggles, political disqualifications and deaths at sea. In Calais, one 
of the most controversial (b)ordering areas in EUrope, Bansky painted three murals 
addressing the treatment of migrants and refugees. The first one represented Steve Job, 
the late chairman and co-founder of Apple, as a Syrian refugee carrying on his back a 
rucksack typical of migrants but also a prototype of an Apple computer in his right hand 
because his biological father was born in Homs, Syria.143 The second mural was a version 
of the French painter Theodore Gericault’s oil Raft of the Medusa (1818-19) where the 
famous 1816 shipwreck of the titular frigate implicated in colonial expansion is 
remobilised to feature a boat carrying refugees 144 -- in both cases a boat (a rescue boat in 
Gericault’s case and a cruiser in Bansky’s) passes by but does not rescue the shipwrecked 
in a way that highlights the work’s title which appeared on Bansky’s website: We’re not 
in the same boat. In the third one we are confronted with the image of a child with a 
telescope pointing to the shores of Dover with a small suitcase at her feet. 145 Hovering 
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over the child and telescope is a black vulture signposting the different forces that 
profiteer from the migrants’ predicament.  
Bansky has also brought the border and the effects of (b)ordering right in the heart 
of London with a mural that highlights how the border between France and the UK is 
cross-managed and both governments are responsible for the police violence and hostile 
environment migrants are exposed to. The mutual responsibilities of France and the UK 
in perpetuating border violence in Calais have been highlighted in a mural he painted 
outside the French embassy in London where the young Cosette from Les Misérables is 
crying because she is engulfed in a cloud of tear gas. The mural, that featured a scannable 
QR code linked to a YouTube video in which it was possible to witness the police tear 
gassing migrants in the former camp called the ‘Jungle’: mural and video, therefore,  
served the purpose of bringing the border practices of both governments within the shared 
political jurisdiction and influence of France and the UK.146 Even though these murals 
are now somehow out of sight as they have either been painted over, damaged, or 
subjected to weather, the broader implications of their absence are still valid.  
In Massimo Mion’s European Programme for Migration147 (fig.39), located in 
Venice where the artists lives and works, a child plays battleship and in so doing forges 
a powerful analogy with the ways in which politicians decide who lives or die by offering 
or withdrawing rescue and treat people as numbers and quotas to be shared among 
member states; by invoking a game, moreover, the mural also denounces the absence of 
a substantial, shared, and well-conceived strategy to address migration.  
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Figure 39. European Programme for Migration by Massimo Mion, Venice 2015. 
 
 
Figure 40. The Mediterranean Door by MTO.148 
 
The French artist MTO’s The Mediterranean Door (fig.40) and The Mediterranean 
Tunnel (fig.41) are murals which deal directly with the plight of migrants’ risky journeys 
in search of safety and remind us of how movement is unequally managed and repressed 
within and beyond the borders of the EU. In particular, MTO’s murals are a sequenced 
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representation of the challenges that migrants experience in order to reach EUrope. In 
The Mediterranean Door (fig.40), the French artist depicts a migrant trapped into a 
tunnel, attempting to push the wall up in order to emerge to the surface. Painted 
horizontally, this mural, completed for the Malta Street Art Festival at Sliema’s sea front 
in 2014, makes the border appear as a layer. The migrant at the bottom of it appears to be 
stranded between two worlds, and his is the hardest to visualise. He struggles to survive 
while life beyond it flourishes, capturing well the idea that (im)mobility is never 
accidental to the determinism of borders. Here, the mural provides a double image of a 
wall, performing both as a mural and as a border which is also a ladder that neatly divides 
the underground from the surface of the wall. The door here is not just the Mediterranean 
per se, as a space in which migrants are made rescuable or un-rescuable, but also the 
borders of the European Union more broadly.  
 
Figure 41. The Mediterranean Tunnel by MTO.149 
 
149 MTO, The Mediterranean Tunnel. Available at: https://twistedsifter.com/2015/08/the-mediterranean-tunnel-by-





The same migrant is the subject of MTO’s The Mediterranean Tunnel (fig.41) painted in 
2015. This is a two-part mural that represents the Mediterranean as a tunnel, this time 
highlighting not the forced spatial (im)mobility of migrants but their difficult crossing 
from Sliema, Malta, to Sapri, Italy. In the first mural painted in Malta we see a migrant 
entering a walled tunnel, while in the second mural the same migrant exits it in the south 
of Italy. In both cases, we can see only half of the migrant’s body, to symbolise his 
transitory status, cut in two by borders that trap as much as they connect. The rift mask 
on the migrant’s forehead, like lifejackets and lifeboats in other works we have previously 
analysed, appears to be an item of survival but it also evokes the sea which does not 
appear in the mural (as it was the case also for The Mediterranean Door) allowing MTO 
to broaden the subject of his work to comprise land and sea migration and border crossing. 
The figure of the migrant that MTO represents is one who struggles to survive from the 
space of the Mediterranean to land. Focusing on the hyper-spectacularised idea of the sea 
as an unsafe path, these two murals do not only engage with the present but also raise the 
question of what happens to migrants once their (im)mobility in islands, in this case 
Malta, extends after borders are crossed, with their arrival to mainland Italy. We can see 
then how these murals reproduce not borders as borders, but borders as counter-
spectacles of (b)ordering that are converted into thinking about the violent effects of these 
boundaries.  
By openly defying their regime of normalisation through interruptions, mural art 
intervenes in morphing our imaginaries of borders. The Italian street artist Blu represents 
the borders of the EUropean Union as a circle with barbed wire that come to replace the 
stars of the EU flag (fig.42). Outside a fortified Europe, in a blue field, are a float of 
undistinguishable people who are trying to enter the European territory. Painted in 2012 




Spanish city of Melilla, that is geographically in Africa and politically in EUrope, this 
mural represents a perfect example of the interstitial intervention of art. 
 
Figure 42. Blu’s mural in Melilla, Spain 150 
 
 
The mural, in fact, occupies this space between two places, namely Africa and EUrope, 
highlighting how (im)mobility is maintained in the area and the dangers that many 
migrants face while gathering across this border. The many people that surround the 
territorial space outside the borders of the EU are already inside its space of control even 
outside the fences of the enclave of Melilla. This mural does not only denounce the 
violence of EU borders and their perpetual fortified design. It also forces us to look at the 
circularity of European internal borders depicted as empty in the inside - there is not ‘us’, 
there is only ‘them’: our moral engagements with the ways in which we design our 
security and justify distant hierarchies of suffering is therefore made manifest.  
The affective capacity of these works to impact our imagination, interrupt and raise 
awareness about our own entanglements with borders and (b)ordering processes and 
 





highlight how our distraction,151 allows the suffering and (b)ordering of others while our 
re-focalization on the problem through art makes available the possibility of “re-pos[ing] 
the problems life poses itself”.152 As Massumi observes, aesthetic politics extend the 
range of affective potential, immediately connecting us with political aspects of life.153 
Affect, understood as “the power to affect and being affected”,154 intensifies thinking in 
the sense that life is no longer just about ‘us’ but  as ‘us’ with ‘others’: “with intensified 
affect comes a stronger sense of embeddedness in a larger field of life”.155 Affect then is 
about the passing of a threshold, the crossing of a border, where a different notion of care 
can emerge. We start caring for a larger idea of life so that we can affirm it for ourselves 
and others.  
‘Affirmative’ migration in this chapter is linked to the politics of perseverance that 
migrants practice so that their life can be reiterated through their resistances, struggles, 
escapes, mobile commons and so on. Along these lines, the affective politics that arise 
through art interrupt the flow of imposed significations that qualify borders, migrants and 
our role in it so that biopolitical life can be first questioned and then resisted. What is 
interrupted with art is no longer only a form of normalisation but also a form of 
disconnection where the intersubjective element of affect is stripped away from our 
relations with borders. These relations, in fact, reduce life, constructing borders as a 
matter of survival and the migrant that crosses them as surviving a life that has yet to be 
fully there. These artists’ efforts to challenge (b)ordering through art translates into ways 
of challenging the dichotomy of victim/criminal which frames discourses on the migrants 
in order to reveal that instead of (alleged) victims or criminals there are beings who 
painstakingly ‘affirm’ living. As Mazzara’s engagement with art and borders has shown, 
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this “aesthetic of subversion” offers a new narrative about the migratory experience156  
and allows life as politics to emerge and find a voice in these acts of subversion. To regain 
political responsibility towards our connections, and re-claim our disconnections, might 
be useful to think of ourselves as what Rothberg refers to as “implicated subjects”.157 
Rothberg argues that we need to think at how our interconnections shape injustices by 
acknowledging our own implications with specific histories and present circumstances. 
We do not need to be direct agents of harm in order to recognise that the ways in which 
we inhabit the world generate inequalities that we need to confront because we are 
implicated in them. As Agamben has suggested, it is only when “the citizen has been able 
to recognize the refugee that he or she is – only in such a world is the political survival 
of humankind today thinkable”.158 Art intersects these dynamics challenging the 
normative construction of life within biopower, biology and politics,159 where some 
deserve to survive while others deserve to live. As Berry puts it:  
“Art’s ongoing attempt to distribute aiesthesis, or sensuous perception, away from the 
omnipotent control of the author provides an essential resource of resistance to biopower and 
its attempted collapse of life’s infinite interrelationships into propertied individualism. In this 
respect, if art is unable to change life in any socially totalistic sense, it is constantly 
challenging the experience of what it means to be (captured as) living beings, within a living 
world. By experimenting with forms and relations of life outside the norms of biopower, the 
best art resists power over life by redistributing our sensuous, conceptual and aesthetic 






As the politics of control need to be situated within those of resistance, I have considered 
a multiplicity of engagements that migrants and artists establish with life as their politics. 
Life with death understood in biopolitical terms aims to reduce possibilities for migrants’ 
to radically engage with their political conditions of survival. Life as politics transcends 
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this (b)ordering re-ontologising life as a matter of “ordinary encroachments” of life with 
politics. In this chapter, these engagements of life with politics have been considered by 
positing life not as a pre-given ontological category, but as an emerging value whose 
content is fulfilled by the migrants’ possibility of being and acting politically. Therefore, 
by focusing on borders and survival, borders and migration, and borders and art from a 
different perspective from crossing, it has been possible to ground life as politics. The 
ways in which we can think of life as politics are highly indebted to the act of rethinking 
processes of (b)ordering that helps us not only to highlight how the state only promotes 
basic survival but also to show the migrants’ persevering forms of political engagements. 
Making visible the (im)mobilising rationale of (b)ordering becomes an act of political 
























Figure 43. “Indifference and apathy are parasitism, perversion, not life. That is why I hate the indifferent", 




To survive, to continue to exist after death, means to outlive life. Survival can be seen 
positively as a reference to what remains alive in spite of dire circumstances that have 
been overcome. This idea of survival has been rewritten in the thesis in order to account 
for ways of governing life with death where causing migrants to just survive has been 




particular rationale for governing migration that gives those who need to be governed 
very little space for manoeuvre. Rather than focusing on the governance of life in death 
(a life shadowed only by death),  I have attempted to focus on forms of survival 
understood as a process where both life and death are maintained as possible but I have 
also looked at survival as affirmation, a process through which those who should be 
managed through (b)ordering, rearticulate their own position by crossing geographical, 
legal and rhetorical borders.  
 The intertwining of survival, (b)ordering and migration has been explored in the 
thesis with the aim of rethinking relations between people on the move and borders. The 
(b)ordering of migrants is consistent with logics of survival where life is considered to be 
disposable but also only minimally recoverable. This double focus is sustained by 
articulating migration, and constructing the figure of the migrant, as a life that is a risk 
and at risk. Sophisticated ways of (b)ordering migrants now range from the virtualisation 
of their identity, the linking of politics of rescue to those of reception, the assertion of 
forms of policed humanitarianism where calculated tolerance and exhaustion have 
become two faces of the same coin. Most importantly, survivability is a condition that 
aims to (im)mobilise the political potential of migrants who, however, are able to resist 
and persevere in their search for a more fulfilling life and whose struggles to become 
visible and make political demands are supported by committed activist aid workers and 
artists: as a matter of fact, while the thesis has considered the governance of life with 
death, it has also engaged with migration as a relation with (b)ordering that repurposes 
life as politics.  
In this work, I approached theory and fieldwork as a ‘living inquiry’ where the 
possibility of intensifying thinking becomes the goal of my research process. In particular, 
by openly challenging conventional constructs of social research, I have explored 




the nuances of these theories with others, in order to open up new experiential spaces. It 
is within the interstices of these spaces that my research questions developed. Elements 
of this approach include refocusing on ‘living theory’ as my research methodology which 
also accounts for ‘discoveries’ and ‘encounters’ which happened in Rome and Calais. 
Visual representations as methods for enlarging my expressive capacity to engage with 
migration and borders have also played a key role in the thesis.  
In chapter one of the thesis I theoretically situated survival as a specification of 
(b)ordering processes where life and death are made to coexist as a biopolitical form of 
mere survival, but I have also considered how these processes deepen into more general 
ideas of what matters for ‘security’ and articulations of the ‘human’ within it. These 
processes (b)order migrants’ bodies but also delimit possibilities of politically engaged 
life. By exploring the work of Agamben and Mbembe, this discussion has been 
complemented by a reading of survival as a (b)ordering project where the limits of 
qualifying life and death for the subjects of migration are never fully transcended. In 
chapter two, I introduced the themes of borders – mobile, virtual and polysemic – and 
figures of migration, and how their construction is predicated upon a politics of excesses 
that contributes to the making of uneven mobility in EUrope. The negative borders of the 
EU function to include and exclude migrants so that their lives can be inserted within 
circulations that capture, disperse and marginalise the political value of their lives. From 
camps as containers to speed boxes of containment, the space and time of migration are 
both targeted as a suspended ordering of biopolitical life.  
The making of migration and borders has been further explored in chapter three 
by confronting (b)ordering in the Mediterranean Sea, where migrants’ lives are made 
rescuable and un-rescuable, to then explore their channelling into circuits of (im)mobility 
on land. From hotspots, islands and encampments of camps, I considered the politicised 




(b)ordering of migrants’ presence both spatially and politically. Most importantly, 
Piazzale Maslax represented an ‘experience’ of resistance where migrants and aid 
workers came together to resituate the terms of their political survival. In chapter four, I 
focused on strategies of everyday (b)ordering in Calais where a rationale of survival 
informs the policing of humanitarian interventions: aid workers and their activities are 
minimally tolerated and violently repressed. I concluded this chapter by introducing what 
I call the politics of perseverance: these are the expression of how strategies of (b)ordering 
are being redefined on the ground by migrants with but also without their ‘alliances’ of 
movement. I discussed these emergent politics in greater depth in chapter five.  
Moving away from what (biopolitical) (b)ordering specifies as political life, I 
advanced the idea of life as politics to account for migration as a creative force. Borders 
make migrants but migrants are more than the result of processes of (b)ordering. As such, 
while biopolitics makes limits to what life should be, life as politics expresses what life 
is for those who affirm it as more than governance of ordered survival. Grounded in 
practices of ‘lived experience’, life as politics recovers life not as an object of government 
but as an opportunity to politicise claims to it through nonmovements, escape, 
imperceptible politics, art endeavours and so on. By committing to rethinking the unequal 
effects of (b)ordering, the thesis has sought to ‘cut’ across the injustice of governing life 
and expose the life as politics of those who persevere in making it their own. This 
commitment has been put in writing in the thesis keeping in mind Gramsci’s words about 
the risk of living life with indifference: “I [too] believe that living means taking sides”.1  
 
 




According to Foucault “knowledge is not for knowing, knowledge is for cutting”.2 I take 
this idea for repurposing knowledge to close with two final observations which ‘cut 
through’ some of the dominant discourses I have tried to challenge. 
 
Cut I: Solidarity Struggles 
 
The European Union’s approach to migration has been that of criminalizing not only 
migrants who make demands but also organisations, activists and citizens who, often, 
have been considered to be facilitators of ‘illegal’ migration. In the thesis, I have 
considered alliances between migrants and aid workers, and indirectly artists, considering 
them to be vital to counter or ‘cut through’ (b)ordering practices. The formation of 
collective alliances of migrants and non-migrants is transversal: as Tazzioli also insists, 
there is always a network in support of these struggles even if it is often difficult to 
identify and thinking through “transversal alliances enables de-essentialising migration 
as a supposedly self-standing terrain of struggle or sociological field”.3 In line with this, 
we need to keep in mind that aid grassroots organisations, or humanitarian activists, are 
only few of the actors involved in resisting (b)ordering: citizens, majors, various members 
of civil society, lawyers, doctors, scholars and many other commit in their everyday lives 
to affect change therefore enabling alternative ways of thinking about migrants, their 
struggles, their rights and their (political) agency more broadly.  
 
Cut II: There Is No Sea In Sardinia 
In There Is No Sea In Sardinia, the Sardinian writer Marcello Fois offers a picture of his 
native island that rejects its condition of “Caribbean of the Mediterranean” subjugated to 
a logic of recreation and leisure. In particular, Fois advocates for the necessity of 
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developing a rethinking of Sardinia that opposes the way in which it is reduced to a 
commodity by the dominant imaginary.4 In Fois’s view, the Mediterranean Sea is not 
erased, forgotten or wiped out from geographical maps but it needs to be relativized if we 
want to escape from the trap of reducing Sardinia to a commodifying string of beaches, 
hotels, and all-inclusives at the expenses of a full vista which also includes its daily life 
and daily struggles. For instance, as Fois observes: 
“For those who live [in Sardinia], winter is almost a natural condition. Certainly for those 
who are used to thinking about the emerald Sardinia, about Sardinia as a region with only 
one season, it may seem strange to think about the mountain, the alpine climate, the dry cold, 
the snow…Yet you only have to turn in-land and you can see the mountains that plunge into  
the water”. 5  
 
The effort that Fois asks us to make, in other words, is one of disjunction; he wants us to 
problematise an equation (Sardinia=Sea) that prevents us to see a myriad of ‘things’ that 
the equation itself erases. This analytical move helps us rearticulate discourses about 
people and places from a perspective that accounts for a whole which can tells us a 
different story. In a similar vein, we could look again at other Mediterranean islands like 
Lesbos or Lampedusa or realities akin to Calais or Piazzale Maslax which are closely 
associated with the so-called migration ‘crisis’ and migrants camps, and refuse to just see 
them as hells on earth where the life of victimised or potentially dangerous migrants is 
reduced to its bare essentials. As I have tried to suggest, in fact, these are also places in 
which, amidst many difficulties, resistance and perseverance loom large, dreams are still 
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